Category Archives: markets

What is their Value, Really?

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What is their Value, Really?

In a Sunday Wall Street Journal article on universities’ penchant for investing their endowments in private equity (as opposed to instruments bought and sold on public exchanges, these are bought and sold in private deals between the university and one or another private (i.e., not traded on an exchange) entity, or rarely a private deal to which a publicly traded entity might also agree.

A few exceptionally talented, or lucky, endowment managers seemingly did very well in this environment. Yale’s late David Swensen got an annualized return of 13% over the course of his management.

But how valuable are those investments, really? The WSJ‘s subheadline reads

Universities and other institutions have built up large private-equity holdings, but they are now lagging behind the S&P 500 and aren’t easy to shed

And this:

And much of what those funds earned for their investors in that time was on paper; endowments and other institutions were getting less and less cash that they could put to work in the booming stock market.

And this [emphasis added]:

…making it hard for managers to get the prices they want for the companies in their portfolios. Meanwhile, institutions have struggled to find investments that hedge against stocks and private equity without further eroding returns—and the problem has gotten worse with the stock market’s latest rally.

The value of any investment is what someone is willing to pay to get it. The initial value of those private equity investments in these endowments is what the endowment managers paid to get the private entity or a piece of it. Now they’re moving to sell some/most/all of these privately held pieces, but there are few to no buyers at those initial prices or anywhere near those prices.

This is Yale’s continued position:

Yale said in a statement that it remains committed to its private-markets strategy. “We trust that sophisticated investors, especially our partners who know us best, understand this,” the school said.

That sounds like the typical arrogance of Know Betters.

What is, in the end, the true value of those privately held pieces? It’s still whatever a buyer is willing to pay for them. And that calls into question two things: an accurate valuation of those entities and the wisdom of relying so heavily on non-publicly traded entities for endowment investments.

Former Yale endowment private-equity manager Tim Sullivan:

One of the reasons we hire these guys is because they know when’s the right time to sell an asset[.]

The problem here is that a potential buyer won’t necessarily agree that it’s the right time to buy that asset.

It’s tough to grow, or even just to maintain the value of, an endowment based on phantom valuations of its holdings.

False Comparison

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In their letter to the Tuesday Wall Street Journal Letters section, Professors Amy Finkelstein, of MIT, and Matthew Notowidigdo, of the University of Chicago, argued for the necessity of Obamacare.

…because millions of Americans “don’t use” their subsidized insurance, they therefore “don’t need” it. Yet as we teach our students every year, this misunderstands the purpose of insurance. Not filing a claim doesn’t mean you didn’t need insurance. We’ve never had to use our oxygen masks during decades of flying, but that hardly means they’re not essential.

The professors, as educated as they seem to be, should know better than to make such a false comparison. Folks die if they don’t have access to those oxygen masks in the realization of the once-in-a-lifetime likelihood of needing one. Folks without insurance always can get at least life saving care, and usually more than that for a variety of non-life threatening ills, in any hospital ER.

The professors also cynically conflate “need” with “useful.” Having insurance against this or that outcome usually is a useful backstop to have, IFF the accumulated premiums paid are worth the Expected [sic] cost of a realized outcome. Underlying the distinction between “need” and “useful” is the individual’s own assessment of those risks and that value. With Obamacare, though, folks are required to buy the insurance, however bad it is, and to do so wholly independently of any cost/benefit tradeoff that actually exists and equally independent of the individual’s assessment of his risk, or of his need. Risk assessment has been taken out of the individual’s hands altogether.

12 Million Don’t Use The Health Insurance They Have

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The lede lays out the background.

ObamaCare really is a gift that keeps on giving—for insurers. The law forces Americans to buy pricey plans with benefits they don’t need. And now the Paragon Institute reports that taxpayers are subsidizing insurance for nearly 12 million people who never use their coverage.

