Primary Elections and Redistricting

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With the Supreme Court’s ruling on Louisiana v Callais et al. many more States are looking hard at redoing their district maps, ostensibly to eliminate Voting Rights Act-centered racial gerrymandering, and to enhance (Republican) partisan gerrymandering.

For good or ill (ill, I say), the current potential move very strongly emphasizes partisan gerrymandering. In the way, though, is the fact that many of the States looking here have already begun mail-in balloting for their primaries, or have completed their primary elections.

That’s an impediment, but I don’t see it as an impassable barrier. Primary elections are not final elections; those don’t occur until well after the political parties have made their nominations. Following those party decisions, the nominees will have months during which to campaign before the actual elections occur.

The dispositive factor, it seems to me, is that primary elections are strictly party-run elections; they are not bound by the laws for district/State/nation-wide elections. These party-run elections are conducted under party rules, albeit within overarching, generalized State criteria. Indeed, most jurisdictions limit primary election voting to members of the particular party fielding its own prospective candidate list. The general voting public isn’t involved in most of these jurisdictions.

That suggests to me that it’s a straightforward matter to cancel primaries in progress (as Louisiana is doing with its upcoming primary season), declare null completed primaries, and (re)hold them after a State’s redistricting effort is complete or has legislatively failed.

The Only Even Remotely Legitimate Move Re TPS

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The Supreme Court heard last Wednesday in an expedited manner (“certiorari before judgment” for the judicial nerds among us) oral argument in a case centered on whether a President’s Executive Branch agency can withdraw, on its own recognizance, Temporary Protected Status from immigration populations who remain here under that status. Several District and Appellate courts have said no, not without (judge-determined) sufficient interagency review of the matter.

The governing statute is quite clear: granting, withdrawing, extending, or not extending temporary protected status for folks from particular nations is not a justiciable matter; courts have no standing to adjudicate these decisions.

The only legitimate recourse those demanding TPS be extended/maintained for Haitians (for instance) is to argue that that governing statute limit is unconstitutional and should be struck. Even this, though, is itself doomed to failure. Here’s Art III, Sect 2, Clause 1 on judicial jurisdictions:

The [Supreme Court] judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity…to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party….

DHS, which is the agency with TPS responsibility within the United States, most assuredly is “the United States” in this context.

Here’s Art III, Sect 2, Clause 2 on judicial jurisdictions:

…the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

Under the Immigration Act of 1990 as amended, which created the Temporary Protected Status facility, there “is no judicial review of any determination” of the DHS secretary “with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state.”  That’s a pretty clear act of setting such Regulations—limiting the courts’ jurisdiction—here withdrawing TPS actions from judicial scrutiny.

And Art III, Sect 1:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

Federal District and Appellate courts, being inferior to the Supreme Court are bound by those same jurisdictional limits.

For good or ill, US courts have nothing to say regarding any aspect of Temporary Protected Status settings.

The Act, as amended, can be read here. The Act withdrew references to court jurisdiction and placed that jurisdiction within the State or INS district, or in the main, within the DHS.

A Powerful Security Tool

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That’s what Anthropic’s Mythos package is. Anthropic already has released it to 50 companies and organizations, and now it wants to release Mythos to an additional 70. This would be a terrible mistake of highly destructive proportions for our national security. The White House is entirely correct to object and to move to get Anthropic to not release it further.

In my not very humble opinion, the 50 releasees already are ‘way too many. As The Wall Street Journal‘s news writer noted, Mythos is fully capable of find[ing] and exploit[ing] software vulnerabilities.

As such, Mythos is the beginnings of both a powerful offensive weapon and a critically proactive defensive tool. Release it too widely, and it becomes a powerful offensive weapon and critically proactive defensive tool in the hands of our enemies. Leaks happen. As the adage so correctly has it, telling a secret to three people makes it no longer secret. Fifty is dangerously larger than three, and those additional seventy guarantee widespread access to Mythos by our enemies.

The better solution would be to leave Mythos in its currently restricted release state, and let Anthropic, or DHS/DoD apply it on request to any company wanting its software inspected for vulnerabilities. Let DHS/DoD encourage companies above a size (TBD) to ask for the inspection, with that inspection coming at a nominal fee. Companies above that size that do not apply for a Mythos inspection that are then successfully cyber attacked should be fined heavily for their negligence. With the availability of a tool like Mythos, the existence of a successful cyber attack would be prima facie evidence of the victim’s negligence.

Hmm….

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I wrote a bit ago about Yale’s “Reform” report. Lauren Noble, Buckley Institute founder, in her Monday letter to The Wall Steet Journal‘ Letters section, pointed out a couple of glaring omissions in that report that she’d spotted.

First, in 2021 Yale eliminated the process by which alumni could run for a spot on its governing board by petition. Alumni now only have the illusion of choice in who guides their alma mater. They select between Yale’s hand-picked candidates whom Yale prohibits from publicly discussing their views on issues. How does Yale expect to earn back the trust of the public if it doesn’t even trust its own alumni?

The Party candidates aren’t even trusted by those who chose them to speak properly in public? Hmm….

Second, Yale’s DEI efforts aren’t addressed. A recent Buckley Institute report found there are over 200 DEI staff still at Yale almost a year after the university supposedly ended its signature DEI program. Seventy-five of those staff were given new titles with less controversial terms. Yale needs to confront rather than hide from the legacy of these programs.

Again, I say,

Hmm….

Don’t Forget the Plutonium

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President Donald Trump (R) wants to eliminate Iran’s ability to generate enough fissionable uranium to make nuclear bombs, and he’s correct to want to do so, and to do so. He’s also correct to demand Iran turn over all of its already generated U-235, the uranium isotope used in making those bombs, of whatever purity the isotope has already been spun down to. There can be no peace from terrorism-generating Iran until those goals have been achieved.

However.

John Bolton, in his Monday Wall Street Journal op-ed, reminded us all, and Trump in particular, that we can’t afford to leave behind Iran’s accumulating stockpile of plutonium. Pu-239 is the plutonium isotope used in making nuclear bombs that are even more powerful than U-235 centered bombs.

The terrorists in Iran’s government, and their nuclear scientists are well aware of that fact, and they’re well aware of this, too: Pu-239, aside from being produced in nuclear reactors explicitly designed for the purpose, also is produced, in smaller quantities, as a natural byproduct of U-235-fed nuclear reactors that are built solely for power generation.

Of particular importance here—but not sole importance—is Iran’s “peaceful” nuclear reactor in Bushehr.

It gets worse:

Once Bushehr launched, its accumulating spent fuel amounted to ever larger amounts of accessible plutonium. … Based on current Russian estimates of spent-fuel levels at Bushehr and International Atomic Energy Agency estimates about the reactor’s energy production, nuclear-proliferation expert Henry Sokolski estimates that Iran has enough plutonium to make more than 200 nuclear weapons.

The Bushehr reactor isn’t Iran’s only nuclear reactor; it’s just the one they’re using explicitly to produce Pu-239. It’s necessary to control, or destroy, all of Iran’s “peaceful” nuclear reactors.