Cyber is the New Artillery

The Russian invasion of Ukraine appears—finally (and with deep simplification)—to be reverting to Russian doctrine: soften up and flatten the enemy’s position with massive artillery barrages, and only then committing ground forces—combined armor and infantry—to the battle.

I suggest that cyber should become the new artillery. It’s cheaper. And can be more effective. Below is a very high level look.

There are a couple of ways in which I’d exploit cyber to soften up and flatten the enemy’s position before committing physical forces of any sort. The beauty of my strategy and tactic is that it would work at sea, in the air, and in space with equal cheapness and facility.

One method can be used promptly; however, the other method will take some years to prepare.

The prompt way is the currently classical method of electronic jamming of radio signals to disrupt both real time (especially critical in the air and in space) communications and electronic-centered sensor systems. This prompt way should be combined with hacking the enemy’s computers so as to disrupt his signals and sensor processing, to inject bad data into his systems databases—including those fed by his sensors—to disrupt and damage other systems databases, to deny access to critical computers (DOS attacks) at critical times, resulting denial of commanders at a number of levels contact with the combat units they command.

Those are all short-term disruptions and can be relatively quickly overcome, so they’d need to be applied only at critical times of a campaign’s onset or of a battle.

The longer-term method, and this is the especially critical part, involves the computer chips we make (and which should be the sole source of chips going into our military and civilian computers) and sell to our enemies in this global economic environment, within which we trade with our enemies even in high tech goods.

These chips—particularly those that are destined for enemy weapons systems or that are dual military-civilian use—should be delivered with small (they only need to be small) bits of code embedded in the chips’ installed software. These bits of code should be remotely triggerable to damage the host chip (primarily by erasing or merely corrupting other software installed on the chip) and/or to spread to adjacent chips in the system and then damage them. The damaged chips then would then effectively shut down the weapons system hosting the infected chip: air defense systems, sensor systems, armor and artillery systems, communications systems, government control systems, financial systems, energy distribution systems; the list is extensive. (Of course, the chips we sell that the customer specifies be devoid of any software would be harder to treat. Note, though, that “harder” is not “impossible.”)

None of this obviates the utility of artillery in leading the physical phase of the battle. First in the artillery barrage, though, should be EMP rounds, none of which, contrary to too much popular opinion, need be nuclear in order to generate the desired pulse.

Thus, the new artillery barrage begins with that chip preparation, then when the battle is forced upon us, continues with the first method outlined above, proceeds to execution of the second method, and finishes with the beginning of the physical assault—the EMP barrage.

She’s Right

But for the wrong reasons.

US Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm says billions of dollars in upgrades are needed to the power grid in the US to prepare for widespread electric vehicle adoption.

If that’s the spur needed to get the upgrades started and seriously underway, then cool. However, our power grid badly needs upgrade and strengthening in its own right. It’s old, near capacity under normal draw, and highly fragile—as the California portion of the grid demonstrates continually, and as the Texas grid demonstrated a couple of winters ago.

Indeed, nothing has been done since the Northeast blackout of 2003—which itself was a geographic repeat of the blackout of 1965. The proximate causes of these actually were quite trivial, but the fragility of the grid was demonstrated by how fast and far the effects spread: throughout the American northeast (and deep into Canada, which illustrates, also, international implications for strengthening, or continuing to ignore, the decrepit state of our grid).

It’s a national security matter, too, beyond the economic aspects of security.

We also need to drop some dimes (though not as many as might seem) on hardening all of our power grids (plural: not only electricity, but grids distributing natural gas and oil from the well through refiners to end users) against EMP attacks—which needn’t be nuclear weapon-originated, or even large, but merely carefully targeted—and against being software-hacked, as the Russians did when they shut down Colonial Pipeline.

Export Controls Regarding the PRC

It has come to light that we really don’t have any serious export controls covering technology-related exports to the People’s Republic of China.

Of the US’s total $125 billion in exports to China in 2020, officials required a license for less than half a percent, Commerce Department data shows. Of that fraction, the agency approved 94%, or 2,652, applications for technology exports to China. The figures omit applications “returned without action,” meaning their outcomes were uncertain.
The result: the US continues to send to China an array of semiconductors, aerospace components, artificial-intelligence technology, and other items that could be used to advance Beijing’s military interests.

Why is this being allowed to occur?

Some warn tighter restrictions on US tech sales to China will backfire because allies such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea will step in to fill the void. For export restrictions to be effective, “we need our allies to have the same controls,” said Kevin Wolf, a senior Commerce official during the Obama administration, while testifying on Capitol Hill last year. “It is that simple and logical.”

That would be silly if it weren’t, at bottom, rankly defeatist. We shouldn’t be waiting around on putting curbs on technology transfers to an enemy nation. Instead of looking for consensus first, we need to act, to lead, to let the consensus build as we go, and to give our allies something to follow and a consensus to join. After all, if we don’t care enough to do, there’s no reason anyone else should care enough to do.

Beside that, if we stop exporting our technology to the PRC and our putative allies step in to fill the gap, at least we’ll be stopping our own transfers, and our allies’ technologies, for the most part, aren’t as good as ours. The PRC would be getting second best, continuing to trail us, and that would be to the good for our security.

This Says It All

The Republic of China’s Mainland Affairs Council has issued a statement in response to a People’s Republic of China policy statement that did not include phrasing that ruled out the dispatch of Chinese troops and civilian administrators to Taiwan as had prior editions. In their own statement, the RoC, among other things,

declar[ed] that “the Republic of China is a sovereign country,” referring to the government in Taipei by its formal name.
“The CCP regime has never ruled Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu for a single day,” the statement read….

Hear, hear.

Bragging about Getting al-Zawahiri

It’s good that we got him. It’s unclear that we can do this sort of thing routinely. General Frank McKenzie, Central Command commander during President Joe Biden’s (D) panicky running away from Afghanistan, had this:

Let’s remember, this is one strike in a year[.]

Indeed. Successfully burning al-Zawahiri in his city apartment makes us one-for-two in over-the-horizon drone strikes into Afghanistan. The other was in the immediate aftermath of that cut-and-run, when we successfully burned a civilian and a bunch of kids with a drone strike on a car.

However, with an n of 2, we can’t tell whether the first, failed, strike is illustrative of the true trend, or the second, successful, strike is illustrative of the true trend—or even whether the true trend is closer to that mediocre 50-ish per cent success rate.

Nor is two strikes a year apart a very useful pace.