Category Archives: foreign policy

I Disagree with Israel

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Per a Wall Street Journal article centered on Israel’s revised war plans vis-à-vis Hamas, this appears to be at those plans’ core:

…a series of escalatory steps to gradually ratchet up pressure on Hamas now that talks to extend a seven-week cease-fire have stalled, plans that could lead to a resumption of hostilities in the 16-month war in the Gaza Strip.

The steps, supposedly:

• block the entry of goods and supplies into Gaza
• cut off electricity and water
• campaign of airstrikes and tactical raids against Hamas targets
• displace the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who have used the cease-fire to return to their homes
• re-invade Gaza with far more military power than it has deployed so far in the conflict
• hold ground and effectively occupy territory while it attacks the remnants of Hamas

Even if it’s only something like that, gradual escalation, at its core, is a mistake: it gives the enemy time to adapt to the revising situation. Even if the escalatory pace is faster than the enemy’s OODA Loop, that leaves too much room for the enemy to catch up from the first, or first very few, response deficits. It’s necessary IMNSHO to apply maximum pressure at maximum pacing from the start. Leave no room at all for the enemy to adapt to the new and levels of violence and pacing of their application.

This is particularly the case when dealing with a terrorist entity whose avowed purpose in life is the extermination of Israel with no concern whatsoever for the cost to the civilians among whom these terrorists secrete themselves.

What Makes a Match?

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In a Wall Street Journal article centered on the possibility of Germany acquiring its own nuclear weapons, the news writer had this remark:

[W]ith warheads in the low hundreds, neither the British nor the French arsenals are a match for Russia’s nearly 6,000 warheads.

This comparison is silly. How many targets does Russia face? How many targets in Russia do the UK or France, or potentially Germany, face, whether individually or together?

The match is whether the Europeans have enough warheads and delivery systems to survive an initial Russian attack targeted on those systems, to launch against targets in Russia (and Belorussia and Kaliningrad, since Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons there), to relaunch against targets necessitated by systems failures, and to launch again against additional targets in successive waves. Especially that last, since Russian doctrine, inherited from Soviet doctrine, specifies that nuclear war is winnable and that it will be won by successive waves of nuclear attacks rather than a single spasm of everything launched.

It may be that low hundreds are insufficient for that, but it’s unlikely that 6,000 are necessary.

Ignorance of Opinionators

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In the excerpt of her opinion piece in the New Yorker that is quoted in The Wall Street Journal‘s Notable and Quotable section last Sunday, Susan Glasser decried the relative quiescence in DC compared to other nation’s capitals regarding President Donald Trump’s (R) foreign policy moves.

There were no major protests in the quiescent capital…. These acts were a far cry from the popular uprisings that presumably would have convulsed Paris or any other European city if the President of the republic suddenly and unilaterally reoriented the nation’s geopolitical strategy, turned on its major trading partners, and allowed the world’s richest man to cut hundreds of thousands of federal workers and billions of dollars in government services.

Unilaterally reoriented? Never mind the petty cultural differences between the United States and European nations. Those nations’ governments do not have their legislatures and Executives as separate, coequal branches of government. Instead, those nations blur the lines between the two, with many explicitly subordinating the Executive function to the legislative.

The United States is the only nation that separates the Legislative, Executive—and the Judicial (see Great Britain for a subordinated judicial function)—into their separate and equal authority branches. In our Executive in particular, those functions with foreign policy input—State, Defense, Commerce, and some others—are explicitly subordinate to, not equal functions with, the Chief Executive of that Branch, the President of the United States.

And yet she bleated, how dare the chief of foreign policy in our system of governance be the one making foreign policy decisions instead of surrendering that responsibility to a subordinate or to a committee of subordinates?

Glasser’s ignorance of the hierarchical nature and structure of the American Executive Branch is astounding.

“Gambling with World War III”

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President Donald Trump really screwed the pooch on this one. In a public Oval Office meeting with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Trump and his Vice President JD Vance ambushed Zelenskyy and blew up any hope of a peace that serves the Ukrainian people.

Trump repeatedly berated the Ukrainian leader as “not ready for peace,” for having “disrespected” the United States and for “gambling with World War III.”

No. It’s those who back down in the face of Putin’s threats who are gambling with WWIII. It is ex-President Joe Biden (D), too many European government managers, and now Trump who repeatedly accede to Putin’s demands lest he strike at them, thereby giving credence to his threats. Never mind that every time one of those politicians dipped a toe over a Putin red line—authorizing transfers of weapons to which Putin objected, authorizing attacks inside Russia, and so on—Putin…didn’t strike.

It’s Vance’s timidity in rejecting Zelenskyy’s offer for him to go to the Ukrainian front, to go to places like Bucha, Staryi Bykiv, Zabuchchya, Vorzel, the Kharkiv region, and I add, in no particular order, places like Bakhmut, Mariupol (surely Putin would let him in if there’s really nothing to see there), Odesa, Kakhovka Dam on the Dnieper River, Berdiansk (again Putin would let him visit—wouldn’t he?), and any of the plethora of hospitals, schools, apartment buildings that the barbarian has deliberately attacked. Vance hid behind the claim that such tours are just propaganda events. He could have, instead, agreed to the visits on condition that he go unannounced with no notice of any particular places, and on arrival he go wherever he chose to go on the spur of the moment, a stipulation to which Zelenskyy would have agreed readily. But no. Vance said no. Terrifying to have one’s world view challenged by facts. That’s gambling with WWIII.

Zelenskyy, however, has returned to his nation, where he routinely visits the front and the scenes of battle and of civilian carnage. And, unfortunately, he returned empty handed courtesy of the hysteria and timidity of Trump and Vance.

Which raises the question: with this steady backing away in front of Putin by Trump and by central and western Europe (yes, yes, Europe’s other nations natter on about supporting Ukraine, but so far only with words and a trickle of materiel), and so after Russia has gained control over the bulk of Europe from those backings away, when Putin threatens us if we don’t accede to his demands, what will Trump do then, with no nation left to support us? Will he surrender us to the barbarian, too, as he’s demanding Zelenskyy surrender his nation to the barbarian at the outset of this shameful chain? That, too, is Trump gambling with WWIII.

Some Thoughts on our Trade Imbalance

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Phil Gramm and Donald Boudreaux had an extensive op-ed in last Thursday’s Wall Street Journal. I have a couple of thoughts on their piece.

Overall, they presented a typical argument regarding international trade balances, and it was sound as far as it goes. However, I’ve never seen an argument for or against US trade deficits/surpluses that take into account the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.

For international trade, how much, really, are local currencies traded for dollars in order to purchase American goods and how much are local dollars traded for foreign currencies in order for Americans to buy foreign goods? How much of those currency exchanges are really just taps of the foreign nation’s dollars held as reserves and similarly replenished into those reserves through ordinary trade-of-goods-and-services exchanges? In other words, how much to buyers and sellers themselves do the currency exchanges and how much of those currency exchanges are actually done from government to government out of government reserve holdings?

Maybe a lot is government to government, maybe a little, but the question needs answers.

Also this:

Has the expansion of global trade “hollowed out” US manufacturing, as Joe Biden claimed in 2022? No. US industrial production today is more than double what it was in 1975, the last time we ran a trade surplus.

What is produced by today’s “industrial production” compared to that of 1975? Or immediately after WWII? That never gets specified. Nor does “industrial production” ever get normalized to account for changes in technology and manufacturing techniques.

A similar definition disconnect exists for services.

Until those specifications are made, claims of industrial production or services changes in either direction are meaningless.