America’s Future—Foreign Policy Principles, Part V

I have posted here (which has links to my other posts on this subject) on other aspects of our necessary future foreign policy.  In this post, and as a segue to an upcoming series on defense policy and force structure, I want to talk about the meaning of “war” and “state of war”  from a diplomatic perspective and then suggest some things that such an understanding might imply for foreign policy.  There is far more to war than shooting and exchanging missile fire; although overtly military actions are certainly central aspects of war, especially in the end game.  A clear understanding also is necessary if State and Defense are to work together as the unified whole they must in order for the United States to effectively defend itself in wars of any type.

“War” or “state of war” are more than just formalistic, legalistic conditions involving Congress announcing that we’re at war.  A “declaration of War” by Congress under Article I, Section 8 is in the end only an acknowledgment that we’re already in a war.  For instance, FDR’s 8 December 1941 request for Congress’ declaration of war against Japan closed with this acknowledgment:

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese empire.

Congress’ subsequent declaration also acknowledged that it was simply codifying with its declaration that war was already in progress:

Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America….

and

That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared….

Thus, with the legalism of a declaration, we merely acknowledge that a state of war has existed and that we’ve been in a war for some time.  A formal declaration finds use only insofar as it triggers certain legal conditions and parameters that exist in a formal state of war that do not exist in an on-going war that has not been officially announced.

It’s necessary, at this point, to understand what an “act of war” is.  An act of war has meaning on three levels: one is a precipitating action that triggers a formal acknowledgement that a war is in progress: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, for instance.  A second meaning includes an action conducted within the confines of an ongoing, declared war and in prosecution of it: shooting down enemy aircraft, or foot soldiers fighting a battle against each other, for instance.  A third meaning is an action conducted within the confines of an ongoing war that is as real as the formally declared war but which has not been formalized by the participants’ public declarations of war.  A terrorist attack by a non-national organization on buildings and the occupants of them (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, various centers in Mumbai, India) and the killing of terrorists for these and in preempting other attacks are examples of this third meaning.

It’s this third meaning that is of interest in this series of foreign policy principles, and it is the non-national organizations, the terrorist organizations, with which this post is primarily concerned.

Being at war, from a diplomatic perspective, is more than just the tautology of Carl von Clausewitz’ remark about war being an extension of diplomacy.  There are diplomatic considerations applicable during war, including the not-formally-declared war, as well.  These begin with understanding the goals of the nation or non-national organization that is attacking us, a critical matter of catch-up if the strike was unpredicted, and an equally critical matter of anticipation when the enmity has been well-known for some time, and the tensions observed to have been building through that time.  But the diplomatic considerations also apply to hidden wars, especially when we finally realize that we are under attack (vis., cyber war.  This and other forms of “hidden” war are described briefly below).

For instance, the goals Islamic terrorists have for their war on us are not well understood, not least by our politicians.  The present administration, and its predecessors, have long shown little interest in understanding their goals, satisfying themselves with bringing the perpetrators to “justice.”  The Clinton administration considered terrorist acts simply to be crimes.  The succeeding Bush administration understood that we were at war, in some sense, but did not look into the terrorists’ purposes, satisfying itself solely with making war on Al Qaeda and “every terrorist group of global reach;”  although President Bush did understand one goal of Al Qaeda, in particular: “Its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.”   The Obama administration has been even less investigative of terrorist goals, satisfying itself with killing Al Qaeda leaders and “bringing the troops home.”

Yet buried in the incuriosity is a statement by a terrorist leader, Hussein Massawi, a former leader of Hezbollah:

We are not fighting so that you will offer us something. We are fighting to eliminate you.

And there’s this from Sayyed Hassan Nasralleh, Hezbollah’s Secretary General:

“Death to America!” was, is, and will stay our slogan.

Within this clear, but not yet internalized by our government, statement of the purpose of a terrorist war, for instance, we can gain a clearer understanding of what’s included in “acts of war.”

