The incoming Trump administration and the newly installed Republican-led Congress (even if only more-or-less so in the Chaos Caucus-infested House) want to make deep changes to that Act. The law requires, among other things, advance public notice before regulations are adopted or rescinded. The Act more broadly

• requires agencies to keep the public informed of their organization, procedures and rules
• provides for public participation in the rulemaking process, for instance through public commenting
• establishes uniform standards for the conduct of formal rulemaking and adjudication
• defines the scope of judicial review

That public participation is the advance notice and public comment part, with the mandated notice being several months. The Act, though, was done in 1946, when information moved at the speed of newspapers and radio. We have computers today and the Internet with their vastly sped-up—not quite instantaneous—information dissemination capabilities. The advance notice requirement could easily and beneficially be shortened to 30 days for notice and public comment.

The transparency requirement could be sharply improved. One path for that is strictly enforcing responsiveness to FOIA requests by all agencies: require agency response within those same 30 days, with any failure to respond being deemed approved and the requested information required to be delivered in toto on the 31st day. Redactions also would be profitably limited much further, with reasons for allowed redactions being much more limited. Any document still containing redactions would be delivered promptly to the requester with the same document, wholly unredacted, delivered to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the relevant House and Senate committees for their information.

The judicial review requirement needs also to be tightened. This can be done by subjecting all rules that come before a court to substantial evidence review, which encompasses the agency’s assessment of the evidence in the record and its application of that evidence in reaching a decision. That standard requires courts to decide for themselves whether the agency’s factual and policy determinations were warranted in light of all the information before the agency at the time of decision. This is especially important in light of the Supreme Court’s rescission of Chevron Deference: courts no longer are subordinate to agency technocrat “expertise,” no longer expected to take an agency’s bureaucrats’ blandishments seriously.