A Thought

I had another one. This one was brought to my forebrain by a Wall Street Journal article that discussed the lack of Russian military assistance to Iran during the latter’s attacks on Israel and Israel’s nearly two week response in and over Iran.

Israel’s responses to the Iranian war over those dozen days included the virtual elimination of Iran’s air defense capability; reduction of Iran’s ballistic missile capability, both missile production and launchers and launcher production; and Iran’s drone inventory and drone production capability.

It’s that last that interests me. I’ve already seen an apparent reduction in Russian missile attacks on Ukraine since the UA’s successful attacks on Russia’s LRA, at least compared to the number of drone attacks on Ukraine. Iran has been a major source of Russia’s longer-ranged and bigger payload capable drones, the Shaheds. Iran’s ability to produce these were particular targets of Israel’s anti-drone sorties. I wonder what effect the seemingly inevitable drop in exports to Russia will have on Russia’s aerial assaults on Ukraine. It’s true enough that Russia has a growing domestic capability to produce drones roughly equivalent to the Shahed, but that capability isn’t all that yet.

Close the Strait of Hormuz?

Iran’s government now is threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz if the US joins its war on Israel on Israel’s side, among other things by bombing Fordow and Natanz with MOPs.

Iran certainly could, but for how long? My prediction is for a few hours to a few days, at the end of which Iran would have left no navy worthy of the name and no Arabian Gulf or Arabian Sea ports of any use to the remnants of its navy or to its commercial shipping—including is ghost tanker fleet with which it ships embargoed oil.

The reasons center on Iran’s own incapacity. It has no air assets with which to close or to keep closed the strait; it has only a supply of cruise missiles which it would have to divert from its attacks on Israel to close and keep closed the Strait, and its small navy with which to sail the strait.

That navy and the ports from which it would sally are nothing more than targets for the US Navy, which has been expanding in the region, and it would be a campaign of a matter of hours or a few days to sink the Iranian navy and destroy those ports. A few destroyers would serve to protect commercial shipping in the strait, and in the Gulf, come to that, against those cruise missiles, just as those destroyers and cruisers have done in the Gulf of Aden.

There would be sequelae to an Iranian attempt to close the strait. At the end of the campaign to reopen the strait, Iran would have limited capability to get its oil onto tankers (it would be useful for the reopening campaign also to sink such ghost tankers as happen to be in the Gulf or the nearby Arabian Sea, which would further restrict Iran’s ability to ship its embargoed oil). That would hurt the People’s Republic of China’s economy, which has been importing lots of price-discounted Iranian oil (discounts the PRC can demand since it takes 90% of Iran’s oil exports and so can demand the discounts).

Another consequence would be further reductions in Iranian (re)supplies to the Houthis.

There would be a spike in oil prices from a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but that would be temporary, and the closure would lead, nearly inevitably, to those follow-on sequelae, which would be to the net good of the larger world.

A Useful Move

The Senate—at least the Republicans in the Senate; the Progressive-Democratic Party’s Senators remain ensconced in their knee-jerk Nothing Republican mode—is working toward easing Corporate Average Fuel Economy requirements by eliminating the penalties associated with failing to comply with ever-increasing and increasingly impossible fuel efficiency standards. Of course there are objections, but most of them are empty.

From the news writers’ own bias:

nullifying rules that for generations have pushed automakers to churn out ever cleaner and more fuel-efficient vehicles. That technology has saved two trillion gallons of gasoline over the past 50 years, according to the journal Energy Policy.

Ignored here, as the writers cite the journal, is the fact that cost of operation—fuel costs, for instance—remain a competitive selling point, and market forces will drive fuel efficiency. That drive will occur on us average Americans‘ schedule, though, instead of by government fiat. Car companies will continue to seek competitive advantages through such techs as turbocharged engines that deliver more power, transmissions with more gears and powertrains that automatically shut off at stoplights to conserve gasoline along with a host of other pathways, including some not yet thought of, but which competitive R&D will bring out.

Other objectors include Chris Harto, a Consumer Reports policy analyst:

Automakers have proven time and time again that without strong and enforceable fuel-economy standards, many of them will leave proven, popular, and cost-effective technologies like hybrids sitting and gathering dust on the shelf[.]

Aside from the fact that simple competitive pressures in a truly free market, shorn of excessive government regulation, will push “automakers” to continue to work toward, among other things, fuel efficiency. What Harto is ignoring, though, is that his favored vehicles are sitting on the shelf because consumers don’t want them and aren’t buying them.

And this:

Consumer advocacy groups warn that the move could result in…further dependence on foreign oil sources.

This is just disingenuous. The US is the world’s largest producer of oil and a net exporter of it. What would be beneficial here would be a parallel move to deregulate oil production and refining (and exporting).