Beyond the overt actions of forces invading another nation, or bombing its harbors and ports, or the like, acts of war also include, within this third meaning, such things as the following, which is an illustrative list, only (other examples are described here):

  • attacking another nation’s embassy and imprisoning the diplomats, staff, and families within it
  • sending personnel—terrorists—into another nation to murder citizens of a third nation
  • sending personnel—terrorists—into another nation to murder diplomats of a third nation
  • actively supporting piracy

In addition to these plain acts of terrorism, which are a subset of acts of war, are these additional acts of war—acts that often begin as part of a hidden war:

  • shipping, as part of ordinary trade, poisoned products: formaldehyde-laced gypsum board, or toxic baby food, for instance.
  • manipulating currency values so as to damage our economy.
  • attacking our computing and/or communications networks, or our computer-controlled infrastructure, with cyberware capable of damaging/destroying those targets, or planting malware that will be used “later” for that purpose.
  • actively supporting nations and non-national organizations that do the above

With this understanding, from a diplomatic perspective, of the nature of war, what can foreign policy do to support the successful prosecution of such a war thrust upon us?  It’s important to understand that these are actions that occur in parallel, and in coordination, with military actions; they are not limited to being prior to military action, nor are they conducted instead of military action.  They are not merely a point of departure from which military action extends.

The first thing foreign policy can do is to guide our efforts to help our enemies find a way to stop being our enemies.  They do not need to become friends or allies, although this certainly would be desirable, but by no longer being our enemies, they will no longer be getting killed by us, and more importantly, they will no longer be killing us (or trying to).  In practice, this will most likely apply to our enemies’ allies, but it does not automatically exclude the enemies themselves.  Plainly, this must begin with an understanding of our enemies’ motive in attacking us.  In the case of Islamic terrorists, it would seem that convincing our enemies will not occur; we can, though continue to work on their allies and supporters.

Along with this, foreign policy can guide our efforts to convince other nations to allow us entry into their jurisdiction so as to bring down enemy individuals—terrorists—or gain other nations’ cooperation in their bringing to justice those individuals.  Additionally this can facilitate our efforts to engage foreign intelligence and law enforcement organizations to share information and to obtain assistance in identifying, tracking down, and capturing active terrorists before they can strike.

Finally, foreign policy can guide our efforts to understand the needs and imperatives of relevant nations and non-national organizations (both outright enemies and those who, by supporting our enemies have demonstrated their own enmity and complicity), the better to target such other actions as embargos of critical resources and isolation from the global network (or outright disruption) of their financial systems, including the central banks of relevant nations.

Update: Corrected some (egregious) formatting problems.

Do-Nothing…Congress?

That’s the mantra of President Obama, Progressives generally, and the NLMSM.  But what’s actually going on?

In the Senate, we’ve had no budget offering, despite a legal requirement for one, for 900 days.  Indeed, the Senate has actively refused to propose a budget for those two and a half years.  We see legislation offering tax cuts blocked unless those cuts can be “paid for” with tax increases elsewhere.  We see active suppression of legislation encouraging pipeline infrastructure development which would produce tens of thousands of jobs promptly.  We see legislation sent directly to the floor of the Senate, bypassing committee opportunities for debate, with debate on the floor further blocked, thus rendering the legislation’s movement to a vote impossible.

In the House, we have a budget passed that actively cuts spending and offers reform for Social Security and Medicare so those programs can survive.  We have 17 separate jobs-related bills passed.  We have 5 bills related to American energy independence passed.  We see active support for fiscal moves that contribute both to reducing the nation’s debt and eliminating the annual budget deficit (a necessary prerequisite to lowering the debt).  We have a procedure that requires committee debate followed by floor debate.

The budget, the jobs bills, and the energy bills sit idle in the Senate, as the world’s greatest deliberative body refuses to consider them in any way.

Do-nothing Congress, indeed, but is it Congress as a whole, or one house of Congress that is bent on doing nothing?

Hmm….

More Regulations, or Thank you, Sir; May I Have Another?

There has been plenty of commentary about the EPA’s regulatory excesses in various areas; I’ll not go into those.  Here are a couple of other examples of Big Government in action, though.  For our own good, of course.  And one that we desperately need that government hasn’t yet supplied.

