Removing the DA from the Case

That’s what a Georgia State appellate court has done with Fani Willis. She’s off the case she had brought against former President and present President-elect Donald Trump (R) over his alleged interference with the results of the 2020 Presidential election. (She’s appealing the matter to the State Supreme Court.)

The court ruled, in part, that she needed to be removed because the

remedy crafted by the trial court to prevent an ongoing appearance of impropriety did nothing to address the appearance of impropriety that existed at times when DA Willis was exercising her broad pretrial discretion about who to prosecute and what charges to bring.

The appellate court also did not toss the case itself. Inconvenient as this will be for Trump, it actually has the potential to work strongly for his benefit. It’ll be better for the case to be tossed on its (lack of) merits than on the technicality of tossing it as punishment of the prosecutors. The latter outcome would leave the question of Trump’s alleged interference hanging. Winning the case outright, or getting it tossed because no other Georgia prosecutor wants to touch it, would put the question to rest in all of our minds save those of pressmen and Never-Trump hysterics.

Not Necessarily

The Supreme Court has the case of Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v Eagle County, which concerns an 88-mile railway bringing oil and farm goods out of rural Utah. It’s wholly contained within Utah. Colorado’s Eagle County is suing to block the Utah railway on the claim that the National Environmental Policy Act required the Surface Transportation Board to

analyze possible impacts as far away as the Gulf Coast, where the exported oil might be refined, and the environmental effects of “long-term employment and commercial activity” resulting from the railway.

The DC Circuit (! not the 10th Circuit, which includes both Utah and Colorado) agreed with Eagle County, which is why the case now is in front of the Supreme Court.

The Seven County argument is that

it shouldn’t have to analyze the environmental impact of anything not directly associated with railroads. It should be responsible only for the “proximate effects” of development over which it has regulatory authority.

The WSJ editors went on at length about why and how circuit ruling should be reversed, but they began with this:

[E]stablishing a predictable principle to guide future decisions about infrastructure development and prevent further litigation will be difficult. Litigants will have to parry a barrage of unpredictable hypotheticals….

Not necessarily. The guiding principle is clearly laid out by the Seven Counties: if the alleged environmental impact of a thing isn’t directly associated with that thing, there’s no analysis needed of that allegation. Full stop.

Regarding those “unpredictables,” there already is case law barring speculative lawsuits. Indeed, the Supreme Court already has repeatedly held that agencies needn’t consider indirect and unpredictable impact, most recently in Department of Transportation v Public Citizen. If litigation still gets out of hand, SLAP sanctions are available.

Eagle County’s case is just another of those quibbles for interference’s sake that the Court needs to stoutly chastise along with reversing the DC Circuit’s ruling.

Rifles and the 2nd Amendment

The Wall Street Journal‘s Sunday editorial, AR-15 Rifles and the Constitution, is centered on the potential for the Supreme Court to take up the question of whether AR-15s, and semi-automatic rifles in general, are protected by the 2nd Amendment of our Constitution. My commentary here is centered on Judge Harvie Wilkinson III, who wrote the 4th Circuit’s en banc opinion upholding a Maryland law that bans the sale and possession of “assault weapons.” He wrote that such rifles

fall outside the ambit of protection offered by the Second Amendment because, in essence, they are military-style weapons designed for sustained combat operations that are ill-suited and disproportionate to the need for self-defense.

He’s both factually wrong on this, and he, like activist judges before and alongside him, distort the 2nd Amendment’s protections to reinterpret that Amendment to say what he wants it to say rather than what it actually says. Here’s the actual text of the 2nd Amendment:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

Wilkinson’s factual error: AR-15s and the like are not at all military-style weapons designed for sustained combat operations. They were developed around the same time as the Army’s then-new M-16, but the latter was designed for full automatic use, whereas the AR-15s of the industry were designed explicitly for civilian use in civilian environments and are wholly incapable of (full) automatic operation. They require a brand new, subsequent, trigger pull in order to fire a second round—it’s a new trigger pull for each individual round that’s fired. The only automation in the sequence is the same as with any other semi-automatic firearm (pistols, for instance): it automatically chambers the next round.

Now for Wilkinson’s cynical redefinition reinterpretation of what the Amendment says. The amendment says in so many words—and in only those words—the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. There is not a syllable in that bar, not the veriest minim of a pen stroke, that gives the government any authority at all to say what our needs are in our keeping and bearing Arms. Wilkinson’s writing is nothing more than a power grab for government and an attempt to amend our Constitution from the bench by an activist judge.

