Humanitarian, or…?

The Cuban government released 2,000 prisoners from its jails in conjunction with Easter celebrations (I’m writing this on Friday in anticipation of the government having followed through on its Friday plans).

Cuba’s Communist government said on Thursday that it would free 2,010 prisoners from its jails in a “humanitarian and sovereign gesture” as it carries out negotiations with the Trump administration.

The cynic in me has doubts regarding any humanitarian motive. I see two others. One is that this is just a PR move of no further import than virtue signaling and trying to curry favors, even though it might be good for those released.

“Might be” brings me to the second motive. The Cuban government can no longer support the prisoners it holds, even in the truly deplorable conditions extant in Cuban jails, so it’s dumping them out onto the street and into an economy that also cannot support them, much less support the not-jailed Cuban population.

Another Issue

Recall the theft of nearly 414,000 units of KitKat bars while enroute from Poland to Italy. Nestlé and other companies publicized and otherwise reacted to the theft with humor, turning the theft into a marketing success for those companies.

Nestlé, though, has not lost sight of the seriousness of the matter.

Nestlé said it had publicized the incident with humor to raise awareness around the more serious issue of thievery. In this case, it added, the risks are low since the theft won’t affect supply and the chocolate bars can be traced by unique product codes.
“Whilst we appreciate the criminals’ exceptional taste, the fact remains that cargo theft is an escalating issue for businesses of all sizes,” the company said.

My paranoid (or conspiracy theorist) mind has an additional concern, though. For all that the stolen bars can be traced by their product codes, those bars would make excellent devices with which to attack children by inserting nefarious items into the bars, items ranging from drugs to ground glass to metal shavings or staples. Keep in mind the dangers of Halloween candies. This could become an extension of that.

When is a Strategic Strength a Strategic Vulnerability?

The lede laid out the misconception:

The oil states of the Persian Gulf have made great strides to diversify their economies in recent years, but they have also created a new vulnerability: more strategic targets for Iran to hit.

More targets to hit? Sure. But attacking them dilutes and dissipates any ability to attack a choke point in any economy, to seriously degrade or to destroy a Critical Item in an economy. Indeed, by diversifying, an economy’s single or a couple of Critical Items are eliminated, and what replaces them are a larger number of Important Components to that economy.

But that number protects the economy as a whole, and so strengthens the targeted nation: it will suffer economic losses, but it has become much harder to shut down.

When is a strategic strength a strategic vulnerability? Not this time.

A False Perception

I’ve been over this before, but it bears repeating in light of President Trump’s (R) and SecState Marco Rubio’s contemplating the US leaving NATO altogether. The misperception is this:

The alliance’s lifeblood is its deterrent credibility: the perception by potential adversaries that attacking a NATO member would likely trigger a war with the full alliance, including the US.

As the news writer noted a bit later in his paragraph, though, this is a chimera, one that I claim is dangerous by its existence.

The alliance’s political promise to defend its members goes beyond the flexible wording of its famous Article 5, which says that each country in NATO would help a member that is attacked by taking “such action as it deems necessary.”

The relevant part of Article V is this:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence…will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

“Such action” includes—but does not require—a military response.

Congress passed, in 2023 under the Biden administration, a law requiring a two-thirds vote of the Senate agreeing before the US could withdraw from NATO. The law has questionable constitutionality, interfering as it does with the President’s constitutional Article II role as our nation’s Chief Executive and our military’s Commander-in-Chief. This question is easily sidestepped, though, simply by adhering to the flexible wording of the NATO treaty’s Article V and declining to commit American military to a fight, confining our response, instead, to diplomatic words of demurral regarding an attack on other members.

Iran’s Nuclear “Dust”

President Donald Trump (R) has repeatedly stated that one of the three goals for our war against Iran is the permanent destruction of Iran’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons. A critical part of that is for Iran to turn over all of its accumulated enriched uranium, some of which is enriched to 60% of what is needed for weapons grade purity. In conjunction with that, Trump is contemplating sending ground forces in to forcibly seize that enriched uranium.

Iran’s enriched uranium is reported to be stored in propane cylinder-sized containers and that those containers are in just a couple of sites, both of which the US Air Force so devastatingly hammered last summer. Which raises a couple of thoughts in my mind.

Stipulate, arguendo, that our ground forces can get in and out in the few days it would take to penetrate those two sites (whose physical accesses have been closed to some depth by those bombing attacks) with no or minimal casualties.

What is the quality, really, of the intel that says that uranium remains in only those two sites? Iran had, after all, more than a few days heads up that the attacks were coming, during which those containers could have been removed and disbursed among a number of new storage sites?

In conjunction with that, what intel do we have regarding the possibility that, having removed those cylinders in advance, the enriched uranium hasn’t been further disbursed among a number of smaller containers—expensive as that might be and cumbersome in handling that might make the “dust?”

Finally, having penetrated those two storage sites, what planning has been devoted to a) collecting further intel regarding Iran’s nuclear weapons development that would still be present in the form of equipment types and research and production documents, and b) setting the relevant explosives to further collapse altogether those remaining chambers? What planning has been devoted to, on the way back out of those sites, (re)collapsing those entry tunnels and doing so to a much greater depth than those earlier bombs had achieved?