Power Line tells about a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that rain falling onto forest roads wants tight regulation.  It turns out that when this water passes through a culvert or some such that a forester has added to the road he built for logging access, the rain becomes polluted with…something, and the culverts, says the 9th Circuit, are point sources of pollution that might contaminate that rainwater.  With 378,000 miles of roads in our national forests alone, some 400,000 permits will be required to handle that nasty rainwater (some roads have more than one culvert), and it’ll take roughly 10 years before the requisite permits can be issued (assuming that process goes smoothly) and the logging can resume.

What’s the logic for this?  Oh, wait, here it is: the housing industry’s bubble bursting caused our present economic malaise.  Bad housing.  Bad.  We’ll cut off your supply of wood.

Next, Steven Nelson of The Daily Caller reports this.  The Clean Up Government Act is going to really clear out corrupt gift giving and conflicts of interest.  For instance, a part-time state legislator who also owns a car dealership could find himself, as a result of the Act, in Federal criminal violation of the Act by voting on a highway bill.  A potential (but not certain) ethical violation—certainly that should be a Federal felony.

On the matter of gift giving, it’s currently illegal to give or accept gifts for or because of any official act.  Gifts that are given or received by public officials because of their position also are already handled by existing regulations: when the gift-giving occurs, and refusing the gift would be offensive (for instance to a foreign dignitary who made the gift), it’s received and turned over to the proper government authority.  This Act, though, would ban all such gifts.  Can’t have those exceptions.

Finally, Daily Markets offers this.  According to this table golf is three times more dangerous than hunting with firearms.  Hmm….  We have regulations that govern the conditions of ownership and transportation of firearms.  We have regulations that govern the interstate sale of long guns, or rifles.  The government even reserves to itself the definition of “sporting,” the only legal purpose for importing a firearm.  Where are the regulations governing the possession and transport of golf clubs?  How do we know that golf bag is safe, much less legal?  Where are the regulations governing the interstate sale of long clubs, those dangerous drivers and low irons?  Under what conditions might we import a golf club from Canada, or Scotland?

And tennis?  What are we to do?

Is There any Clearer Demonstration

…of Attorney General of the United States Eric Holder’s incompetence than his own words?

As reported in The New York Post by Michael Walsh and in Politico:

  • About who ordered Fast and Furious: “We don’t know yet.”
  • Even though he is “ultimately responsible for everything that happens in the Department of Justice….”  Yet “There are all kinds of operations going on right now in the Justice Department about which I know nothing because of the way the Department of Justice is structured.”
  • After Holder told Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R, UT) that he had never discussed Fast and Furious with President Barack Obama, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or the president or attorney general of Mexico, “You have to understand something about the way Washington works, here, OK?  The meaningful conversations that happen between DHS and DOJ that happen at lower levels, between investigators.… [Obama, et al.] can find out about my state of involvement in matters connected to the Justice Department without speaking directly to me.”
  • The recently withdrawn letter from DoJ to Congress denying federal responsibility for Fast and Furious did not contain lies, “…because it all has to do with your state of mind and whether or not you had the requisite intent to come up with something that would be considered perjury or a lie.”
  • “I have no intention of resigning.  I’m the attorney general who put an end to these misguided tactics that were used in Fast and Furious.”

and

  • “I’m a big guy. I’ve been in Washington for a long time.”

Deterrence

Deterrence is one means of influencing another nation’s behavior.  It is, by its nature a passive activity, relying as it does on persuading another nation not to do something by threatening a response so powerful that any gain from the undesired behavior is overwhelmed by the loss from the threatened response.  One nation might deter another from initiating a nuclear attack, for instance, by threatening a nuclear response of devastating effect.

