Law and Trump’s EO Regarding Travel Delays

The 4th Circuit Appellate Court is hearing the Trump administration’s appeal of Hawaii and Maryland Federal trial judges’ preliminary injunctions blocking implementation of the President Donald Trump’s second Executive Order imposing a temporary travel delay of its own on persons from six Middle East nations from entering the United States (with provisions for case-by-case exceptions).  Even though Hawaii is in the 9th Circuit and not the 4th, I’m using the Hawaii ruling as my example here since the Maryland ruling is substantially the same, the Hawaii ruling is more readily available, and I’m lazy.

Judge Derrick Watson’s Hawaii ruling can be read here, and from that ruling…[emphasis added]

Because a reasonable, objective observer—enlightened by the specific historical context, contemporaneous public statements, and specific sequence of events leading to its issuance—would conclude that the Executive Order was issued with a purpose to disfavor a particular religion, in spite of its stated, religiously-neutral purpose….

No truly reasonable, objective observer would read any of that into the EO’s stated, religiously-neutral purpose because no truly reasonable, objective observer would go beyond the plain meaning of the words to seek clearer understanding of them unless those words, as present, were unclear.  The word here are plainly clear; outside words are less than irrelevant; their importation here is inappropriate.  Judges must apply the law (here, the EO) as it is written and not in accordance with their personal moral precepts.  To do the latter is a blatant violation of their oaths of office.

To determine whether the Executive Order runs afoul of that command [the Establishment Clause], the Court is guided by the three-part test for Establishment Clause claims set forth in Lemon v Kurtzman….

The applicability of the Lemon test is nonexistent because the Establishment Clause is irrelevant to this case.  Aside from the fact that the EO, by design and declaration, has no religion-related purpose, the EO applies solely and strictly to foreign nationals who are outside the US.  That means they also are outside the United States’ jurisdiction.  That means the Constitution and its tenets and requirements do not apply to those foreign nationals.

For the court to assert that our Constitution reaches beyond our borders, for this court to claim our government has jurisdiction over persons (and by extension, to nations?) outside our borders runs contrary to our nation’s policies, contrary to international law, contrary to the very principles of what it means to be a citizen of a nation—especially for those persons who are citizens of a nation other than our own.

The 4th Circuit should overrule.

Syrian Refugees

One Syrian, Kassem Eid an erstwhile media activist in Syria, and a victim of the gas attack that was Bashar al-Assad’s calling of then-President Barack Obama’s (D) bluff of a “red” line and that exposed Obama has being too timid to back his words, had a thought about aid and support to Syria’s refugees in a recent Wall Street JournalHere’s the money quote.

America, if you really care about refugees, then take to the streets, call your representatives, and ask for even further action against the murderer who displaced us. President Trump could order strikes to fully ground Assad’s air force, whose bombing forces civilians to flee. The Assad regime still has more than a dozen operational military airports from which to continue its attacks. Help civilians by creating safe zones and no-fly zones.

If you really care about human rights, work to remove Assad, the tyrant who has killed, raped, gassed, burned, tortured and displaced millions of civilians. If you really care about eliminating Islamic State, oust the dictator who for years has supported extremist terrorist groups like al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah and who buys oil from ISIS.

Because, as Eid emphasized at the start of his piece,

Syrians—like the people in the other Arab Spring countries—didn’t rebel against the dictatorship as a way to gain entry to the US as refugees. We rebelled because we wanted to live for the first time as equal citizens in our own nation. We wanted to stay home and make Syria a better place.

What he said.

YGTBSM

This episode is from Newark Mayor Ras Baraka (D).  He claimed last Sunday, with a straight face that

Attorney General Jeff Sessions is “targeting” mayors like himself, and intimidating them into being “fugitive slave catchers that run around and do their bidding in our cities.”

Milwaukee County, WI, Sheriff David Clarke was more polite than I:

I’ve heard a lot of stupid things [but] comparing fugitive slaves to illegal immigrants is the gold standard of stupidity[.]

I say, rather, that Baraka’s TDS has turned him into an irrational election-denier.

