Tag Archives: foreign policy

Showcase Potential

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Brussels is worried, and we should be, too, but for different reasons.  The People’s Republic of China is gaining influence in eastern Europe, and it’s doing it with one of my favorite tactics: international trade as a national policy tool.

In Hungary it is hailed as the “Eastward Opening.” Serbian authorities see it as the glue in a “reliable friendship”, while the Polish government describes it as a “tremendous opportunity.” Yet the 16+1, a grouping of 16 central and eastern European countries led by China, receives more caustic reviews in leading EU capitals, with diplomats fearing it could be exploited by Beijing to undermine union rules and take advantage of growing east-west tensions in the pact itself.

The catalyst for the group is China’s ability to finance and build the roads, railways, power stations and other infrastructure that some poorer central and eastern European countries need. But the scope of its operations has spilled over into overtly political and strategic areas, breeding mistrust among some of the western European powers that dominate the EU’s agenda.

The Financial Times piece at the first link is well worth the read, but the quoted paragraphs are the sum of it.

We should be worried, but not because Europe—the EU—is beginning to lose the contest for the hearts and minds of central and eastern Europe to the PRC, even as it’s beginning to lose the contest for the geography to an aggressively acquisitive Russia.   We should be worried because we’re not taking advantage of the opportunity the People’s Republic of China’s moves in eastern Europe presents us.   This is a contest we cannot lose, were we to enter it at all.

The way we should enter this contest is two-fold, and one of those folds also would serve to counter, and to roll back, the gains being made by that empire-seeking, domineering Russia.  One fold is to engage with eastern Europe—all of those 16, but not the +1—economically through international trade.  We should be busily pursuing free trade agreements with those 16—and contra President Donald Trump, we should be working toward a regional free trade agreement involving the 16 nations.  And Great Britain.  True enough, central Europe also is the heart of the EU, and that would complicate trade agreements, but that shouldn’t stop us from pursuing, separately and in parallel, such arrangements with the nations of eastern Europe.

There’s nothing like free market competition to increase the prosperity of the citizens involved, and so the nations involved, and from that, showcasing—again—both the fatal weaknesses of centrally planned economies in contrast with free markets, and the power of individual liberties and responsibilities for each citizen compared to the stultifying “security” of Big Government doing for the citizens, while firmly controlling what Big Government will allow those same citizens to do on their own.

The other fold is a mutual defense arrangement, much like NATO although separate from and in addition to it, with certain nations of eastern Europe.  As a first stage in setting this up, the treaty nations should include us, Great Britain, each of the Baltic States, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania.  This arrangement would profit from a second stage that would include Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.  In addition to the ties generated by trade, the mutual defense imperatives would both move toward a strong barrier to Russian expansionism, and it would spur economic development as a happy side effect—to both the nations’ benefit and further to resist PRC inroads.

Two Views of the Saudi Purge in Progress

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One is that

the “purge” is not about removing political rivals who threatened MBS’s [Mohammed bin Salman, the newly anointed Crown Prince] position as heir apparent but rather about sending a message to political and economic elites that their entitlement to extreme wealth and privilege, and their impunity, is coming to an end.

Indeed,

With the exception of Minister of the National Guard Prince Mutaib bin Abdallah, the detainee list is made up entirely of individuals who had no capacity to challenge the succession.

The other view is that

Despite his youth and inexperience, he [MBS] has risen rapidly through the ranks, amassing previously unimaginable powers for a single royal. This, and his refusal to govern through consensus—as is customary—has caused deep resentment, jealousy and anger. His most prominent critics and rivals were therefore carted off on corruption charges.

So, maybe a purge after all—but of whom?  Apparently not threats to his political power:

[T]he wider significance of this can only be fully understood in conjunction with events in Israel. The Jewish state is hardly a natural ally for Saudi Arabia, but they have long shared a common enemy: Iran.
…
So the two have been working together: close diplomatic cooperation, intelligence sharing and perhaps more.

And the possibility of an actual alliance may be growing.  The purge, thus, could be a clearing of the decks in anticipation of an Iranian-backed anti-Saudi Arabia program (expanding its Yemen program—recall the Houthi launch of an Iranian-supplied IRBM against Riyadh—supporting another client’s efforts against Saudi Arabia, …) if not an overtly fought military action.

