A Cyber First Strike

John Wohlstetter in The Wall Street Journal defines cyberspace as the software that controls the operation of networks linking computers in the governmental and private sphere.  This is incomplete, though.  Cyberspace includes that, but it also includes the software running on individual computers, whether they are linked into a (the) network or are operating in isolation.  Even those isolated computers, after all, are susceptible to cyber attacks, with many of them (unless they are physically disconnected from any network at all) susceptible to being hijacked into cyber attacks against other computers/networks through such means as social engineering, a process whereby hackers, or hostile governments, or terrorists, or… convince, usually through subterfuge, the human operator of those computers to load malware onto them.

Wohlstetter then identifies the People’s Republic of China’s “military’s massive continuing cyberspying” as an example of one type of cyber attacks that may be simple spying, or that may be preparation for further adventuring.  People’s Liberation Army spies, he notes, have stolen “volumes of documentation on the ultra-advanced F-35 Lightning, the only fifth-generation fighter still being produced by the US,” and they’ve penetrated “every major national-security database that they can within the Pentagon and US defense companies.”  But this could be just ordinary pre-battle preparation.  Every general is going to investigate his enemy so as to understand as clearly as possible that enemy’s force disposition and the strengths and vulnerabilities of that enemy’s systems so as to efficiently neutralize those systems at the battle’s start.

To support these efforts, the PLA “Third Department” (among others),

which handles telecommunications, can call on 12 operation bureaus to carry out cyberattacks, and three research institutes for technical support with some 13,000 staff upon request.

The PRC isn’t alone in this sort of effort.  Russia and Iran are two others who maintain major efforts in offensive cyberspace.

A necessary, but not sole, prelude to defending against a first strike is understanding the nature and depth of what’s happening in a particular incident.  Siobhan Gorman and Siobhan Hughes address this in part, citing Army General Keith Alexander, Commander, US Cyber Command

When does a nuisance become a real problem and when are you prepared to step in for that?  That’s the work that I think the administration is going through right now and highlighting that.

But this is the question concerning a physical problem, too—when does any incursion stop being an error, or stop being minor, and start being an act of war?  And what do we do about it, and when?  Do we simply defend against the incident?  To we take offensive measures to encourage the attacker to not do that anymore, do we take more extensive measures to defeat outright the attacker and compel his acquiescence?  When?  In accordance with what criteria?

And that’s part of where a first strike starts to come into play.  A cyber attack as a first strike in all likelihood won’t occur.  A first strike, though, will include a decisive cyber attack.  We’ve seen rehearsals of the cyber component:

  • the “PLO virus,” a logic bomb designed to infect and destroy files on computers [a very early virus, its “rehearsal” aspect is in the lessons learned in managing and delivering such malware]
  • 2010’s stuxnet, which damaged or destroyed hardware—high-speed centrifuges, in one case, by causing them to run too fast and burn themselves out
  • 2012’s cyberassaults on the websites of many US banks
  • 2012’s more destructive attack on a Saudi oil company that destroyed 30,000 computers
  • the implantation of malware on computing equipment prior to sale and delivery to the target nation.  For instance, I bought a laptop from an otherwise reputable major computer company; it was delivered to me directly from the factory in Shanghai—with a Trojan carefully installed.

Given the penetration of American systems by the Chinese, it’s not beyond the pale that either a) this kind of malware has infected the computing systems managing any target nation’s infrastructure—water, electricity, communications, et al.—and the target nation’s defense systems, including, but not necessarily limited to, sensor suites and communications, or b) this kind of malware is ready to be emplaced in the weeks prior to the intended first strike.

How would a first strike work, then?  With the malware in place, sufficient of it could be triggered to shut down a nation’s electrical grid, its water handling and delivery systems, and its financial infrastructure.  With responders deployed to deal with this—and so widely dispersed—communications then could be crippled, isolating those responders, and isolating that nation’s population from each other and from their government.  Far fetched?

Russia tested a limited cyber attack against Estonia in 2007.  Moreover, as Gorman and Hughes note the temptation offered by our own continued vulnerability:

US intelligence officials told a Senate hearing that the nation is vulnerable to cyberespionage, cybercrime, and outright destruction of computer networks, both from sophisticated, government-sponsored assault as well as criminal hacker groups and cyberterrorists.