But deterrence, to be successful, relies on a number of factors, only some of which are under the control of the deterring nation.  One of those factors is actually having the ability to deliver the threatened response and the ability to defeat the other nation’s initiating action.  This is generally within the control of the deterring nation.  Either the United States, for instance, has the ability to deliver a devastating response and to defeat sufficiently the initial action, or we do not, and within limits, only we make the determination acquire/maintain those abilities.  Another factor in deterrence is the will to use that strength, should the nation we’re trying to deter act anyway.  This is a shared factor, though, depending not just on our actual will, but on the other nation’s perception of our will.  We can manage that perception only by acting meaningfully and decisively with lesser consequences in response to lesser actions.  If we do not deliver those lesser consequences, the nation we wish to deter will have no reason to believe we’ll respond with our described deterrence actions.  A third factor on which deterrence depends is the clarity of our position.  The consequences of the other nation’s action must be well understood by that nation.  This also is a shared factor: communication is a two-way street, and we must ensure that the other nation does get the message.  A fourth factor in deterrence is the other nation’s tolerance for the damage we’ll inflict should they strike and we respond as our deterrence position says we will.  The moment the other nation decides the cost is worth the gain, our deterrence ceases to exist, and we must adjust our deterrence—and defensive—posture.  And we must recognize the other nation’s tolerance for pain in order to make the adjustments.  This factor, other than our understanding, is entirely under the control of that other nation.

With these thoughts in mind, let’s look at our ability to deter today.

We say we do not want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, going so far as insisting that such a thing is unacceptable.  How have we gone about pursuing that goal?  This administration began by extending an open hand to Iran, if only they would unclench their fist: we would negotiate with them, offer them incentives, including help with enriching uranium to the level that an Iranian nuclear power plant needs in order to function effectively.  In truth, the negotiation attempts did not originate with the Obama administration; prior administrations had been pursuing this path all along.  When it became clear that the open hand, the negotiations, were failing, then this administration began a parallel course of threatening ever stronger sanctions, and repeated attempts to apply them.

Indeed, President Obama insists that “this administration has systemically imposed the toughest sanctions on…Iran ever.  When we came into office, the world was divided.  Iran was unified and moving aggressively on its own agenda. Today, Iran is isolated and the world is unified in applying the toughest sanctions that Iran has ever experienced and it’s having an impact inside Iran.”

The Iranian response, though, has been continued effort, and progress, toward nuclear weapons acquisition.  The “toughest sanctions” were ineffective, and part of their ineffectiveness was the active interference with global sanctions by Russia and the People’s Republic of China.  Indeed, Iran has taken to openly attacking diplomatic missions in Teheran, and they’re dispersing their medium range missile systems, making them harder to target should Iran take overt military action.

Our deterrence effort vis-à-vis Iran has failed on a number of fronts.  We did not demonstrate any particular will to apply serious consequences at any stage of our interactions with Iran.  We have not demonstrated even the capability to apply serious consequences.  Even our message is muddled: we’ve never really spelled out the consequences of their continued efforts or of their actually getting nuclear weapons: we’ve only made fatuous remarks about sanctions and vague threats of “no option is off the table.”  Finally, Iran has determined that it’s willing to bear the costs we might inflict.

With Russia, it’s a slightly different story.  The question here is who is actually deterring whom.  The Russians object to our having a missile shield to protect against Iranian missiles (against northern Korea’s missiles, too, but Russia’s public objections have centered on a defensive deployment in Europe).  Shortly after President Obama took office, Russian objections became quite vociferous as we concluded agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to install components of the shield in each nation.  The Russians said that if we persisted, they would move nuclear weapons into western Russia from where they could strike Europe.  They also made direct threats to destroy Poland with nuclear strikes.  We canceled those agreements and agreed not to deploy a missile shield there.  (As an aside, keep in mind that this missile shield would have been part of that larger deterrence against Iranian use of their nuclear weapons—an ability to defeat a strike by them.

Now The Weekly Standard reports that

The Obama administration is…undertak[ing] what amounts to an off-schedule Nuclear Posture Review—one that ices out Defense and State Department experts usually consulted on nuclear issues.  It is also beginning a new round of talks with Moscow here in Washington next week that many observers believe will result in the United States offering to trade U.S. strategic weapons in exchange for reductions in Russian tactical weapons.