A Test

In South Dakota v Dole, the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal government could not withhold already committed funds from States in amounts that could coerce the States into obeying Federal diktats, such withholdings were legal but only in amounts that would be persuasive rather than coercive (as an aside, the Court did not get around to identifying a threshold or a threshold region that would separate the coercive from the merely persuasive).

Attorney General Jeff Sessions said Monday that he was reaffirming a[n]…Obama-era policy that threatened to pull grants from jurisdictions that bar officials from communicating with federal agencies about immigration, and implied that more sweeping rules were coming. He also said the Justice Department would try to take back previously granted funding from places that don’t comply with the communications law.

Sessions’ rationale seems entirely reasonable, on one plane.

When cities and states refuse to help enforce immigration laws, our nation is less safe.  I strongly urge our nation’s states and cities and counties to consider carefully the harm they are doing to their citizens by refusing to enforce our immigration laws and to rethink these policies.

There are, though, a couple of problems with this, one legal and one political (and political philosophical).  The legal problem stems from that Supreme Court ruling.  While the inability to coerce was applied in a matter involving coercion of States, the extension of the principle to jurisdictions below States is straightforward.  If the Federal government cannot coerce States, it cannot bypass the State governments to coerce lesser jurisdictions within (and generally bound by) a State government.

The political problem is this—and it’s the larger problem in my view, since Court rulings can be overruled by later Courts.  Just how much do we want, in our federated form of governance—the 10th Amendment—and the sovereignty of We the People—our Constitution’s Preamble and the 9th Amendment—the Federal government to be able to coerce the States and lesser jurisdictions?

It seems entirely legitimate to prevent coercively a State or lower jurisdiction from flouting federal law, from disobeying it.  Forcing it to actively enforce federal law seems a different matter.  Where is the threshold?

If this level of coercion is appropriate or legitimate, how about that level of coercion?  If coercing States, et al., regarding immigration questions is OK, what about coercing States, et al., regarding gun (control) rights?  Speech?  Drinking ages (that South Dakota thing again)?  And on and on?

Where would it stop?  What is Sessions’ limiting principle?  What is the Federal government’s?

Partial Immigration Moratorium

The irrationality of some Federal District judges is being made palpable by their rulings against the latest Executive Order involving a temporary moratorium on folks from six terrorist- and terrorism-supporting countries.  Here’s one example, from US District Judge Derrick Watson in Hawaii:

The illogic of the Government’s contentions is palpable.  The notion that one can demonstrate animus toward any group of people only by targeting all of them at once is fundamentally flawed.

Yet he chose not to explain his own logic, nor did he deign explain the limiting principle he holds underlying this claim.  Indeed, he explicitly refused to explain himself:

The Court declines to relegate its Establishment Clause analysis to a purely mathematical exercise.

Thus: the illogic of the judge’s contention is palpable.  The notion that one can demonstrate animus toward entire groups of people by only targeting some of them is fundamentally flawed.

How small a minority of the group can be targeted without the judge deeming the entire group targeted?  Is targeting only terrorists in a group a necessary targeting of the entire group?  Is targeting a single individual—rightly or wrongly; that’s what trials are for, after all—necessarily a targeting of the entire group to which he belongs?

And which group in which he has membership—Islam?  Sunni Muslim?  His fellow citizens of a nation?  The group comprised of fellow members of his gender?  All groups?

Where is the limiting threshold?  Watson chose not to say.

And this:

[P]lainly-worded statements, made in the months leading up to and contemporaneous with the signing of the Executive Order, and, in many cases, made by the Executive himself, betray the Executive Order’s stated secular purpose.

Here is the judge dragging into the case things that are not in the case at all.  The matters before the judge are the Executive Order and its constitutional legitimacy and nothing else.  Campaign rhetoric, marketing commentary, are not relevant.  What is relevant–all that is relevant–are the plain text of the EO, existing immigration law, and the Constitution.  Full stop.

This judge has ruled solely on personal ideological grounds and not at all on the legality of the matter.  Ideology, political matters–policy–are for the political branches of Government, not for the judicial–as Article III makes plain.