Category Archives: markets

Déjà Vu All Over Again Cont’d

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In this post I continue a discussion of the advice to Reagan memo that The Wall Street Journal excerpted a few days ago.

On the matter of budgeting, the memo advised, in the context of fighting then-high inflation

Many question whether you are serious about a sizeable cut in budget outlays.  Credible FY 1981 and 1982 budgets which do that clearly and unambiguously would evoke an extraordinary response in the financial markets, and set the stage for a successful assault on inflation and a decline in mortgage and other interest rates.

This is sound advice for the next President, also.  Credible FY2013 (since the Progressives in the Senate and White House have variously refused to offer a serious budget or any budget at all for the last three years, a 2013 budget for the fiscal year then in progress will remain a necessity), FY2014, and FY2015 budgets will be as critical in demonstrating resolve in cutting irresponsible spending as it was in fighting inflation.  And it will be critical in reducing the impact of the inflation time bomb the Fed is creating, should that go off before it can be defused.

Those advisors continued in their section on the Budget:

Off-budget financing and government guarantees mount and expand programs through the use of the government’s borrowing capacity, draining the nation’s resources without being adequately recorded in the formal spending totals.

Pop quiz time: what off-budget financing and government guarantees are present today?  Bonus question: what does the continued existence of off-budget financing and government guarantees of any sort say about the sense of responsibility felt by incumbents of a Big Government?

The Reagan advisors also warn of this:

In addition, the mandating of private expenditures for government purposes has gained momentum as the spotlight has [i]lluminated direct spending. These mandates are also a clear call by government on the nation’s resources.

Boy, has it ever gained momentum.

Closely related to budgeting is tax policy.

Tax policy is properly the province of your Secretary of the Treasury.

Indeed.  And the inability of the present Treasury Secretary to pay his own taxes says far more about the unnecessary scope and complexity of current tax law than it does about his intelligence or sense of responsibility.  If we assume Geithner isn’t a tax scofflaw—and I believe he is a fundamentally honest man—his mistake should be a clarion call for simplification.  That it is not speaks poorly of the incumbents on both sides of the aisle.

Reagan’s advisors continue:

We consider that the key ingredients should be your proposals for the Kemp-Roth cut in personal income tax rates, simplification and liberalization of business depreciation and a cut in effective taxes on capital gains….  Consistent with your proposals earlier this year, the effective date for these reductions should be January 1, 1981.

Other key proposals are…reductions in…inheritance taxes and the taxation of Americans living abroad….

Again, these are remarkably prescient.  The Obama tax increase is set to take effect on January 1, 2013.  That increase, aside from raising income taxes on ordinary Americans smack in the middle of the present recession, will include jumps to usurious rates on what those same ordinary Americans would otherwise leave to their own children and other heirs of their choice—not of government’s choice.  Moreover, most sub-Federal jurisdictions only tax income earned within their jurisdiction.  Why should the Federal government be any different?

The Obama tax increase also includes major increases in business-related taxes: investment taxes on capital gains and increasing the double taxation present on dividend payouts.  These will serve only to reduce investment in American businesses, to the detriment of our already suffering economy.

I’ll have more in the coming days.

Déjà Vu All Over Again

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This post is taken from “Economic Strategy for the Reagan Administration,” a memo summarizing studies commissioned by candidate Ronald Reagan and delivered to President-elect Reagan on mid-November 1980, as summarized in The Wall Street Journal.  The memo began

Sharp change in present economic policy is an absolute necessity.  The problems of inflation and slow growth, of falling standards of living and declining productivity, of high government spending but an inadequate flow of funds for defense, of an almost endless litany of economic ills, large and small, are severe, they are not intractable.  Having been produced by government policy, they can be redressed by a change in policy.

Aside from the high inflation of 1980, that could have been written today.  Besides, the actual inflation then is a threatened inflation today, with the Fed’s policy of deliberately depressed interest rates and rapid printing of money coupled with the administration’s prolific spending.