But Wilkinson wasn’t done.

Compared to a handgun, the AR-15 is heavier, longer, harder to maneuver in tight quarters, less readily accessible in an emergency, and more difficult to operate with one hand[.]

This is wholly irrelevant and only cynically offered in his effort to rewrite our 2nd Amendment from his august bench. To repeat: Wilkinson, nor any other judge, has any authority to tell us what our needs are and to presume to limit us to those judge-manufactured needs.

On the other hand, Wilkinson’s entire argument in that last is an argument for legal keeping and bearing Uzis and machine pistols: those weapons are most assuredly lighter, shorter, easer to maneuver in tight quarters, more readily accessible in an emergency, and easier to operate with one hand than those judge-hated rifles.

This is an appellate decision that badly needs reversal by the Supreme Court and a stern admonition by that Court for judges who persist in entertaining such quibbles and outright distortions of our Constitution.

A Bad Ruling

US District Judge Richard Bennett (Maryland District) ruled that the US Naval Academy can continue to use race as a “factor” in its admission decisions. Never mind that the Supreme Court recognized in its Students for Fair Admissions v Harvard decision that using race in determining admission fitness is intrinsically racist.

This is a terrible ruling on two counts (at least). One is Bennet’s decision to ignore the Supreme Court’s rescission of Chevron Deference as a factor in assessing the legitimacy of a regulation or, by extension, a law. Bennett, in his ruling, chose to ignore the Supreme Court’s rulings in Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo and Relentless v Department of Commerce, the two cases the eliminated Chevron Defense as a court decision criterion. Bennett deliberately chose to apply the Chevron technique to his USNA ruling. He closed his ruling with this:

In short, this Court defers to the executive branch with respect to military personnel decisions. Specifically, as noted by Justice Kavanaugh in Austin v United States Navy Seals, “the President of the United States, not any federal judge” ultimately makes such decisions.

Bennett chose to elide in that cite that Austin predates Loper and Relentless, and so any deference aspect of Austin is overridden by them. At least as tellingly, Bennett chose not to disclose that Kavanaugh was writing in the Court’s decision to stay the case pending a lower court’s decision and, more directly to the present matter, that Austin concerned the Navy’s decision to mandate vaccination against the Covid-19 virus; it was wholly irrelevant to any question of the place of race in getting into the Seals (or the Navy or any of the Navy’s training institutions) in the first place.

That’s the technical part of this bad ruling. Bennett also wrote this:

The US Naval Academy is distinct from a civilian university. … During the admissions procedure, which is distinct from that of a civilian university, race or ethnicity may be one of several non-determinative factors considered.

More briefly treated by me, but far more important because it’s on the merits of the matter, is the question of racism in our government institutions. Racism is racism regardless of where it is practiced. That it’s done by our military academies in no way legitimizes it; on the contrary, it deprecates those academies and their ability to train the officers who will lead our men and women in combat. Bennett’s ruling is every bit as racist on this side of the question as was then-President Franklin Roosevelt’s (D) decision to refuse to integrate our military on the other side. Race must be wholly irrelevant in admissions (and everywhere else), neither emphasized in order to block nor emphasized in order to push forward.

This is a ruling that badly wants overruling on appeal.

A Fatuous Argument

The Supreme Court heard oral arguments last week concerning a Tennessee law that bans transgender medical procedures for minors. In the course of that session, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson made this argument favoring striking the law:

…racial classifications and inconsistencies. I’m thinking in particular about Loving v Virginia [which struck, on 14th Amendment grounds State laws banning interracial marriage], and I’m wondering whether you thought about the parallels, because I see one as to how this statute operates and how the anti-miscegenation statutes in Virginia operated.

This is just Brown Jackson’s attempt to claim a discrimination based on sex, which would make the law harder to sustain. The argument that the Tennessee ban is based on sex discrimination is risible on its face, since regardless of the life style chosen or the drugs and surgeries engaged in to support that life style, the individual remains the male or female he or she was conceived as all those months prior to birth.

Her false equivalence is silly. Trending PoliticsCollin Rugg:

Yes, because banning a white person from marrying a black person is the same thing as cutting off a 10-year-old’s gen*tals.

Keep in mind, though, that this is the same woman who, at her confirmation hearing, was completely unable to say what a woman is.