Germany…Dithers

…on the matter of helping protect freedom of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and, presumably, up into the Arabian Gulf.

Great Britain, in an effort that parallels the US’ efforts, is proposing a European naval mission to the region to protect European oil tankers.  Germany isn’t sure.  On the one hand, Norbert Röttgen, Bundestag Committee on Foreign Affairs Chairman, says

Our prosperity lives on free shipping.  And we have to make clear that we stand alongside our British friends, partners and allies who are affected. There must be joint European action.

But the US might be involved, so he dithers:

Unfortunately, there are fundamental differences in Iran policy with the US, which is why we can’t cooperate with the US just like that.

No, can’t have that.

The Social Democrats are more open about their reluctance to participate. Karl-Heinz Brunner, SPD member of the Bundestag Committee on Defense:

A German participation is currently neither necessary nor opportune. Of course, securing free trade routes is extremely important, but I am convinced that this would also be possible by diplomatic means. In the current situation, military options could contribute to further destabilization.

Yeah, Iran is open to diplomacy—so long as everyone does exactly what Iran diplomatically says.  Besides, if we took concrete action to defend German or European interests, we might angrify the pirates.

Can’t have that, either.

‘Course, Germany really doesn’t have a dog in this hunt, anyway—it gets most of its oil from Russia.

Update: Germany has decided not to join any coalition ensuring free sea navigation in the Strait of Hormuz or the Arabian Gulf.  Foreign Minister Heiko Maas:

“Germany will not take part in the sea mission presented and planned by the United States,” Maas told reporters during a trip to Poland.
The German government said it remains in close consultation with France and the UK over a European approach to the freedom of navigation crisis in the Persian Gulf.

Close consultation. Chit chat. I’ve already pointed out whence German oil comes.

Trump’s Dispute with Cummings

Rebecca Ballhaus and Catherine Lucey asked whether President Donald Trump’s tweets about Congressman and House Oversight Committee Chairman Elijah Cummings (D, MD) were personal.

After Cummings’ scurrilous attack on the integrity—and the humanity—of DHS Secretary Kevin McAleenan followed by Cummings’ cowardly denial of any opportunity to respond by McAleenan, you bet Trump’s response was personal.

But its more: Trump’s tweet barrage against Cummings is deeply personal because Cummings’ despicable behavior and his terrible failure to perform for his constituents is deeply personal. It’s real people in those terrible Baltimore slums—real constituents of Cummings—who Cummings personally is abusing with his failure to perform. I grew up in Kankakee, and Chicago’s South Side slums were never this bad in terms of living conditions.

As to Trump speaking particularly against minority lawmakers, as Ballhaus’ and Lucey’s subheadline had it, this is plainly erroneous. Trump is criticizing lawmakers. The only ones bringing up their “minority” status are these two authors. Why is that, I wonder?

Or, do Ballhaus and Lucey really think House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D, CA) and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D, NY) are minority lawmakers? Or Congressman Eric Swalwell (D, CA)?

Trade Talks

The People’s Republic of China wants to slow-walk these negotiations in the expectation that their delay will get them better terms.

Beijing, while wanting to appear willing to negotiate, thinks it can extract better terms by not hurrying into concessions, according to Chinese experts and others briefed on the talks.

The PRC’s attitude, though, seems counterproductive.

Since negotiations faltered in May, Chinese officials have said that for any eventual trade deal, the US must be reasonable about the amount of goods China can purchase and must remove all the tariffs placed on Chinese exports in the dispute.

“Being reasonable:” we can remove tariffs when the PRC stops subsidizing its domestic production to yield artificially low prices on its exports.  We can remove tariffs when the PRC stops stealing our intellectual property and technologies and stops extorting technology transfers as a condition of doing business with/in the PRC.  We don’t have to sell anything to the PRC, and the PRC doesn’t have to purchase anything from us.  They constitute a very large market, to be sure, but what’s the value of that market when they’re just going to rip us off with those practices?  And then threaten us and our allies and friends militarily and politically—and economically—with the result of those thefts?

But sure, the PRC can go slow. After all, the longer the PRC stalls, the more time there will be for producers to move their PRC production facilities to other, cheaper and more flexible venues.  The longer the PRC stall, the more time there will be for sellers—like our farmers—to sell into markets other than the PRC.

The longer the PRC stalls, the more time there will be for its economy to slow.

The longer the PRC stalls, the more PRC governance failures—Hong Kong, PRC concentration camps for Uighurs, overt threats against the Republic of China, seizure and occupation of other nations’ South China Sea islands and of the Sea itself are just a few—will dominate the public discourse, exposing PRC government “trustworthiness.”

And the harder the terms from the US will become.