You have identified in the campaign the key issues and lines of policy necessary to restore hope and confidence in a better economic future:

  • Reestablish stability in the purchasing power of the dollar.
  • Achieve a widely-shared prosperity through real growth in jobs, investment, and productivity.
  • Devote the resources needed for a strong defense, and accomplish the goal of releasing the creative forces of entrepreneurship, management, and labor by:
  • Restraining government spending.
  • Reducing the burden of taxation and regulation.
  • Conducting monetary policy in a steady manner, directed toward eliminating inflation.

This amounts to emphasis on fundamentals for the full four years, as the key to a flourishing economy.

Sound like what’s needed today?

The need for a long-term point of view is essential to allow for the time, the coherence, and the predictability so necessary for success. This long-term view is as important for day-to-day problem solving as for the making of large policy decisions.

This was true then, 50 years after the start of the New Deal, a 50-year period of spendthrift policies and high taxes, and it’s even truer today, 30 years farther down that road, with this administration’s effort to raise taxes on top of its already explosive spending and debt accumulation.  It’ll take a long time, and a long-term strategy is critical, to repair the damage.

The memo went on with sound advice concerning budgeting, tax policy, regulation, energy, and monetary policy—it could have been written for delivery to President-elect Mitt Romney in mid-November 2012.  And we can certainly hope both for President-elect Mitt Romney, and that he takes this advice to heart.  The incumbent certainly has already eschewed it.

I’ll more on the Reagan memo in the coming days.

The Long and Short of Fiscal Policy

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Sorry, I couldn’t resist.  That’s the title of another missive by Alan Blinder in a recent Wall Street Journal issue.

He begins with this Keynesian fiction:

In the short run—let’s say within a year or so—a larger deficit…boosts economic growth by increasing aggregate demand.  It’s pretty simple.  If the government spends more money without raising anyone’s taxes to pay the bills, that adds to total demand directly.

Umm, well, no, it doesn’t.  That increased government spending (accepting, arguendo, no associated increase in taxes) only comes at the expense of future taxes or current borrowing—which is more future taxes.  People aren’t as dumb as Keynes thought they were, or as Blinder thinks they are.  In the present case, Americans see this trap, and they reduce spending (and investing) today in favor of saving and/or paying down their own current debt, thus offsetting that spike (again assuming, arguendo, that a government actually can reduce spending after its spike up).

Moreover, that government spending crowds out a significant fraction of remaining private spending.  After all, why should we buy something that the government is going to buy and give to us?

On top of this, Swedish economists Andreas Bergh and Magnus Henrekson have a 2011 piece (login required; sorry), that surely Blinder has read, in the Journal of Economic Surveys that shows the deleterious effects of increases in government spending.  They conclude that a 10% increase in government size (relative to GDP) is associated with a 0.5%-1.0% lower annual growth rate in the economy.  This is no spike, but then governments don’t spike spending.

It really is pretty simple.  Just not as oversimplified as Blinder suggests, and not in the same direction.

In short, money that folks, and businesses, are paying in higher taxes is money that folks, and businesses, no longer have available for current spending.  Or investing, or saving.

It is true, though, that spending is increased relative to taxes.  But the only result of this “increase” is in the deleterious effects of deficit spending.

On this matter, Romer and Romer have a 2010 piece (login required here, too; sorry), that surely Blinder also has read, in American Economic Review, that shows the powerful effect of increasing tax rates on economic growth: an increase in taxes of 1% of GDP lowers GDP by nearly 3%.

Blinder has more in his piece, but with his underlying assumptions shown to be false, the rest has no more value than that.  For instance, he writes in all seriousness

But don’t we need to reduce the deficit—and by large amounts? Yes, we do, but that’s in the long run, where the effects of larger deficits are mostly harmful to economic growth.

Of course, as Blinder’s own Keynes noted so long ago, in the long run, we’re all dead.  More empirically, over the long run, governments do not unroll spending increases that they’ve foisted off on us for that good cause of the time.  As long as Blinder is satisfied that our present enormous debt can be safely reduced in that far-off fantastical long run, he’s satisfied that our present enormous debt never will be reduced.

