A Teachers Union Strike

There have been teachers union strikes in Oklahoma, Kentucky, and West Virginia, and now there’s one set to go off later this week in Arizona.  Readers know my disdain for union strikes generally: they’re nothing but legalized extortion—”nice business you got here.  Be too bad if something were to happen to it.  Like, say, it’s destroyed because nobody works here anymore.”  It isn’t possible to negotiate when the other party is sticking a gun in your ear—even if it’s “just” a metaphorical gun.

But it’s especially despicable when it’s a teachers union strike.  These persons are using children as hostages to back up their extortion.  And the Arizona one is all about ego and hurt feelings.

Lynn White, a high school biology teacher in Gilbert, AZ:

People feel like the state doesn’t respect the job we do as public school teachers[.]

Never mind that respect comes the way any honest American gets it: by earning it with actual deeds.  It certainly doesn’t come because this or that person, or collection of them—think they’re special.  And in the case of public school teachers, those deeds are how well they teach, as demonstrated by the quality of their graduated students.  And that’s not very high (scroll down the table at the link to see Arizona’s bad and worsening performance in 4th grade math).

Arizona should replace the strikers en masse with substitutes and insist on actual teaching performance.

A Board Whose Time has Come and Gone

The National Labor Relations Board is supposed to protect all workers, but it’s been focused on union workers exclusively for far too long.  In the effort, too, it’s become far too politicized to be useful or able to be rehabilitated.

For instance, it ignores the courts.

In [a] DC Circuit case…the NLRB ignored the court’s longstanding precedent on an employer’s bargaining obligations under a collective-bargaining agreement, forcing a Michigan health clinic to defend itself against charges it knew the court would reject.

The NLRB ignores other long-standing precedent, also.  For instance, it has ruled [sic] the franchising companies—a McDonald’s, a Subway, and so on—are at least partially responsible for the employment practices of the franchise holder—a particular McDonald’s or Subway restaurant—even though employment decisions are entirely the purview of the franchise license holder.

Peter Schaumber, ex-NLRB Chairman under ex-President Bush the Younger, argued in his op-ed at the link that the NLRB could cure this by issuing a slew of regulations that would reverse those abusive practices.  It’s true enough that regulations ” adopted after public notice and comment cannot be overturned without ‘substantial justification’ or renewed rule-making,” but that’s only a temporary sop.  The same politicization would leave it straightforward (if cumbersomely so) to find “substantial justification” or to spend the time to go through “renewed rule-making” in order to alter the NLRB to its members’ ideology—even ego—rather than staying focused on all workers.

Formalizing regulations through rule-making processes cannot correct the board’s political biases, whichever way those might lean.

The NLRB needs to be done away with altogether.

Fired or Resigned?

Ex-Veterans Affairs Secretary is making his case that he didn’t resign, he was fired.

Shulkin said he had not submitted a resignation letter, or planned to, and was only told of Trump’s decision shortly before the Twitter announcement.

Of course, the format of a resignation is immaterial to the act; in particular, letters are the polite, professional way to quit, but they’re not required, not at all.  Too, learning that your boss wants you to leave “shortly before the Twitter announcement” might be impolite, even impolitic, but again, learning the boss’ desire is not required for resigning.  Nor is desiring one to leave the same as firing that one.

The distinction in this context might seem minor, but it actually flows from a very serious legal matter.

The semantics could be relevant to Trump’s ability to name an acting VA secretary to temporarily fill Shulkin’s place. Last week, Trump named Defense Department official Robert Wilkie to the acting position….
Under federal law, a president has wide authority to temporarily fill a federal agency job if someone “dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office.” There is no mention of a president having that authority if the person is fired.

The fact is, Schulkin may have felt considerable pressure to resign, and it’s common to conflate pressured-to-resign with being fired, but the two are not the same.  Especially here.  Cabinet Secretaries are nominated by the President, but they are confirmed by the Senate.  The President cannot fire a Secretary.  He must be impeached.  It may be that Secretaries serve “at the pleasure of the President,” but once confirmed, they serve “at the pleasure of Congress,” also.

Schulkin could have held out for being impeached, but he resigned—under pressure certainly, but voluntarily nonetheless.

I am Shocked, Shocked

Recall Amazon.com’s playing off of several cities against each other in order to maximize the tax breaks and other returns that company might get for building its second headquarters in the “winning” city.  Now we discover this in the offing:

US cities vying for Amazon.com Inc’s second headquarters risk facing an unexpected consequence to victory: other companies will demand the same hefty tax breaks conferred on the online retail giant.

How amazing is that?  Other companies want in on the goodies.

I’m not shocked at that; I’m shocked that those cities’ managers didn’t see this coming.  Their lack of anticipation speaks poorly of their ability to respond to those demands.

It also speaks poorly of the competence of those cities’ managers.

Agency Fees

These are fees unions in a raft of jurisdictions are allowed to charge non-union members as a condition of those workers’ right to work at all.  Ostensibly, the fees are for the unions’ labor efforts in negotiating wages, benefits, and working conditions for everyone in the workplace.  The Supreme Court is considering a case, Janus v AFSCME, concerning whether such fees are constitutional.

It’s already the case that

Agency fees already are forbidden from paying for advocacy and other political activity.

Money is fungible, though, and even though agency fees might be barred from the purpose, the existence of the fees allows unions to reallocate equivalent money from other sources to the purpose—making it impossible actually to say that agency fees aren’t being used for the illegal purpose.  After all, if a union has $100, it can’t afford to engage in political activity.  If the union also collects a $10 agency fee from a non-union member, it now has $110, and it can afford to spend $10 on political activity, even if it’s forbidden by dollar bill serial tracking from using the non-union member’s $10 for the purpose.  Those ten bucks went illegally, however indirectly, to the political activity.

Moreover,

…plaintiffs in the Supreme Court case argue that negotiating with public agencies requires taking positions on government’s size and scope, which is a political question, so forcing employees to pay for the negotiations violates the First Amendment.

There’s the crux of the matter.  Agency fees are eminently unconstitutional, but I’m not sanguine that the Court will see it that way.  Both CJ Roberts and J Kennedy have shown themselves unreliable defenders of the Constitution, and the four Liberal Justices are a rock-solid bloc.