A New US-RoK Alliance?

That’s what Michael O’Hanlon, of the Brookings Institution wants.  He thinks a continued, but greatly reduced alliance would be a useful tradeoff for northern Korea’s elimination of its nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons development program along with a reduction in its conventional military forces.  Aside from the utter naivete of the suggestion that northern Korea would reduce its conventional capability along with giving up its nuclear capability—or especially in light of that cessation—one comment at the end of his piece really illustrates the naivete of his idea.

The heavy Army brigade now in Korea might be transformed into a light brigade, better suited for peacekeeping missions.

Peacekeeping missions are wholly incapable of keeping the peace unless they’re fully capable of fighting.  Unfortunately, peacekeeping missions are incapable of fighting a serious enemy (and police forces are better suited for dealing with unserious enemies—criminals).  A light brigade on that peninsula would not be a peacekeeper, it would be a target.

A Matter of Integrity

Elizabeth Bernstein asked—and she was serious—the question of when it’s appropriate to violate a confidence.

A while back, my sister, Rebecca, called with a request: she wanted me to book a flight to come and see her immediately—and not tell anyone.

Rebecca explained that she was having a breast biopsy the next day, was terrified to hear the results, and wanted me there for support. But she didn’t want to worry others in our family.

I jumped on a plane but wrestled with a dilemma. Many members of my family are doctors. Rebecca herself is an internist. Our father is an orthopedic surgeon and another sister is a gynecologist. I knew they would have advice for Rebecca—and would want to know if she were sick. But my sister asked me not to share what she told me. And I didn’t.

How do you decide whether to keep someone’s secret when there are good reasons to tell?

There are no good reasons to tell this sort of secret.  There are no good reasons to tell anyone’s secret of any sort, to violate any confidence, with a single exception.  Either the person being told the secret has honor and integrity, or he doesn’t, and giving up someone else’s secret is a terrible dishonor. There isn’t any middle ground.

Two days later, while I was sitting in Rebecca’s living room, I got a call from my mother. My sister, overwhelmed with worry, had told her about the biopsy she’d asked me to keep secret, and my mom was angry with me for preventing the rest of the family from supporting Rebecca. Then my other sister, the gynecologist, called, hurt that I didn’t seem to value her expertise. Too late, I realized that in keeping Rebecca’s secret, I might have betrayed others.

Not even close.  Those folks were completely out of line on two counts. One is directing their ire at Bernstein: she was keeping a confidence, as integrity demanded.  Their beef was with the sister for insisting they not be told.  That’s the other count: their beef was bogus.  The secret was the sister’s to tell, or not; it most assuredly was not the others’ to demand to hear.  Full stop.

“Essentially, you become a co-owner of the information,” says Sandra G Petronio, a communication professor and director of the Communication Privacy Management Center at Indiana University[.]

No, you don’t.  You become a co-keeper of the information, but ownership in no way, shape, or form, changes hands or gets diluted.

“Just having to think about someone else’s secret makes it harmful to our wellbeing,” says Michael Slepian, an assistant professor at Columbia Business School….

Having integrity, honoring obligations, isn’t all roses and sugar plums.  Doing the right thing isn’t always going to be easy, and rarely will it be comfy-cozy in the short term.

Here is the single reason a confidence can be violated: if the one passing the secret and asking for secrecy is describing her victim status in an abusive relationship. Then, and only then, can a confidence be violated, since the person’s life is in the wind.

Offensive, Is It?

Recall that President Donald Trump has decided to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum on national security grounds, and that these tariffs impact Canadian (among other nations’) imports to the US.  Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau finds it offensive that Trump considers Canada a security threat to the US.

Really, he said that.

No, what’s offensive is Trudeau’s cynical distortion of the purpose of those tariffs.  The national security threat for us is our inability to produce our own steel and aluminum, not the steel and aluminum we might import.  Whether tariffs are the best way to encourage recovery of that ability can be debated, but it’s clearly self-sufficiency that’s our concern, not imports per se.

Trudeau is young, and he has much to learn.  But he knows this much full well.

Private Enterprise and Social Media

In one of The Wall Street Journal‘s frequent debate articles, this time about whether businesses should allow employees to use social media at work, a couple of comments made by the pro-use debater jumped out at me.

When I first began helping companies use Twitter and Facebook more than a decade ago, every organization started with this question: how can we use social media without compromising our security and privacy obligations?

The answer to this question seems straightforward, yet the debater equivocated.  While a business needs access to social media for its advertising and other communications with current and future customers, the plain fact, made all the more plain with recently revealed misbehaviors of Facebook and Twitter, is that businesses cannot use social media without severe risk of compromising their security and privacy obligations.  The business models of social media like Twitter and Facebook depend on exploiting exactly those privacy data, and those enterprises—and not only Twitter and Facebook—have shown themselves incapable of maintaining security regarding those data.

And this one:

The same kind of risk/benefit assessment applies to the use of personal social-media accounts by employees.

While it is true that companies can reduce risk if they ban personal social-media use during business hours, discourage employees from making any online references to their work and maybe even ban personal smartphones from the workplace, that is a terrible idea for the same reason companies now embrace social-media marketing: you can’t be a successful company in the social-media era unless you accept some level of social media-related risk.

This is just flat wrong.  In the first place, there’s no reason at all an employee should be conducting personal business on company time and company equipment.  Normal breaks and lunch hours answer the first part, but it’s still company equipment.

More importantly, the claim of no success without employees on social media is wrong.  I worked for one of the most successful defense contractors in the world in our niche of the industry.  Along with hundreds of fellow employees I worked behind a cipher lock.  No radios (and so no cell phone), no personal tablets or laptops or the like, we were air-gapped from the Internet.  We survived the isolation.  In fact, we thrived in that environment, and so did our company.  Companies that don’t do classified work still do proprietary work.  There’s no more need for those employees to access the Internet than there was for us.  They’ll thrive, too.  Saying a business just must surrender and accept social media-related risk is nothing but a quitter’s attitude.

And: any company is better off operating short-handed than operating with an employee who will put the company at risk with his own security errors, especially if those errors flow from doing personal business on company time or equipment.

Thirty Days

That’s when NATO’s newly expanding rapid response force would be ready to act when called upon.

The alliance is planning to establish a pool of around 30,000 soldiers who could be operational within 30 days. They would be armed with several hundred fighter jets and ships, according to high ranking NATO diplomats cited by the paper [Welt am Sonntag]. The new troops would be in addition to the already established NATO Response Force (NRF), which has around 20,000 soldiers.

This would be risible if it weren’t so incompetent.  It took 36 days for Germany to overrun Poland with numerically inferior forces at the start of last century’s WWII.  It took Germany 46 days to overrun France with numerically and technologically inferior forces at the start of that war.

Russian forces may remain numerically inferior, but they’re not technologically inferior.  Beyond that, 21st century forces are much faster and strike with much greater precision and with much greater power.

A “rapid” response force that can’t be ready for 30 days likely won’t find a fight to enter.  Such a response time harks back to WWI and prior wars where mobilization occurred first and took several weeks to complete.  Today’s force-on-force war will begin with a limited mobilization at most and a running start.  And I’ve elided the likely parallel cyber attack that will be fought to the detriment of communications, even impacting the target’s sensor systems’ ability to say that an attack is underway.  That cyber attack will shorten further the response time available.

A nation or a bloc that forms a “rapid” response force that can’t be ready for 30 days isn’t taking the matter seriously.