Also absent is any rationale for why we should care about gasoline savings of that magnitude. My back of the envelope estimation of how much that actually works out to is based on there being 105 million cars on the road in 1975 (those 50 years ago) and 299 million cars and now light trucks and SUVs (which burn gasoline and are much more ubiquitous than 50 years ago) on the road today. A naïve average of that is 201.5 million gasoline-burning vehicles on the road each year. 40 billion gallons of gasoline “saved” each year (those 2 trillion spread across the years) works out to 200 gallons “saved” per car per year.

To achieve that tiny savings, a ton of money has been spent on CAFE compliance rules, on building compliant and so very expensive vehicles, and on wasted money pushing those far more expensive CAFE-meeting vehicles out the factory door in order to meet the mandated manufacturer’s fleet average fuel efficiency numbers. This wastage includes, over the last several years, pushing battery cars and hybrids out the door only to sit unsold on dealer lots as us average Americans refuse to pay the enormous cost of those battery-dependent vehicles.

This is a good beginning, if the Republicans can pull it off, and the Republican caucus in the House goes along. Better would be elimination of CAFE altogether, that should be for a later day.

I Can’t Think of a Reason

Mark Zuckerberg wants to automate ad-creation in his Meta.

That’s not all he wants to do, though. Zuckerberg said this at his recent shareholder meeting (keep in mind that the these meetings generally are Zuckerberg talking to himself since he owns the controlling number of voting shares) [emphasis added].

In the not-too-distant future, we want to get to a world where any business will be able to just tell us what objective they’re trying to achieve, like selling something or getting a new customer, how much they’re willing to pay for each result, and connect their bank account and then we just do the rest for them[.]

Which of those processes—customer convenience or Meta convenience—is the one intended to be jumped on with both feet, and which is the one intended to be slipped past us?

I, for one, have no reason at all to let anyone other than myself or my wife have whenever-they-feel-like-it access to my financials.

Nvidia and Investing in the PRC

Nvidia‘s honcho, Jensen Huang, says it’s not straightforward for his chipmaker to leave the People’s Republic of China altogether. Many of his arguments, though, are irrelevant.

In the end, the platform that wins the AI developers wins AI. Export controls should strengthen US platforms, not drive half of the world’s AI talent to rivals.

You bet. But our chipmakers don’t need to be in the PRC to win the race—which isn’t a race, anyway, since technology always advances. It’s a never-ending journey. American chipmakers need to be elsewhere, tapping other talent, including American talent that still is second to none.

The US government’s decision in April to stop the company from selling its H20 chips to the Chinese market cost the company about $2.5 billion in lost sales in the April-ended quarter and will cost another $8 billion in the current period ending in July. That is because the H20 chip was designed specifically for the Chinese market to comply with then-current export restrictions, so it isn’t really salable anywhere else.

Avoiding export restrictions is entirely legal, but this is a trade and technology war that the PRC has been inflicting on us for years. Huang had to know that export restrictions would evolve in that war, just as weapons technology and export restrictions evolve in shooting wars. Again: American chipmakers don’t need to be in the PRC. American chips, of any generation, don’t need to be in the PRC.

Also, an irrelevancy from the peanut gallery:

“China is a quarter of the market. It’s a big number,” UBS analyst Tim Arcuri said in an interview. He added that Nvidia would have a “dominant hold” on that market if it were able to compete there.

Here’s a bigger number. Three-quarters of the market is not in the PRC. Nvidia would have a dominant hold on that market if it wanted to.

Dominant hold in the PRC chip market? What about all that PRC techie talent about whom Huang worries so much if left in isolation? Won’t they move even faster with American chips in their suite? Beside that, other companies, American and European, have held a variety of “dominant holds” there: GM, Tesla, Volkswagen, Nokia, Ericsson, and on and on, all had dominant holds, until they didn’t. And the reason they don’t anymore isn’t because they can’t compete on technology and market skill, it’s because they can’t compete with PRC government subsidies of domestic companies and PRC naked theft of intellectual property.

And this, from Huang, again:

China’s AI moves on with or without US chips[.]

Of course; that’s obvious. The PRC, though, does not need easy access to American chips—or those of other Western chipmakers’ chips—in order to do that. The presence of American chips (and others’) inside the PRC only makes it easier for PRC techies to “move on” through their reverse-engineering, theft of techniques, software, intellectual property, and so on.

Certainly, switching out of the PRC would be short-term disruptive to American chipmakers, but it would be mid- and long-term beneficial to them and to our nation. Especially if our chipmakers, and our government, were to arrange coalitions of Western chipmakers to do development and marketing rather than working strictly alone. There would be anti-trust problems here if the coalitions aren’t set up properly, but that’s doable, and has been done in many other venues.