Gold-Backed Dollars

Murray Sabrin, a proud PhD holder and equally proud Associated Scholar at the Mises Institute, wants us to go back to a gold-backed dollar.

A sustainable path forward requires a gold-backed dollar….

This is risible on its face. Gold-backed dollars, or silver-backed, or whathaveyou-backed dollars are every bit as fiat currency as are floating dollars.

Franklin Roosevelt demonstrated this when he confiscated everybody’s privately held gold and then revalued the gold in dollar terms.

A metal-backed dollar is worth what a government says it is. A floating dollar is worth what the market says it is. The latter is sound(er) currency.

ARPA 2.0

The Federal government has taken equity stakes in some rare earth development and production companies as supply chain control moves. Now the government is taking equity stakes in a few companies nascent and still doing basic research that’s becoming increasingly engineering-to-production in a critical industry—quantum computing.

The Trump administration is awarding $2 billion in grants to nine quantum-computing companies in deals that include US government equity stakes, the Commerce Department said.

In the middle of the last century, the Federal government started the Advanced Research Projects Agency in response to the USSR’s successful launch of a Sputnik satellite, soundly beating us into space. ARPA’s mission, ultimately, was centered on high risk, high gain R&D projects that were too expensive for private enterprise to start, but which private enterprise could develop into thriving businesses once that initial hurdle was overcome.

Quantum computing is a Critical Item industry which neither Russia nor the People’s Republic of China has beaten us at, but their progress threatens to gain critical leads in. The output of those ARPA projects, however, did not encompass the government taking equity stakes in the companies that ultimately went into production with those outputs. The government’s current moves are shades of that earlier ARPA approach, with government stakes thrown in.

And this:

[A] senior Commerce official said the agency did so many different deals to spread out its bets, acknowledging that it could take years for them to pan out.

This is a government version of a long-standing investment tactic, gorilla investing. The idea as implemented by private investors is to shotgun investments into a collection of companies in a new(er) industry, and then as they develop, or not, begin selling off the nots, while keeping those still promising or beginning to achieve success, repeating the process until the investor is left with the one or two that are actually taking off and the gains from which vastly outpace those prior losses. The technique often works.

Quantum computing, other nascent technologies, even the established areas like rare earths, though, may well benefit even more without the government ownership but with increased reduction in the regulatory environment within which those areas are being developed.

Experts Everywhere

A couple of professors at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics want a body of Experts to supervise risks from emergent AI, saying that such a body would be better than an FDA-like regulatory body, or Congress through statutorily enabled product-safety laws.

They’re right that having a government body of experts like the FDA do this sort of thing is determinedly suboptimal. They’re right, also, regarding Congress, although Congress is considerably more malleable than a department or agency of bureaucrats.

But another body of Experts?

Bank supervision, which emerged in the Civil War and took its current form out of the Great Depression, offers the best framework for overseeing the most advanced AI labs.

After all,

Frontier AI labs such as OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google DeepMind are different.

And there’s always an excuse for standing up yet another bureaucratic regulatory body. In the case of their bank supervision model, about which they’re so enthusiastic, they give their game away [emphasis added].

Banks are too complex to govern through legislated rules alone, too important to leave to market discipline, and too dynamic for one-time approval.
Bank examiners often sit inside the institutions they oversee.

That’s the problem with our economic system government overlords. With the Panic of 2008, the Federal government created out of whole cloth the myth of some (ultimately government favored) businesses are too big to fail and so must always be guaranteed a government bailout. That confidence in the Federal apparatchiks sitting inside the banks also is misplaced. It’s only necessary to see the failures of the Silvergate, Signature, and First Republic banks to see the intrinsic failure of this. Those banks didn’t only fail through their own mismanagement; they also failed because their regulators were incompetent enough or lazy enough or complacent enough to miss those bank managers’ basic economics error of borrowing short-term while lending long-term and letting those two get ‘way out of balance. That allowed their short-term debts to come due before they had the long-term debt income to cover.

But the good professors want a board of Expert Apparatchiks inside the OpenAIs, Anthropics, and DeepMinds to oversee how these handle risks of emergent AI.

And this:

Banks share information with supervisors that they could never safely disclose publicly.

AI software is too important, too critical to national security, to share with apparatchiks of government. Our Federal government is infamous for its inability to defend against PRC cyber espionage. It’s infamous, also, for its bureaucrat employees leaking confidential financial data about businesses and persons of which those bureaucrats personally disapprove.

And this:

An AI risk supervisor could be funded by industry fees. Its leaders should be Senate-confirmed and removable by the president, but its expert staff should be insulated from day-to-day political pressure.

No.

Experts have their uses, often very important uses. On the witness stand to explain this or that aspect of a crime, balanced by another expert on the witness stand with a differing explanation. In police department forensics sections. As teachers in environments where their expertise is more important to the teaching than their teaching style. In medical and mental health doctor offices.

But in government? Not so much. Experts are useful when they’re part of a range of experts advising, as employees, the government’s decision makers. But as government decision makers? Definitely not so much. For the lack of utility of that last role, it’s only necessary to look at the Fauci-Collins-led experts as bureaucrats, or at the experts of the John Brennan and James Clapper CIA and ODNI, respectively.

The Supreme Court was right when it greatly reduced Chevon Deference in its Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo ruling, making clear that “experts” in government aren’t owed any particular deference on matters of government behaviors and decision-making.

So it is with emergent AI.

Who’s In Charge?

Is it a company’s leadership, ultimately hired by the company’s owners, the shareholders. or is it a couple of proxy advisers, whose income depends on being the ones consulted over management decisions?

Exxon Mobil, having grown fed up with the anti-business climate of New York, has put before its owners, its shareholders, the proposition that the company should go out from New York, move to Texas, and redomicile there.

The two largest Proxy Advisors aggregate to somewhere between 90% and 97% of the American proxy advisory market. The two, Glass Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services, are pushing those shareholders to reject the move.

(Aside: they’re not even American companies. Glass Lewis, although headquartered in San Francisco, is owned by Peloton Capital Management, a Canadian company. Institutional Shareholder Services, although headquartered in Rockville, MD, is owned by the German company, Deutsche Börse AG.)

Their motive is obvious. Texas, for instance,

lets companies domiciled in the state require that investors hold at least $1 million in market value, or 3% of voting shares, for six months to submit shareholder proposals. Companies can also require shareholders to own at least 3% of shares to bring lawsuits for breaches of fiduciary duty and self-dealing.

A successful move to Texas would encourage lots more companies to leave States with high business taxes, excessive regulatory environments, and especially relevant to this context, a heavily advisor-permissive suite of regulations. This is a significant reduction in the “advisors'” ability to…influence…the companies they choose to target.

Who runs, then, Exxon Mobil: the shareholders or Glass Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services?

Not a Chance

In an article about the future of travel coming to us in just 20 years, this prediction jumped out at me. From Scott Fleming, Aon‘s Director Aon Travel Practice:

My [AI travel booking] agent will know the places I like, it will have insight into my finances, my budget, my risk tolerances, all my preferences from the kind of room I like to my pillow type[.]

As British royal butlers and secretaries and other staffers, royal and commoner, British or elsewhere, routinely demonstrate, not even personal staff can be trusted with such personal information in such quantities and breadth. I’m certainly not going to trust a robot or other software package with all that information.