Nor are the two views mutually exclusive, and they could be entirely independent of each other.  Overt dispute with Iran or not, the Saudi economy in the post oil-only economy can prosper only with corruption in government and other high places eliminated or at least greatly reduced.  On the other hand, Iran seems intent on taking over the Middle East, and that has negative implications for both Israel and Saudi Arabia.  With Iran’s view of how to run things, too, the implications would seem to be no less catastrophic for the Saudis, regardless of the degree of corruption.

Overstating the Case

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Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, on the occasion of his visit to the DMZ separating the Republic of Korea from northern Korea, had this to say, among other things:

North Korean provocations continue to threaten regional and global security….

We shouldn’t be feeding Baby Kim’s ego by puffing up the level of influence northern Korea has on security.  We should stick to “regional security,” and leave off references to “global,” even if the real impact might be global.

A Mistake

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Would a partitioned Iraq be a better pawn for Iran?  Or would a freed-up, independent Iraqi Kurdistan serve as a buffer to mitigate Iranian influence in the area—and an impediment to an Iranian road to Damascus and on to Latakia and Tartus on the Mediterranean Sea?  And an impediment to that road, passing as it would, right by Israel via Hezbollah?

An Iraq weakened by the partition would be easy prey for Iran?  No, that’s a wash for the weakened Iraq that’s already in Iranian sway, via all those Shiite “militias” that are funded and armed by Iran’s terror support organ, the Iranian Republican Guards Corps.

Recall two things: one is the Peshmerga and their courage and battlefield skill and tenacity in rescuing Yazidis from a mountain “island” during the initial Daesh barbarians’ rout of the Iraqi “army,” in stopping the barbarians’ rush east into Kurdish Iraq, in helping clear Mosul, and other events and campaigns.

The other thing is that all of this was done without support from Baghdad, done even with active Baghdad obstruction of US arms going to the Kurds so they could better fight the Daesh, who already were armed with American heavy weapons, courtesy of the Iraqi “army” which had abandoned all of that as they abandoned their duty and ran south before the Daesh, like grains of sand on a desert wind.

Now President Donald Trump is professing American neutrality as Baghdad, supported by Iranian forces (those “militia”) and Iranian weapons, moves into territories liberated by the Kurds from the Daesh and seeks to subjugate the Kurds, once again, to Baghdad’s diktat.

We don’t like the fact that they’re clashing.  …  We’re not taking sides.

And: what is the stability in the region before Iran’s advances with Iraq riven by civil war rather than stabilized by a settled Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan?

Where would an Iraqi Kurdistan, or even a subjugated Kurdish region, be regarding its policy toward the US were we to betray them in the present situation, as we betrayed them after the first Gulf War, implying they should revolt against a surviving Saddam Hussein government only to stand by while he gassed them into submission?

And there’s this bit from a Wall Street Journal editorial:

A central tenet of the Trump foreign policy, a work in progress, has been that the US would rebuild its relationship with America’s allies.

Who are the Kurds, if not an American ally?  Who are the Kurds, if not one of the staunchest allies we’ve had?

Shortsighted

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President Donald Trump is, IMNSHO, misunderstanding the role of diplomacy in a shooting conflict. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said,

He’s (Trump) not seeking to go to war.  He has made it clear to me to continue my diplomatic efforts…until the first bomb drops.

Of course, war should be a last resort, not a never resort, and Trump understands that.  But to say that diplomacy ends when the shooting starts, is mistaken.  Diplomacy doesn’t only shape the coming battlefield during a prior period of peace and during the runup to the fight.  It also shapes the battlefield during the fight: both directly with its (however minimal) impact on the enemy belligerents, but also on the periphery and the far field surrounding the battlefield through its impact on our allies, our enemy’s allies, and on neutrals.

It’s that diplomacy that affects the fight itself and, at least as importantly, sets the stage for post-fight actions.

Tillerson, again:

Rest assured that the Chinese are not confused in any way what the American policy towards North Korea (is) or what our actions and efforts are directed at[.]

Ongoing diplomacy maintains that clarity, as well as clarity of consequences, during and after the fight, both with our enemy’s allies (the People’s Republic of China in this case) and with our own allies (the Republic of Korea and Japan, for instance), as well as with neutrals like the EU, Vietnam, et al. (and make no mistake: the EU has shown itself neutral in the present matter of northern Korea with its own timidity of action).