“It’s hard to overemphasize its significance,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said, addressing members of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “These capabilities put all sectors of our country at risk—from government and private networks to critical infrastructures.”

Then, with cyber’s civil battlefield preparation in place and domestic upset rising, additional malware could be triggered to attack defense sensory and communications systems (among others), greatly disrupting, if not crippling them.  This phase of the cyber preparation could functionally blind physical military units and cut off their communications with adjacent units and higher command echelons.  In this environment, many of those units might not even know they’re next coming under physical attack until they start being destroyed.

This isn’t even a new strategy; it just uses modern facilities.  Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote about this a century and a half ago, as noted by Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen in Makers of Modern Strategy:

They were fully aware that military campaigns could be lost before the first shot, that they would in fact be decided beforehand on the preliminary battlefronts of economic and psychological warfare….  To [Marx and Engels] war was fought with different means in different fields.

Modern economies expand the opportunities to be gained from a first strike.  Most modern economies don’t have an industrial capacity.  Modern industry either assembles components that have been manufactured in other countries or it consists of component manufacture which are then shipped to those assembling economies.

A Cyber first strike would be no worse than a Pearl Harbor?  On the contrary, a properly executed first strike, as a classical combined arms assault that would include cyber warfare, could prevent us utterly from responding in any way at all, whether in cyberspace or in meat space.  There may not be any opportunity to work our way through our response decision criteria.

In a modern war (now exacerbated by those modern national economies), there will be no time to recover, to build up our forces, to bring our industrial capacity to a wartime footing and production rate.  We’ll fight this war with the army we have and with nothing at all, including replacement equipment and soldiers, else.

We could be left prostrate, begging for mercy.  If we could get our radios and telephones to work well enough to beg.

None of this is to suggest that a first strike is imminent.  But responding after the fact will be no response at all.  If we’re not better prepared, though, after the fact is what will be left to us.

Update:  Here’s a realtime example of a cyber attack rehearsal.

Computer networks at major South Korean banks and top TV broadcasters crashed simultaneously Wednesday, paralyzing bank machines across the country and prompting speculation of a cyberattack by North Korea.

Screens went blank at 2 p.m., the state-run Korea Information Security Agency said, and more than six hours later some systems were still down.

The Obama Sequester in Action

From Fox News:

The top US immigration enforcement official acknowledged Thursday that the Obama administration has in fact released thousands of illegal immigrants from local jails over the last month despite prior claims that the release was only in the hundreds.

The sequester clemency:

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director John Morton, at a House appropriations subcommittee hearing, said the agency released a total of 2,228 illegal immigrants from local jails “throughout the country” between Feb. 9 and March 1 for “solely budgetary reasons.”

But DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano says she knew nothing of this.  Of course.  She’s Sgt Schultz.

Another Victory over Big Government

Here’s the long and the short of it, as summarized in The Wall Street Journal:

A federal judge this week struck down a controversial set of laws allowing the Federal Bureau of Investigation to seek people’s records without a court’s approval, saying the strict secrecy orders demanded by the laws are not constitutional.

US District Judge Susan Illston (Northern District of California) ordered the government to stop sending national security letters or to stop trying to enforce gag orders related to them, but she stayed her order pending the government’s appeal.

Of course, it’ll go to the 9th Circuit, which means it will go on to the Supreme Court, so the fight isn’t over.  But this is an excellent start.

Illston’s opinion decried these violations of Americans’ individual freedom:

[The] pervasive use of nondisclosure orders…creates too large a danger that speech is being unnecessarily restricted.

She added [emphasis added]:

[T]he statute impermissibly attempts to circumscribe a court’s ability to review the necessity of nondisclosure orders.  …the NSL nondisclosure provisions significantly infringe on speech regarding controversial government powers.  …  As written, the statute expressly limits a court’s powers to modify or set aside a nondisclosure order to [certain] situations….  The statute’s intent…is incompatible with the court’s duty to searchingly test restrictions on speech.

There are two problems with these letters.  One is that they allow searches without a court’s warrant.  The FBI can use them to search for phone data and for financial and electronic records, and all the FBI agent needs is his Field Office Special Agent in Charge to say it’s all jake.  This is a clear violation of our 4th Amendment.