Further,

[T]he Obama administration is looking to make unilateral cuts….  Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has suggested that to save money the administration might have to eliminate America’s land-based 450 single-warhead Minuteman III ICBMs (though ICBM sustainment is but a rounding error in the DoD budget)….”

It may be that Panetta’s threats are mere polemics in an attempt to protect the Defense budget from the cuts mandated by the Super Committee’s failure.  However, against the backdrop of Russia’s just concluded success at deterring us from deploying a defensive system—the flip side of which is our appeasement of them (which itself comes against the backdrop of our acquiescence in the Russian partition of an American ally, Georgia), it’s reasonable to ask whether we’re being further deterred, this time from having sufficient offensive weapons with which to respond to an attack against which we no longer can defend ourselves.  Understand: whether we’re conning the Russians (or conning ourselves) into accepting the decommissioning of supposedly obsolete ICBMs in return for their decommissioning of (obsolete) tactical missile systems or we’re being deterred from maintaining an offensive leg of our triad makes no difference.  We’ll lose a major fraction of our offensive capability.  Further, the tactical systems will be faster and cheaper to replace in the event of a breakout and arms race than will be the strategic systems.  And they will be more immediately decisive in a fight, especially one in which we have no defenses.

With no missile defense capability and with such reductions in our offensive capability, where is our ability to satisfy either the first factor in deterrence: the capability to respond?  And with the reduced capability to respond at all, the pain threshold is much harder to cross, also, giving Russia much less pause as they consider an offensive move.  Russia seems to be moving our behavior in directions satisfactory to it, however.

It’s different yet with the PRC, but not optimistically so.  We have a legal obligation to keep the Republic of China well enough armed with modern weapons that they can defeat an attack by the PRC.  Yet when we began the latest round of talks with Taiwan, the PRC objected so vociferously that we walked away from an initial sale of 66 modern F-16s, and agreed only to sell our ally a couple dozen of outmoded F-16s.

Further, the PRC is increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea, threatening American allies (vis., the Philippines) and potential allies (vis., Vietnam) and seizing key islands—including those that belong to the Philippines and Vietnam—and claiming them for itself.  The American response to this has been…silence.

Finally, DoD is on record as saying that the PRC is developing their own road-mobile ICBM (a capability which the Soviet Union had developed in the early days of mobile ICBMs), and they’ve dug a 3,000 mile tunnel system in which to hide their ICBM force.  They’ve also dismissed out of hand an offer of a joint weapons verification facility proposed by then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

Here, it’s clear that the PRC does not consider that we have the will to act, and so any ability to act does not concern them.  Nor have we said anything at all about consequences for their continued aggressiveness.  Finally, as they demonstrated with their human wave attacks in the Korean War, they’re perfectly willing, literally, simply to throw bodies into a fight until we run out of ammunition.  The degree of damage they’re willing to absorb is quite high.

So here we are with our deterrent capability.  Iran is about to acquire nuclear bombs, and it already has the missile systems with which to deliver them.

Russia has convinced us not to deploy a missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic.  Russia threatens our allies and any new, potential defensive systems we might deploy with nuclear attack, and it does so with impunity.  Indeed, the imbalance has reached the point where we can’t even determine for ourselves whether we will acquire/maintain the strength necessary for us to deter Russia.  We’re negotiating our arms levels with them.

The PRC threatens our allies and potential allies over sea resources and key islands in South China Sea and over our erstwhile willingness to provide the Republic of China the resources with which to resist a PRC invasion.

Given all of this, what happens when Iran gets its nuclear weapons?  Which of us will be deterred then?  From what else will we be deterred by Russia and the PRC?  What will we deter these three from doing?

Finally, a closely related aside on the question of appeasement: President Obama insists “Ask Osama bin Laden and the 22 out of 30 top al-Qaida leaders who have been taken off the field whether I engage in appeasement.  Or whoever is left out there, ask them about that.”

Let’s also ask Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Vladimir Putin, Hu Jintao, and Kim Jong-il, how American strength and steadfastness is working out.  Oh, and congratulations to President Obama on his success in carrying out President Bush the Younger’s drone and bin Laden policies.