How is this Possible?

In an apparent attempt to obviate the need to move forward with a Congressional contempt citation of the Attorney General of the United States, that AG, Eric Holder, last Thursday sent a letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Congressman Darrell Issa (R, CA).  In this letter, Holder offers to provide to the Committee many of the “Fast and Furious” documents subpoenaed and heretofore withheld by Holder, and Holder offered personally to brief Issa in the subject.

This is a good start, but there’s more to this story.  Here’s an amazing paragraph from that letter [emphasis added].

The record in this matter reflects that until allegations about the inappropriate tactics used in Fast and Furious were made public, Department leadership was unaware of those tactics.  Indeed, as the documents we provided to the Committee relating to the drafting of the February 4 letter reflect, Department leaders were assured by the heads of Department components in the best position to know the true facts that the allegations being made were “categorically false.”  However, over a period of months in 2011, as documents to be provided to the Committee were collected and reviewed, and as witness testimony before the Committee was evaluated, Department leadership learned more and began to assess the facts of this matter independently.  The Department’s understanding of the facts underlying Fast and Furious became more developed, particularly as evidence came to light that was inconsistent with the initial denials provided to Department personnel.  Over time, Department leadership came to recognize that Fast and Furious was fundamentally flawed, as I noted in my October 7, 2011 letter to you and other members of Congress….

This fast and Furious operation was conducted under the auspices of the DoJ.  These data, concerning the misbehavior, were in the DoJ’s hands all along.  “Department leadership” (read: Holder) didn’t know these data?  How is he leading his Department if he can’t even get his own subordinates to talk to him?  How is he leading his Department if, alternatively, he chooses to be ignorant of the data in his subordinates’ hands until outside agencies force him to look at them?

What level of competence produces this quality of performance?

Finally, keep in mind that the House Committee didn’t begin its own investigation until well after Agent Terry’s murder.  Holder could have put this whole matter to rest—indeed he could have avoided all of  this hoo-raw, all of this expenditure of taxpayer money—if only he’d listened to the Clue Bird when it presented him with the murder of a government agent, presented him with a murder victim with weapons his own Department was turning over to drug cartels near the body.

The complete Holder letter can be seen here.

Lending in Europe

I don’t often take issue with The Wall Street Journal, but a recent column by David Wessel cries out for a response.  His column is a description of the potential for an unraveling of the euro zone and of the euro itself, and of what needs to be done to preserve them both.

Wessel notes that [emphasis mine]

Today, banks in one euro-zone country are reluctant to lend to banks in another for fear that they won’t get repaid.  Bank lending among euro-area banks at the end of 2011 was 60% below the 2008 peak.  Money is moving not through usual bank-to-bank channels but only through the European Central Bank.  The urge…has given way to a rush to “ring-fence” assets and liabilities within individual countries.

He notes further that

Banks and investors are increasingly unwilling to buy bonds of governments other than their own.  Stronger northern European banks are reluctant to lend to customers and governments in southern and Eastern Europe.

You bet—see that bit about not expecting to be repaid.  Surely, it is no surprise that one enterprise declines to do business with another, or with a government, that the first views as unreliable.  Such a decision is entirely reasonable—it’s how sound businesses stay sound, for their own good, for the good of their employees, for the good of their larger community.

Wessel then quotes an example offered by Philipp Hildebrand, a former Swiss central banker, in an effort to show the unfairness of the situation:

Consider two similar companies, one Austrian and one Italian, that produce the same thing and sell to customers in Tirol in Austria.  The difference: the Italian firm, through no fault of its own, has to pay six percentage points more to borrow money.  “It kills whatever effort you make on structural reform,” [Hildebrand] said.

This is certainly too bad for the Italian firm and for the Italian government’s effort at reform, but where is the unfairness of the advantage to the Austrian firm?  The Italian firm operates under a government whose policies work against that firm’s ability to honor its obligations.  Further, how does this obligate in any way the German or Dutch or Finnish—or Austrian—taxpayer?