The other problem worsens this exponentially: the FBI can require (or could before Illston’s ruling) the recipient of the letter to keep quiet about his receipt—denying the owner of the records any opportunity to respond to the search before it happens.  This also denies two critical aspects of the 1st Amendment: that right to speak of receipt and the duty of a court to adjudicate any allegation of a 1st Amendment violation.

Illston’s ruling can be read here.

Something about Missile Defense

I won’t go into the older history of the Progressives’ vilification of President Ronald Reagan over his push for a missile defense, and I won’t mention then-Senator John Kerry’s (D, MA) denunciation of such a system as

a dream based on illusion, but one which could have real and terrible consequences[.]

But we do need to think about Presidential Candidate Barack Obama’s 2008 promise to gut missile defense development programs and—in one of the few spending cuts to which Progressives have agreed in recent history—to cut spending on such things.

We do need to think about President Barack Obama’s betrayal of Poland and the Czech Republic when he cancelled agreements to deploy missile defense systems there on the basis of Russian demurral.

We do need to think about spending $2 billion to add a whole 14 interceptors to our existing de minimis system in this time of world-ending sequester.

We do need to think about Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s analysts justifying all of this:

Although American and South Korean intelligence officials doubt the North is close to being able to follow through on a nuclear strike, or that it would even try, given its almost certain destruction, analysts say the country’s aggressive behavior is an important and worrying sign of changing calculations in the North.

After all, this “analysis” comes in light of the Russians and the Iranians having or being allowed to achieve this capability, yet we withdraw missile defenses from European locations that could defend Israel and Europe.

We do need to think about DoD delaying deployment at additional sites, including the East Coast, in order to do an environmental study, first.

We do need to think about whether this administration has any sort of clue at all about a coherent national defense policy.

Congressman Mike Rogers (R, AL), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s Strategic Forces Subcommittee, is saying

Four years ago, the Obama administration began to unilaterally disarm our defenses and deterrent in the hope our enemies would follow suit.  President Obama is finally realizing what President Reagan taught us 30 years ago—the best way to keep the peace is through strength.

But is he?  Or is all of this just the loud posturing of a paper tiger?  After all, Pentagon officials are dismissing Rogers’ criticism, insisting that northern Korean technology was considerably less developed four years ago.  Yet surely they know that Russia’s wasn’t, when Reagan’s missile defense efforts were so loudly pooh-poohed, and surely they know that Russian technology was 30 years improved when Obama acceded to Russian demands to cancel our missile defense plans in eastern Europe.

Hmm….

YGTBSM

And these guys are serious.

Recall that Cyprus is as bankrupt as Greece.  In order to bail out Cyprus (we’ve been over the legitimacy of bailouts elsewhere), the European Central Bank, European Commission, and the IMF have demanded a one-time tax on deposits: 9.9% on deposits over €100,000 ($131,000) and 6.75% on smaller deposits.

Nothing underhanded about any of this, either.  Uh, uh.  Because depositors, including many of the 3,500 British soldiers stationed in Cyprus, are complicit in the incompetence of the banks’ management.  Yeah.  That’s it.  We’ll go with that.

Finance Minister Michalis Serris already has taken steps to block depositors from taking their money out ahead of the tax:

We have taken immediate measures so that electronic transfers cannot take effect before banks reopen on Tuesday [today is a holiday in Cyprus.]

Chump change was recovered by depositors over the weekend via Cyprus’ cash machines, but the machines’ money stocks were limited and not replenished as they ran out.  Willy Sutton couldn’t have done it better.

A planned weekend vote by the Cypriot Parliament to pass this thing, however, was been postponed until today amid…concerns…that the Parliament may have more integrity than Serris and block the “agreement” with the ECB, the EC, and the IMF.

This is supposed to raise €5.8 billion ($7.6 billion).  Think about this, though.  Are the interest rates or investment rates of return that the Cypriot banks are paying on those deposits more or less than those taxes?  You get three guesses, and the first two don’t count.  For how long will those depositors leave their remaining money in those banks?  Again, three guesses, and the first two don’t count.

This is what happens when the wrong folks are left in charge of OPM.

Update: Cyprus’ legislative vote has been delayed until Tuesday afternoon.

Update again: Today (Tuesday) the Greek Parliament rejected any “tax” on private deposits by a vote of 36 “No,” 19 abstentions, and 0 “Aye.”