Australian Trade with the PRC

Australia is finding much of its exports to the People’s Republic of China piling up in PRC ports (Australian wine is the proximate subject of the WSJ piece at the link)—not because the customers no longer want them but because the PRC government objects to Australian policies designed to limit PRC meddling in Australian domestic affairs.

From that, there’s this remark by Rob Taylor, the piece’s author:

Australia faces an awkward diplomatic balancing act in trying to address concerns about political interference while relying heavily on China for its economic well-being.

Stop being dependent on the PRC for trade. It’s as dangerous to be dependent on a single trading partner as it is for a business, or a nation, to be dependent on a single product.

There are lots of other markets around the world—and throughout Asia—for Australian goods and services. It’ll be expensive for Australia to wean itself off the PRC, but the payoff will be well worth it.

Other nations doing business with the PRC should consider the same weaning. After all, what’s the value of a large potential customer base when its government uses that connection for an economic Anschluss?

The Libya Model and the NLMSM

Much has been made of National Security Advisor John Bolton’s remark that the “Libya Model” would make a good example for handling northern Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear weapons development program.  That todo is centered on what the NLMSM is pleased to describe as the “Libya Model.”  Deutsche Welle‘s characterization is typical:

…North Korea could end up like Libya, which found itself in a civil war and its leader killed after giving up its nuclear weapons.

That’s not the Libya Model; it’s a deliberate conflation of two separate events.  The Libya Model is this.  Libya under Muammar Gaddafi had been subject to economic and political sanction as a result of its complicity in a number of terrorist acts for some years.  The US’ burning Saddam Hussein’s evil government in early 2003 was the final straw: in late 2003, Gaddafi agreed to give up his nuclear weapons program, and international facilities shortly after the agreement dismantled and removed all traces of it.  Libya lived peacefully with its neighbors in the ensuing years, and the incidence of its participation in terrorist activities fell off sharply, even if Gaddafi did continue to sorely abuse his own people.

Fully eight years later, an entirely separate event occurred.  As part of the Arab Spring of 2011, the Libyan people revolted against Gaddafi’s thuggish rule, and with the active support of European air power and American refueling aircraft and ordnance resupply (the European nations quickly ran out of bombs—literally—and had to be resupplied by us; those same nations also had no air refueling tankers of their own; two examples of a level of preparation that might sound familiar today), they succeeded in overthrowing the Gaddafi regime.

These cynical misrepresentations by the NLMSM do not help in dealing with rogue gangs like northern Korea’s rulers.

Europe, EU, and Iran

Walter Russell Mead had an op-ed in Monday’s Wall Street Journal wherein he suggested that, while Europe…is dismayed…with President Donald Trump, they still need us, as we need them.  There are, though, a couple of remarks that want response.

The Europeans should have checked the relevant clauses in the American Constitution, assessed the state of congressional sentiment, and realized that Mr Obama simply lacked the authority, political or constitutional, to commit the country permanently to such an agreement.

The Europeans knew—and know—this stuff full well. They’re just desperate for Iran’s post-JCPOA nuclear-armed missiles to fall elsewhere than Europe and hoping that their continued appeasement today might achieve that.

The Trump administration’s apparent indifference to European concerns….

Never mind that European leadership is utterly indifferent to the concerns of the US. European concerns are all that matters. Especially regarding those Iranian missiles and how much we owe Europe.

More Mindsets

Iran says that not only are Germany, France, and Great Britain not doing enough to satisfy the demands it’s made as a quid pro quo for staying in the nuclear weapons deal.  All of the EU must pay some vig.  Here’s Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif:

With the exit of the United States from the nuclear deal, the expectations of the Iranian public towards the European Union have increased….

That’s one mindset; unfortunately, it’s not unique to Iran: we exist, therefore, you owe.

Here’s another Iranian mindset:

The cascade of decisions by EU companies to end their activities in Iran makes things much more complicated[.]

The EU must take concrete supplementary steps to increase its investments in Iran. The commitments of the EU to apply the nuclear deal are not compatible with the announcement of probable withdrawal by major European companies[.]

Iranian businesses are completely under the control of the Iranian government.  Therefore, the companies of other nations must be controlled by those nations’ governments.  Those nations’ companies, therefore, must be required by their respective government masters to do business with Iran (through companies in Iran).

And this mindset from Germany’s Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas:

Giving it up means entering a completely uncertain future as far as the question of nuclear weapons in Iran is concerned.

It’s not really about Iran; it’s about our own original security interests, German as well as European.

Because not paying the vig would make Iran angry.  The EU wouldn’t like Iran when it’s angry.

Oh yeah, there’s one more mindset in play here.  Iran knows the mindset of the European signatories to the Iran nuclear weapons deal and how desperate those nations are to keep on Iran’s good side.  Iran is playing on that desperation to extort more goodies in return for Iranian pretty words of compliance.

Mindset

Here’s the new US offer regarding the Iran nuclear weapons deal; we’ll soon see pretty clearly the mindsets of Germany, France, and the UK.  And of Iran.

Iran must

  • end nuclear weapons development in perpetuity
  • stop all uranium enrichment
  • never preprocess plutonium
  • allow nuclear unqualified access to all sites throughout the country
  • withdraw all forces from Syria
  • end support for militant groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, youths militia and Taliban in Afghanistan, and the IRGC Quds Forces
  • stop sending arms to the Houthi militia in Yemen
  • release all US citizens
  • cease threats to destroy Israel
  • stop missile launches
  • stop development of nuclear-capable missiles
  • respecting Iraqi government sovereignty

In return, the US would

  • be willing to lift all economic sanctions
  • restore full diplomatic and commercial ties with Iran
  • allow it to access advanced technology
  • support modernization of Iranian economy
  • help it reintegrate into the global financial system

Big gains for Iran in recompense for serious Iranian behavior.

So: do the European parties to the existing nuclear weapons deal want stability and prosperity in the Middle East, or do they prefer appeasing Iran?  Do they care about Israel’s prosperity and safety in a nuclear weapons free Middle East, or do they prefer appeasing Iran?

Do they accept the terms on offer or have concrete, viable counteroffers (vis., include a demand for release of all British citizens), or…?