Beyond Europe’s new bailout of Spanish banks, there is talk of strengthening the authority of a pan-European banking supervisor…and creating a pan-European deposit-insurance fund so Italian depositors won’t move euros from Italian banks to safer German ones.

But this is insane.  In the first place, why shouldn’t Spanish depositors, or Italian depositors, or…—taxpayers all—move their money to safer locations?  Why should the taxpayers in those safer locations be on the hook for making other nations’ debtors, including those governments, whole?  There’s a very good reason some banks are safer than others, some economies sounder than others.  Some took—and take—better care of their fiscal responsibilities.

Banks are hunkering down at home.  National regulators are acting to protect their banks from the rest of Europe.  Governments are rebuilding old walls to protect taxpayers from bailing out others’ banks.

Why should they not?  By what remotest stretch of imagination should a sound bank be required to lend to an unsound bank—see the bit above about repayment expectations?  Why should taxpayers of one nation be required to throw their own hard-earned money into the bottomless pit of the profligate—see the bit above about repayment expectations?

And if this means the breakup of the euro zone and its currency, well, I’ve written about that elsewhere.

Government Censorship

Readers know that I’m no fan of the NLMSM.  However, now we hear of a naked attempt to turn the press—that erstwhile bastion of freedom—into an arm of the Federal government, all at the behest of President Obama’s Labor Department.

Labor officials have put forward a plan to require reporters who analyze and write about economic data which Labor provides in its “lock up” room to use government—Labor—computers, software(!?), and Internet accesses so the government, they claim, can protect itself against potential security hacks.

I have some beachfront property in central New Mexico on offer for those who believe this claim.

This is nothing but the government’s attempt to dictate to the press what they will be permitted to see and what they will be permitted to say about what they will see.  Bloomberg News Executive Editor, Dan Moss, testifying before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, has the right of it:

This proposal threatens the First Amendment.  The government would literally open the reporters’ notebooks.

(As an aside, it’s interesting to note that the Senate’s Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee isn’t conducting any hearings on the matter.)

Carl Fillichio, a Labor communications specialist, told committee Chairman Darrell Issa (R, CA) after Wednesday’s hearing that he, Fillichio, would provide “some flexibility” on a June 15 deadline for the plan’s implementation.  Notice that: a communications specialist, not a Labor official with actual authority, claims to be in a position to commit the Department.  Fillichio did then send an email to Bloomberg, The Washington Examiner, and others, saying in part

Per my commitment to Chairman Issa’s request, we are going to move the effective date on changes to the lock up[.]

Notice this, too: there’s no commitment by this underling—or by anyone in authority at Labor, or by anyone in Obama’s White House—to eliminate this plan; there’s only a “commitment” to move its effective date.

Fox News‘ headline in the linked article is naïve.  This isn’t a backing off.  This is just cynical delay and a weasel-wording of a pseudo-change made by a junior functionary.  This obfuscation is of a piece with the HHS contraceptive, sterilization, and abortifacients insurance coverage “compromise.”  The plan will go into effect essentially unchanged, unless there’s more outcry and more pressure put on our Congressmen to withdraw by legislation this plan’s attack on our freedom (which also will force Obama’s explicit veto).

Regulations and Foreign Law

The Fed wants to put our own banking system under the aegis of international banking regulators.  Not directly, but by requiring all American banks—including even our smallest institutions—to meet the capital requirements of Basel III.  Basel III is an international standards “agreement” carrying international bureaucrats’ view of what constitutes a bank’s capital adequacy; those bureaucrats’ view of proper stress testing of a bank; and those bureaucrats’ view of the adequacy of a bank’s liquidity, apart from its capital adequacy.

There’s more: the Fed intends to impose on each bank a 1%-2.5% surcharge on its (increased) capital—because the Fed has a better understanding of how the bank’s capital should be used than does the bank.

