Continued VA Cover-Up

This time with the VA’s IG participating. It’s an unfortunate side effect of having an organization’s inspection/watchdog function be an internal one, even if it works for the organization’s boss and not for anyone further down the totem pole.

Crucial language that the Department of Veterans Affairs Inspector General could not “conclusively” prove that delays in care caused patient deaths at a Phoenix hospital was added to its final report after a draft version was sent to agency administrators for comment….

The single most compelling sentence in the inspector general’s 143-page final report on fraudulent scheduling practices at the Phoenix veterans’ hospital did not appear in the draft version, according to a staff analysis by the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs.

It was inserted into the final version, the only one that was released to the public, after agency officials had a chance to comment and recommend revisions.

It’s certainly legitimate for IG draft reports to be run by the group just inspected and about whom the report is being written, but that’s to give the inspectees an opportunity to check facts and to suggest corrections to factual errors. Giving the inspectees the ability to “correct” the conclusions themselves is entirely illegitimate.

A separate report, written by the inspectee, is a normal part of the proceeding. Here, the inspectee indicates its concurrence with IG conclusions and its plan of corrective action regarding those conclusions. It’s also in this separate inspectee response report that the inspectee indicates its disagreement with a conclusion and the reasons for that disagreement.

Then the IG responds, again in a separate report, indicating its acceptance of the inspectee’s disagreement or the IG’s overruling of the inspectee, with the original conclusion standing and the inspectee required to take corrective action. All three of these reports are part of the official record.

Notice that: the legitimate course is to disagree with an IG conclusion, in writing, in a separate report, not to rewrite the IG conclusion itself.

And the cover-up of the cover-up:

The House committee obtained the draft version of the report late Thursday, after the [Washington] Examiner published a story that IG had been refusing its release.

Again, I say, it’s time to disband the VA altogether and send the VA’s existing budget and what would have been its future budgets directly to our veterans as voucher checks with which they can be free to seek out their own doctors and their own medical facilities.

With Whom Among the Kurds Should We Work?

How about with all of them?

President Barack Obama appears, finally, to be agreeable to arming the Pershmerga of the Kurds’ Iraqi Kurdistan in northern Iraq and to be working a little more closely with them in where the US takes its potshots against ISIS forces—the Mosul Dam effort comes to mind in this context.

But that can’t be all of it, if ISIS is to be destroyed. That will require attacking ISIS in Syria as well as more serious efforts against ISIS in Iraq. That more serious effort in Iraq also will require working along the Kurds’ Iraq border with Turkey in addition to working with the Peshmerga to the west of Iraqi Kurdistan.

There are two other groups of Kurds, then, that come into play. One such is

a Kurdish force inside Syria called the Democratic Union Party [the PYD].

We need to deal more closely with this group, too, at least in the context of destroying ISIS. The PYD has been actively fighting ISIS and other jihadist terrorists in Syria for some years, as well as fighting the Syrian government. The US has been reluctant to deal with the PYD because of alleged difficulty telling the good Syrian rebels from the bad ones. Something about needing a scorecard. It’s not that hard, though, except in the minds of the Obama administration.

The other group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the PKK, is the group of interest along the Turkish border of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turks object to the PKK, and so the US has too, because of the violent nature of the PKK’s objections to Turkish treatment of them. However, the PKK appears to have greatly moderated its violent techniques (though this isn’t certain), even if they are still zealous partisans for their autonomy. That they still have autonomy arguments with Turkey need not concern us here given that apparent temperance, and given Turkey’s open support of terrorists elsewhere—like on Israel’s southern and eastern borders. In addition to this, the Turks are working an accommodation with the PKK, so Turkish relations with the PKK is rapidly becoming a non-entity as well as merely irrelevant.

In the end, the enemy of our enemy certainly can be our ally, and at least one of those enemies of our enemy can be an outright friend, and at least one of those other enemies of our enemy can continue to be an ally.