TikTok

TikTok is trying to negotiate an agreement with our government that would allow it to continue operations within our nation.

TikTok has been negotiating with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US, an interagency government panel, for more than two years on a way to wall off the company’s data and operations from the Chinese government.

The article’s headline, though, correctly identifies what should be the deal-breaking factor:

TikTok’s Talks With US Have an Unofficial Player: China

The China in question is the People’s Republic of China.

TikTok is a wholly owned subsidiary of ByteDance. ByteDance is a company domiciled in the PRC. The PRC has a 2017 National Intelligence Law that makes all PRC-domiciled companies beholden to the PRC intelligence community for any and all intelligence-gathering and reporting tasks the intel community might choose to levy on the company. That makes TikTok a potential espionage facility operating for the PRC within our nation.

There shouldn’t be any negotiation at all regarding TikTok: there’s nothing to discuss. The “unofficial player” isn’t hidden at all; it’s the PRC with its intelligence-gathering imperative.

Balloons Over the PRC

People’s Republic of China Foreign Minister Qin Gang now is claiming, through his spokesman Wang Wenbin, that

the US had flown high-altitude balloons through its airspace more than 10 times since the start of 2022….

The short answer to that is this: Qin needs to show us the sensor tracking data on these balloons. Otherwise, he’s lying through his spokesman.

COMSEC

COMSEC, COMmunications SECurity, is the practice of protecting communications, and types of communications, no one of which is classified in any way, but that when aggregated with others can reveal classified information, even highly classified information. An example of this, probably apocryphal but illustrative nonetheless, is the WWI allies’ putative practice of reading the Berlin newspaper society pages to see which German general or generals were in Berlin for the opera. The portions of the Western front for which those generals were responsible could be expected to be quiet for the time being.

It’s also the real world case that, during the runup to the Allies’ WWII D-Day invasion, military radio traffic was steadily increased in areas in Great Britain’s southeastern regions in order to make it appear that a (the) military buildup was occurring there rather than where it actually was occurring, a deliberate use of COMSEC (here in combination with OPSEC, OPerations SECurity) weakness to spoof the Germans.

Now we learn that the People’s Republic of China’s People’s Liberation Army has been floating a fleet of spy balloons across the world, listening to communications across five continents (apparently, the winds aloft don’t blow southerly enough to get balloons reliably over Antarctica or Australia). The balloons are capable of geo-locating the origins of the communications they overhear, also.

But over five continents? The PLA likely is interested in the doings of the nations resident on those continents; however, the US remains a global power with installations all over the globe. It’s a safe bet that the primary target of those spy balloons is us and our doings around the world.

COMSEC. It would be highly useful to the PLA were its balloons, or the PLA back home on receipt of the intercepted transmissions, able to decode the communications. It’s enough, though, for the comms to be tracked back to their origins. Those concentrations then reveal sites worth focusing espionage efforts on, efforts ranging from spy shoes on the ground to focused listening from nearby locations (like, perhaps, farmland near government sites or office space near government buildings) to directed observations from orbit. Those concentrations can, on occasion, overtly expose sites of which the PLA hadn’t yet learned the existence.

This is only part of what President Joe Biden (D) deliberately allowed a PLA spy balloon to do for several days a bit over a week ago.

It’s only part of what the NORAD Commander, General Glen VanHerck, deliberately allowed with his failure of judgment in not recognizing that a spy balloon (which he correctly understood it to be) from an enemy nation was [] demonstrating hostile act or hostile intent that would have allowed him to destroy the device after it entered American airspace (not just our ADIZ) over the Aleutian Islands.

‘Twarn’t Me

President Joe Biden (D), in a backhanded acknowledgment that classified documents in his possession got mishandled as he left office in January 2017, now is blaming his staff for the…error.

One of the things that happened is that what was not done well is, as they packed up my offices to move them, they didn’t do the kind of job that should have been done, to go thoroughly through every single piece of literature that’s there. To the best of my knowledge, the kind of things they picked up are things, they’re from 1974, stray papers. There may be something else, I don’t know.”

Couple things about that. One is that it was Biden’s office, not theirs; it was his responsibility to see that the packing was done properly. That’s not a responsibility he can pass off onto others.

The other thing, the larger thing, is why Biden still had those classified documents still in his possession at that late date? Why hadn’t he already returned them, signed them back into their vault?

And: now he’s saying he might still have classified documents from as far back as 1974? Might? Doesn’t he know?

Whatever. Those will be somebody else’s fault, too.

Aiding an Enemy Nation

In the present case, it’s technically legal, but it’s strictly wrong.

The People’s Republic of China is a global leader in the development of artificial intelligence, and it’s on the way to becoming the global leader. AI has a number of uses of which the PRC is taking advantage, including surveillance of citizens and fighting battles and entire wars.

Despite this threat to our nation’s security, American businesses and investors have comprised more than 40% of the 400 international investments in PRC AI, and those 400 investments were 17% of total international investment in PRC AI.

Here, per the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, are the top 10 American investors in PRC AI—companies that put their lucre acquisition ahead of our nation’s security:

The CSET has reported further that

Collectively, observed transactions involving US investors totaled $40.2 billion invested into 251 Chinese AI companies, which accounts for 37 percent of the $110 billion raised by all Chinese AI companies.

And [emphasis added]

such financial activity, commercial linkages, and the tacit expertise that transfers from US-based funders to target companies in China’s booming AI ecosystem carry implications that extend beyond the business sector. Earlier stage VC investments in particular can provide intangible benefits beyond capital, including mentorship and coaching, name recognition, and networking opportunities. As such, US outbound investment in Chinese technology, and particularly AI, merits additional attention and tracking.

This comes after Google, for instance, infamously refused to continue a contract with the US’ Department of Defense to develop battlefield-capable artificial intelligence packages while continuing actively to support the PRC’s citizen-surveillance and military AI development. Alphabet’s subsequent words and actions concerning its now wholly owned subsidiary now being willing to work with DoD do nothing to mitigate, much less correct, that infamy.