Go to Trial

In the “legal” battle between Larry Ellison’s Paramount on the one hand and California, et al,, on the other over whether Paramount’s acquisition of Warner Brothers amounts to an anticompetitive monopoly, as California AG Rob Bonta claims, Ellison is pushing for a 4 November trial start date while Bonta and his fellow attorneys general in this case are holding out for a 5 April of next year start date.

Consider, though: Paramount, as part of the acquisition deal, agreed to pay Warner Brothers $650 million per quarter for every quarter the deal stays unclosed after 7 September this year, and a final payment of $7 billion, if the deal collapses or remains unclosed by June of next year. That’s what put the quote marks around the legal part just above.

If the defendant is ready to go to trial in early November, then that’s when the trial should start. That the defendant shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury is explicit in our Constitution for criminal cases, but the principle holds just as firmly in civil cases. California, et al., don’t get to delay the trial at government’s convenience.

Aside from that, they were ready to go to trial, tautologically, when they filed their suit. Delaying five months is nothing but an unethical effort to delay, delay, delay for the sole purpose of running up the costs to the defendant—hoping, perhaps to spend the defendant into giving up—for its impertinence in insisting on defending itself.

A Success from which to Learn

This bit, regarding Ukraine’s battlefield success flowing from Ukraine’s achieving drone dominance in the barbarian’s invasion lays out the success in question:

Ukraine’s rapid adoption of drone technology in warfare, as well as its rapid manufacturing build-out to produce them, is a success that US military officials wish to learn from in order to boost America’s own production and prepare its troops for future conflict.

Some factors of that success obtain in Ukraine that don’t exist in the US. One, that overarches the rest, is Ukraine’s smaller size, relative to us.

Another is that Ukraine’s government has—with that nation’s existence on the line and so clarifying many minds at the top—far less bureaucracy in the way: no acquisition bureaucracy in contrast with our Pentagon’s acquisition satrap whose bureaucrats seem more interested in protecting their bureaucratic turf than they are in getting weapons for our military, no contracting bureaucracy in contrast with our Pentagon’s contracting satrap whose bureaucrats seem more interested in protecting their bureaucratic turf than they are in getting effective weapons contracts signed to produce weapons for our military, a design bureau (for lack of a better term) that produces, authorizes, and encourages input ranging from ideas to developed designs from soldiers at the combat front and the supply and logistics front, in contrast with our Pentagon’s design satrap whose bureaucrats seem more interested in protecting their bureaucratic turf while being, at the same time, entirely too malleable by large defense contractors who constantly evolve their designs in order to plus up their contracts and the income from them, than those bureaucrats are in getting quality designs for our weapons and then freezing those designs for actual production.

Then there’s the political aspect. Ukraine’s size isn’t conducive to balkanizing supply chains and production facilities in response to its politicians’ push to get those projects for their districts. American politicians are infamous for holding up, even killing, useful weapons projects if they can’t get some or all of a project’s production set up in their State or district.

These are obvious lessons, easily learned, but they won’t be easily implemented.

One More Thought on our Second Amendment

The thought coalesced, finally, on reading a post over at Grim’s Hall, a blog I strongly recommend on GPs.

A problem I’ve had with Bruen from the start, hanging its hat on historical tradition as it does, is that the opinion, thereby, accepts as constitutionally legitimate any weapon regulation, so long as it’s been historically long-standing.

The Second Amendment carries no such caveat or exception, though. Its bar on the government is universal and unequivocal: the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. The first attempt to regulate that right should have been ruled unconstitutional. It’s not too late today.

…7th Circuit recently upheld Illinois’ ban, noting that the ubiquitous firearm from 1791 through the mid-19th century was a single-shot muzzleloader. AR-15s with large-capacity magazines, the majority said, are “a far cry from these antecedents.”

This seems to me a patently erroneous argument by the Sages of the Seventh Circuit. The Founders, along with, especially, those members of the first Congress who wrote the Second Amendment, along with the People who ratified it, were no strangers to innovation and to technological advancement. Yet no one in any of the courts that I’ve seen have addressed the premise that with that broad awareness, and against the backdrop of so many of the Continental Army’s and Navy’s large weapons systems employed in the just-concluded Revolutionary War were privately owned, the Amendment was written to be technologically agnostic.

That backdrop, those large weapon systems being privately owned, strikes me as the only valid historical tradition.

That’s the Point

A couple of letter writers in Thursday’s WSJ are spot on.

One writes,

[The] vital principle of representation was brought into our Senate, which wasn’t simply a more select gathering than the House of Representatives, but also a gathering of the representatives of organized places (states), many far from each other, and no less divergent in culture and livelihood.

The Democratic Socialists of America’s proposals to abolish the Senate and concentrate power in the hands of the urban dole-masters amount to a formula for the dissolution of our country.

That is, indeed, the goal of the DSA. In addition to abolishing the Senate, they want to abolish our borders, defund—abolish—our local police forces, and tear down our prisons. That would most certainly destroy our nation.

Another writes,

Can DSA members take the Congressional Oath of Office honestly? They must “solemnly swear” that “I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.” It’s hard to see how an adherent to the DSA’s written platform could swear that earnestly, even believably.

In essence, the very first act of a DSA Congressman or Senator on his ascendancy to office would be to commit perjury during his swearing in.

The DSA’s platform can be read here. Understand, too, that the DSA’s platform is rapidly becoming the platform of the Progressive-Democratic Party, as the two continue to merge into each other.

Markets and Refs

Greg Ip has a problem with Kevin Warsh’s so-far performance as the new Fed Chair.

Warsh’s analogy of the Fed simply calling balls and strikes, borrowed from future Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts, doesn’t work. The Fed isn’t a neutral umpire, it is the most important player in the game.

I have a problem with Ip’s problem. He went on.

Markets respond not just to data but how they think the Fed will respond to data. Investors plug each new bit of information into the Fed’s assumed “reaction function,” which then spits out the appropriate interest rate.

That’s part of what needs to change: “markets”—which is to say investors and business management teams—need to respond to the actual economy, not what one or another arm of government (however independent or not that arm might be) is doing. They need to stop playing the ref so much and work from the economy a whole lot more. It’ll take a bit for them to learn that and then how to do that.

The Fed doesn’t have a role refereeing the markets, in any event. The Fed’s job is to maintain price stability and employment stability, which it does by setting its benchmarks at levels consistent with its long term inflation goal. Its role does not include manipulating the market’s response to those benchmark rate moves.