A New Category

There is a need for a discussion of how to handle terrorism and terrorists.  Before that discussion can be useful, though, we need to understand the relationship among terrorism, crime, and war.  This is a beginning of that discussion.

We currently have two categories of conflict participants which I’ll term—my layman’s terms, understand, not any legal or legalistic ones—criminal and soldier or combatant.  The one is a domestic (usually) question involving the violation of a nation’s domestic criminal laws.  The other is an international question involving a nation’s soldiers or combat arms engaging in more or less declared war and during the conduct of which the nation and its soldiers are subject, together and individually, to national laws and generally agreed international laws of war (for instance, the Geneva Conventions).

As we have seen at least since the turn of the century, though, there is a third category of conflict, and those who perpetrate this third kind—both the polity and its individuals—need a different form of response when encountered on the battlefield or after capture.  It’s important to understand, too, that the battlefield in this third category isn’t limited to classic set-piece force on force encounter on a field or over a beach, nor is it the hit and run battlefield of a guerrilla effort.  This new battlefield includes those, certainly, but it also includes our theaters, concert venues, shopping malls, subways, airports, airplanes—anywhere groups of people are gathered.

This third category already exists in the public’s mind, but it needs a third category of legal handling.  This third category is terrorism and its participants are terrorists.  Examples of these include polities like al Qaeda and the Daesh and gangs like Boko Haram and their individual members.

These are entities and individuals who are intent on killing innocents, not soldiers, and they’re intent on the killing for its own end.  The resulting terror is their goal and their tool for destroying the body politic of their target.

Mere criminal laws are inadequate for handling such mass murderers, whose killing does not rise from insanity, but from a desire for creating the terror that is their tool for larger ends.  Nor can these entities and individuals be handled adequately with laws of war governing how soldiers are to be encountered and killed or treated after capture; their behavior, their targets, place them outside such laws.

For the individual terrorists of a polity or a gang, we need new laws, laws of terror war, both domestic and international, with which to govern our encounters with them in battle and our handling of them should any be captured.  Simply putting them on trial and locking them up on conviction is useless; they’ll just return to their battles upon release (nor are they worth the effort, expense, or resources of maintaining in confinement).  Dealing with them on the battlefield under existing laws of (ordinary) war is unsuitable, too: in far too many cases, to take just one example, their shields are not building walls or bunkers, but innocent, helpless women and children.

Similarly, we need a new Convention with which to deal with a terrorist polity or gang.  Simply crushing these in a series of battles is insufficient.  Their existence as non-nation-state entities, as network entities, makes any battle victory, any war-level victory a chimera.  Their goal of wanton destruction for the terror to be caused make any defeat, or appearance of one, an empty gesture.  Sterner, more permanent measures and the rules governing those measures are needed.

A Test

Recall the false alarm about an inbound ICBM that a functionary of the Hawaii State government apparatus triggered last weekend.  I’m not interested, here, in how the false alarm got triggered in the first place, or why it took so long—38 minutes—to send out a false alarm notice, or why the State apparently chose to not even consider sending out an All Clear notice and figure out the false alarm aspects later.  There’s another question that seems to be getting ignored.

The mistaken alarm presented the citizens of the State and all of the State and local jurisdictions with a live, real-world, 38-minute test of the citizens’ and all of the State and local jurisdictions’ training to date and real-world responses to the situation of an inbound missile.  There was little more than citizen panic for those 38 minutes and little visible response by any jurisdiction within the State to help its citizens get to shelters or even to prepare or open any extant shelters.

At every level of responsibility within Hawaii, the State failed miserably its Operational Readiness Inspection.  What will Hawaii do about that?

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

President Donald Trump has moved to fix or withdraw from ex-President Barack Obama’s (D) Executive Agreement with Iran, cosigned by the leaders of a number of European nations, covering Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Folks can argue that this step has taken too long (and the terms of Obama’s EA have not been fixed, yet, nor have we canceled it; the deadline for that is next May), and I’m among the impatient.  However, the delay isn’t all bad (so far), since discussions of the Agreement, both public and behind the scenes (I assume), over the course of this delay have made the problems with it plainly evident, and the other parties to the deal no longer have excuses—they’ve have plenty of time to make their positions plain.

And the European parties are doing so.

European leaders have pushed back against major revisions. That, they fear, could give Tehran an excuse to walk away from the deal entirely, accelerating Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon.

This is naïve.  Accelerated or only moderately accelerated, Iran will get nuclear weapons in the current circumstance.  That would be the true disaster, since Iran has sworn to destroy Israel, and Iran will happily sell (or give) nuclear weapons to its client terrorist network entities for the latter’s use in Europe, the US, and elsewhere around the world.

We Can Help

And we should.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has pledged to step up defense spending to defend the self-ruled island’s sovereignty in the face of China’s growing military assertiveness in the region.

A good start would be to sell missile defense systems to the Republic of China along with modern aircraft—both air defense, like updated F-16s and F-15s, and ground attack, like F-16s and A-10s.

We also should resume sea and air patrols of the Taiwan Strait, something we’ve not done for far too long.

A Caliphate Has Collapsed?

That’s what Renée Rigdon, Tristan Wyatt, and Karen Leigh would have us believe in their recent Wall Street Journal piece.

It’s true enough that the Daesh—that JV team of ex-President Barack Obama’s (D) estimation—ran through the Iraqi “army” a few years ago, exploded through Syrian territory, and wound up controlling a significant fraction of Iraqi and Syrian land.  Their physical expansion was stopped in the immediacy of the situation only by Iraqi Kurds and the confused and fractious condition of Syria.  It’s also true that under President Donald Trump, a US-refurbished Iraqi army allied with those Kurds and local militias, with the support of an unleashed US-led coalition of air forces, recaptured nearly all of Iraqi territory in very short order while that same coalition of air forces supported a US-led coalition of rebels (albeit of at best dubious provenance) have disinfected most of Daesh-held Syria.

However, it’s naïve to suggest that the Daesh’s “caliphate” has crumbled, as the article’s title claims.  The Daesh, like its forerunner al Qaeda, is a polity that is first and foremost a network entity.  It has physical nodes existing parasitically in a broad swath of nation-states, ranging from western People’s Republic of China through northern Africa.  It has cells throughout Europe and in the United States.  These nodes and cells are connected via the Internet and the world’s cell phone network.

All that’s happened with the physical rollup of the Daesh in Iraq and Syria is that this terrorist polity has been freed from the shackles of geography.  Now our battle must shift to the virtual world; it’s far too soon to cry Victory.

Heads up.  Be very heads up.