Update: Deleted a section where I’d simply–and carelessly–misread Blinder’s statement, and so my argument became irrelevant.

A Thought on Taxes

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With a tip of the hat to The Wall Street Journal, and a caution to those who insist on raising our taxes—including doing so only to certain governmentally disfavored groups.

Henry Hazlitt in “Economics in One Lesson,” 1946:

When a corporation loses a hundred cents of every dollar it loses, and is permitted to keep only 60 cents of every dollar it gains, and when it cannot offset its years of losses against its years of gains, or cannot do so adequately, its policies are affected. It does not expand its operations, or it expands only those attended with a minimum of risk. . . .

There is a similar effect when personal incomes are taxed 50, 60, 75 and 90 per cent. People begin to ask themselves why they should work six, eight or ten months of the entire year for the government, and only six, four or two months for themselves and their families. If they lose the whole dollar when they lose, but can keep only a dime of it when they win, they decide that it is foolish to take risks with their capital. In addition, the capital available for risk-taking itself shrinks enormously. It is being taxed away before it can be accumulated. In brief, capital to provide new private jobs is first prevented from coming into existence, and the part that does come into existence is then discouraged from starting new enterprises. The government spenders create the very problem of unemployment that they profess to solve.

What he said.

Sound Currency Policy

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A Sound Dollar Act was introduced in the House of Representatives last month by the Vice Chairman of the House Joint Economic Committee, Congressman Kevin Brady (R, TX), and a companion bill was offered in the Senate by Senator Mike Lee (R, UT), who sits on, among other committees, the Senate Joint Economic Committee.

This bill has a couple of interesting aspects.  For one thing, it would limit the Federal Reserve Bank system  to a single mandate—to maintain price stability, i.e., control inflation.  It would eliminate the Fed’s current other mandate, that of maintaining full employment.

This simplified requirement would both eliminate the conflict inherent between those two requirements and reduce the government’s involvement in what is essentially a private economy imperative—the decision to expand a business, or not, and to employ more or fewer personnel (with a free market economy’s inherent bias toward more employment stemming from a prior inherent bias in favor of growth).

The bill also would reduce the Executive Branch’s political dominance of the Fed.  Currently, the Federal Open Market Committee, the instrument of the Fed that sets monetary policy, has as voting members seven men and women who are appointed by the President, the president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank (these eight are permanent voting members), and four presidents of the Fed system’s remaining eleven regional Federal Reserve Banks (the four rotate among the remaining eleven).  Thus, monetary policy is set by Presidential appointees.  Certainly, those appointees are nearly as independent as a President-appointed Supreme Court Justice, but still.  Under the bill, all 12 presidents of the individual Fed banks would become permanent FOMC voting members, so the regions collectively would outnumber the President’s appointees.  The advantage here is that the individual bank presidents are appointed by boards of directors made up of bankers and business leaders local to each of the Federal Reserve System’s regions.  In this way, the regions, which better understand their situations than can a remote government, would gain significant influence over FOMC decisions that impact those regions.

The Sound Dollar Act also would limit the Fed to purchases of Treasury securities.  This would reduce the ability of the Fed to make credit allocation decisions—to pick and choose which banks, for instance, it will “save” by buying from them the toxic asset du jour.  Bailout or bankruptcy is a free market decision; no government instrumentality, other than a bankruptcy court, has any legitimate role in the matter.

I’m not sure allowing the Fed even to buy Treasuries is a good idea, though, unless it’s done after the free market has bought what it wants, and then only at that just demonstrated set of prices.  If the Federal government is such a poor credit risk that it has trouble peddling its debt to private investors, or other governments, why should the American taxpayer be Dragooned into taking on that risk?

With some tweaks, this is a bill that would serve well.  We just need to get the Big Government types out of government and so out of the way.

Incidentally, the WSJ‘s op-ed also has some words on the Fed’s success rate with that other mandate, maintaining “full employment,” and why it’s useful to take that DOC away from the Fed.  RTWT.