As the WSJ puts it, here’s the wild part:

More than a third of all enrollees generated no medical claims last year, according to Paragon’s analysis. That includes 40% of those in plans that are fully subsidized. Between 2021 and 2024, the number of enrollees who didn’t use their health coverage more than tripled to 11.7 million from 3.5 million.

There are a couple of reasons for this. One is that being forced to buy something that isn’t needed or wanted bit. The other is that “purchasers,” after paying those enormously high premiums, or having the government pay those premiums with OPM, still would have to pay out of their own pockets for any health care throughout the year because of the enormously high deductibles those ObamaCare plans hide behind.

Forgive us for being old-fashioned, but why should taxpayers subsidize insurance for healthy people who don’t need or use it?

Indeed.

Yes and No

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Just one example on the matter of drug approvals.

A case in point is Replimune’s melanoma treatment, which the FDA rejected last month. About a third of patients who hadn’t responded to prior immunotherapy showed a strong response to Replimune’s in a clinical trial.
Tumors shrank in nearly all patients, and responses proved durable over three years. Serious side effects were rare. Oncologists who treated patients in the trial hailed the results.

These are responses in absolute terms. The drug was safe, and it worked.

The FDA blocked its release into the market though:

[T]he FDA said the trial was “not considered to be an adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation that provides substantial evidence of effectiveness.”
Its quibble is that the trial lacked a control group.

This is a demand for a relative outcome—whether the drug worked better or worse, and whether it was safer or less so, than the status quo. The status quo is what a control group presents.

The answer, though, is not to stop “quibbling” about control groups when assessing drug trial efficacy. Instead, it’s necessary for the FDA to get out of the business of requiring, as a condition of approval, that a drug work. FDA’s role should hold out only for assessing a drug’s safety. The market, formed by patients and their doctors, will do a perfectly fine job of assessing the drug’s effectiveness, with no more exceptions than are extant in any other market. That Replimune’s drug was shown to work in absolute terms is a happy additional outcome and should not represent even this much of an acceptance criterion.

This is where FDA Commissioner and medical doctor Marty Makary can—and should—make the changes to the FDA’s approval processes. A doctor’s primary injunction is “first, do no harm.” So it should be with the FDA. A doctor continues, with his patient, actively to treat the medical problem. The FDA, on the other hand, should stop at the do no harm part. Let the practicing doctors and their patients do the rest.

Juicing 401(k)s

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President Donald Trump (R) is loosening the restrictions on what 401(k)s are allowed to contain in their investment options. His EO has directed the Labor Department, which oversees the rules governing business’ 401(k) offerings, to consider additional, non-traditional investment vehicles, things like private equity, real estate, and digital assets such as bitcoin.

Hal Scott and John Gulliver, Committee on Capital Markets Regulation President and Executive Director, respectively, argue in favor of this move on the grounds that

investment opportunities in public markets are shrinking. In 1996 there were roughly 8,000 public companies, but that number has since declined by half. Why? Because public companies are subject to increasingly burdensome disclosure obligations, compliance costs, and litigation risk, while private companies aren’t.

They’re right in the sense that overregulation by an ever more intrusive government keeps tying increasing numbers of hobbles onto our investment opportunities, and they need to be rolled back. They’re right, also, in that Trump’s EO moves to sidestep some of those regulations; although workarounds always are suboptimal. Better to eliminate the hobbles.

I say they’re right, though, on an additional ground: more opportunities for and flexibilities in investment are intrinsically good and should occupy a central place in a free market economy.

However.

These added opportunities bring with them added, and harder to measure or even to estimate, risks inherent in those opportunities, especially for retail investors. These things also are not as liquid as the more traditional 401(k) investment vehicles, and that carries its own added risk. Then, too, some of those vehicles carry added tax complexities. See Master Limited Partnerships and Real Estate Investment Trusts, for instance.

None of that is an argument for not getting into these investment vehicles, nor is any of it an argument for a nanny state to “look out for us little guys” by telling us we can’t use them. It is an argument for added caution and more careful vetting—especially by us unwashed retailers—of those opportunities before jumping onto them with both feet and our elbows, too.