Aside from whether US businesses should be under the control of foreign quasi-governmental agencies—a meme this administration is increasingly embracing—smaller financial institutions will have trouble meeting the additional requirements.  This is apparent from the results, in market share and profit margin, of this sort of intervention.  Lenders with $1 billion or less in assets have seen their market share fall to the neighborhood of 10% from the 31% they held in the early ’90s, and smaller banks had a return on assets of 1.22% for the first quarter of this year, compared with 1.52% for those with more than $1 billion in assets, just from the existence of the Fed’s domestic regulatory requirements.  So much for too big to fail.  The Fed is busily instituting too small to survive.  (And as an aside, notice those profit margins.  So much for fat cat bankers.  Those are the margins of chain grocery stores.)

There’s yet more.  The Fed doesn’t want banks to rate their riskiness in any effective way.  It intends to  force banks to stop relying on credit ratings when looking at their own assets’ riskiness.  Instead, the risk classifications of another foreign entity, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, are to be used.  The OECD Knows Better.

Hmm….

A Short History Lesson

Much ado has been made about the Great Depression and of the Panic of 2008, whose effects we’re still feeling.  Here is a brief history of another economic depression, one that could have had devastating impact, the depression that occurred in the US in 1920-1921.

In the 18 months between January 1920 and August 1921, our unemployment rate jumped to 14% or so from about 2%, as estimated from the times’ inexact records; wholesale prices fell more than 40%; and industrial production fell 23%.  From peak to trough, the total of checking accounts and currency fell by nearly 11%.  Some today might have considered the survival of the banking system as a whole to be in the wind.  The farm economy also was hard hit, and there were waves of business failures.  What interventions did the government effect to rescue the nation from this devastation?  The most effective intervention a government can execute with a free economy: it sat on its collective hands and let the economy right itself.

The Harding administration very deliberately ran a budgetary surplus. The Fed, with less than a decade’s worth of bad habits to influence it, raised interest rates, increasing the cost of money (and increasing the value of savings).   In response, the economy in 1922, the first full year of recovery, increased industrial production more than 27%, and by 1923, unemployment was back down to 3%.

What happened?  Market forces, unfettered by Know Betters in the government, happened.  The US and our goods and services were dirt cheap, and bargain-hunting investors from overseas jumped on the opportunity with both feet.  No central banker had to instruct investors in what to do with bargains.  Money flowed into the US, and this inflow delivered a powerful monetary stimulus.

Moreover, that 40% drop in prices meant that Americans’ dollars were able to buy more.  This increase in the value of our money—wonks call it the “real balances effect”—enabled Americans in our aggregate to begin again to buy goods and services.  Which stimulated demand for new production, which stimulated job creation.

And those banks that a Hank Paulson might have panicked over?  The biggest casualty was the little First National Bank of Cleburne, Texas, with its deposits of $2.8 million. That certainly hurt those Cleburne depositors, but the damage was that limited.  No bank was “too big to fail” in those days, and no big bank did.

That depression lasted all of 18 months, and over its course—one more little tidbit—the nation’s debt was reduced by nearly 6%, to a shade under $23 billion.  The Great Depression lasted 10-17 years (depending on who you read) and added billions to our debt—even before WWII, and the Panic of 2008 is still being felt four today, years later, and our national debt still is exploding by trillions of dollars per year.

Yet the Obama administration has cynically ignored the lessons the Harding administration could teach about not intervening in a free economy.  Rather, Obama and his “advisors” have chosen to listen to a fellow Progressive, Franklin Roosevelt, and so to ignore the manifest failures of government intervention into that more publicized depression.  Obama has chosen to double down on those failures with his own interventionist policies, which are exacerbating the Panic of 2008, and the ongoing recession still ensuing (never mind the “official” end of the recession in 2009—ask the millions of Americans who are out of work, and the millions more who have given up and abandoned the labor force altogether, how their recovery is going).

Worse (if that’s possible), the supposedly independent Federal Reserve System has been entirely complicit in these interventionist policies, what with its freely running dollar printing press, its QE2 (preceded by a QE1—why do these sound like failed luxury cruise liners?), its Twist, its artificially depressed interest rates (so much for the widows and orphans who need their savings for living), and so on.