Two Not So Opposing Views

In Sunday’s Letters section of the WSJ, one writer wrote

The fact that markets don’t eliminate particular risks is no evidence that they underprice those risks. Mr. Yass writes that whenever the market falls, pundits offer the same explanations:…. Economic theory and history give us ample reason to doubt that politicians and bureaucrats can match, let alone surpass, the success of markets at assessing risks and allocating capital. The case for markets isn’t that they are always right. They aren’t. Instead, the case for markets is that they are more likely to be right than are politicians and bureaucrats.

Another letter-writer wrote

When the 1990s dot-com bubble was underway, I asked a friend in banking about the bubble in internet stocks. As I recall, he told me: “Our IPO guys say that no models can justify these prices, but there’s too much money being made not to participate.” Bubbles do exist, and their exploitation is a business model. There’s always another gold rush around the corner.

The WSJ presented these letters as a debate. There is no debate here, only a large confluence of conclusions. Markets aren’t perfect, but they’re better than government or pundit intervention. Bubbles certainly seem to violate efficient market hypotheses, especially regarding the market’s ability to assess and price risk. Never mind that risk itself is not determinate and so impossible to assess/price with perfection. There is that bubble money to be made, though, and bubble exploitation does make money for a large percentage of the exploiters—ordinary American retail investors and institution “experts” alike.

Failures in the bubble exploitation risk-taking are merely part of that imperfection, and the success of exploiters demonstrates that market participants even so are much better than the pundits, who make their money touting from the safety of the sidelines; and government, whose politicians make their money with vote pandering on “protecting” us retail investors, and bureaucrats who make their money with the job security associated with continuing and increasing regulatory actions.

This Would Be a Mistake

There is a move afoot to convince Nvidia to bring back Jensen Huang as its head honcho. This would be a mistake.

Leave aside that he’s a serial philanderer which demonstrates that he thinks too much with his nether brain, illustrating weak judgment when the chips are down.

Illustrative of why his return would be a bad choice is his relationship with Megaspeed. It turns out Megaspeed, headquartered in Singapore, was a conduit for the advanced computer chips that the People’s Republic of China wants and needs but which export to it is barred by US law. That conduit consisted of outright smuggling of those chips into the PRC and Megaspeed’s renting access to AI servers using them to PRC businesses.

That’s a serious failure of Nvidia’s—Huang’s—vetting of companies with which it does business with those of its chips on the export control lists. Huang, as the man in charge, is responsible for that sort of thing, and what other failures here are there that haven’t shown up?

There’s the general matter of Huang’s credibility, too. He’s been a constant lobbyer for reduced controls on exports to the PRC. His relationship with Megaspeed and Megaspeed’s behavior cast doubt on his motives for that lobbying. His credibility is further damaged by his nether brain relationship with Alice Huang (no relationship), who was a mucky-muck for Megaspeed and possibly a PRC spy.

And: the downside of his not coming back isn’t all that. Lots of major companies lose a head honcho who was responsible for the company’s rapid growth and market penetration but experience a speed bump and then continued growth. Losing Huang won’t be any different.