Tag Archives: law

A Correct EO

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In early March, President Donald Trump (R) wrote an Executive Order that rescinded the security clearances of the law firm Perkins Coie and its lawyers individually. The EO also barred Perkins Coie from access to a number of Federal buildings and instructed other Executive Branch agencies to exam contracts with Perkins Coie with a view to ending them.

Last week DC District Judge Beryl Howell ruled the EO unconstitutional. Among other things,

Howell wrote that the text of the executive order, and Trump’s statements about it, made clear that he targeted Perkins Coie because it represented clients he doesn’t like, and clients challenging some of his actions.
“That is unconstitutional retaliation and viewpoint discrimination, plain and simple,” wrote the judge, an appointee of former President Barack Obama.

She’s not far wrong in that, and this is a case where Trump’s rhetoric contaminated the legitimacy of his move. Perkins Coie made an argument in its suit, though, that is and should have been so considered wholly irrelevant.

It told the court it was at risk of losing its most lucrative clients, as they frequently work with the federal government, and many are major government contractors. In fact, the firm told the court, it did lose clients.

That confers no obligation on the government to grant or continue security clearances to Perkins Coie or any other enterprise. No business must be allowed to arrange its business model in such a way as to compel our government to grant it a security clearance.

The President of the United States is the final arbiter of security clearances, of what is classified, and of who has declassification authority.

From that, this: a better—and entirely constitutional—Executive Order would require all Departments and agencies in the Executive Branch, including the President and his White House, that have security clearance authorities to rescind all security clearances of personnel who leave their Departments or agencies on the day of their departure—even if those employees are transferring to another Department or agency. The new Department or agency, and any nongovernment entity who employs the departed person, if they want the person to have a security clearance, must do a de novo background investigation before granting a clearance, and the Department, agency, or outside entity must justify the level of clearance requested.

The EO should do this, as well: recast security clearances, extant or newly granted, held by nongovernment enterprises and their employees as for the duration of the particular contract with automatic rescission on the end of the contract. New contracts must have de novo background investigations of all enterprises and individual employees contemplated for work on the contract. If an existing contract is extended for a second time, those security clearances must be explicitly renewed via de novo background investigations.

Security clearances give access to our nation’s most important secrets, and no person and no entity has an intrinsic right to one. No person and no entity has any sort of Constitutional right to a security clearance. Neither does our government have any obligation to grant a security clearance, of any level, to any person or entity. This fundamental concept is one that is too often unconsidered in disputes over clearances.

A Thought Experiment

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Our so-called “elite” universities are banding together to form a collective to resist the Trump administration’s efforts to withhold grants and contracts from those institutions that aren’t doing enough to combat antisemitic bigotry and support for terrorists, reporting what foreign money they’re receiving and in what amounts, and adequately limiting the numbers of foreign students and faculty to suit the administration.

The collective is centering its resistance on the premise that Government doesn’t get to dictate to them what their practices might be, never minding that all donors get to specify how their donations are used.

What this collective is missing is that colleges and universities have no particular right to government funds, and that government has no particular obligation to send money to colleges and universities.

Hence my thought experiment.

Consider that a large collection of private citizens get together and say to a college or university, “You can’t have any more of our money unless and until you stop doing these things and start doing these other things.”

What legal recourse would that college or university, or any collection of colleges and universities similarly addressed, have against that collection of private citizens? How is their private collective action any different from their collective action through their government? It is, after all, the same money, whether their private money given or withheld directly or their private money washed through government as tax remittances.

Federal and State Funding for Abortion

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There is a move afoot in Congress to remove from Medicare reimbursements for abortion, and there is a case before the Supreme Court that will impact States’ ability to remove funding for abortion from Medicaid reimbursements. The removal from Medicare, should it come to fruition, would be entirely consistent with the Court’s Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization ruling, which rescinded Roe v Wade and put the abortion question entirely in the States’ hands. Now many States are attempting to act on their newly restored authority—hence the case before the Supreme Court.

It’s true enough that it’s a fraught decision for the mother to bring an unwanted pregnancy to term, but my concern here is for the life of the baby. From this, I see two boundary cases that are especially difficult.

One is where the health of the mother is at risk if the pregnancy continues. In this case, the mother’s health must be weighed extremely carefully against the life of the baby. This weighing may need to occur—must occur?—in open court, with competent, well-trained lawyers speaking for the baby.

The other is a mother’s pregnancy as a result of incest or rape. Carrying the baby to term here is an especially terrible choice for the mother—the pregnant child incest or rape victim may be too physically young to carry her baby to term, in which case, see above. Even where the victim mother can safely do so, it remains an especially terrible choice to carry inside her body a constant reminder of the monster who did this to her. Carrying the baby to term isn’t a matter of the mother’s inconvenience for nine months as some extremists on the right claim—the emotional damage to the mother from that is real, extreme, and often irrepairable.

Conventional wisdom is to permit abortion in the these narrowly defined, and not so often occurring compared to “ordinary” unwanted pregnancies, cases of incest or rape. Conventional wisdom here is not a completely bad bit of wisdom, but I remain concerned: why should the baby have to pay with its life for the crime of another? The baby needs competent, well-trained lawyers speaking for him or her in these cases, also.

It’s also true enough that, while Republicans are attempting to do more to provide fiscal support for those mothers during their pregnancies, in the period surrounding birth, and in the early years after birth (here including adoption options), they need to do better at specifically identifying those needs and then providing for them—and to do so publicly. That shortfall, though, shouldn’t be allowed to impact whether the baby is allowed to live at all.

Supreme Court Has the Louisiana Redistricting Case

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After the 2020 census, Louisiana’s Republican-controlled legislature

only drew one majority-Black congressional district when it redrew the boundaries for the state’s six seats in Congress. A group of Black voters, who make up about a third of the state’s population, sued the state in 2022, arguing that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits voting practices that discriminate on the basis of race, required lawmakers to add a second majority-Black congressional district.

Here’s the entirety of what that Section 2 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act actually says:

SEC. 2. No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.

Drawing voting districts explicitly to favor one group of Americans over other groups in that same district is precisely what the CRA prohibits. However the Supreme Court rules in this case, it’s imperative that the Court finally recognize the truth of our Declaration of Independence and the foundational American law that’s before them in the form of the 14th Amendment of our Constitution, which says in pertinent part,

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

One of the most basic privileges accruing to us American citizens is our right to vote, and all of us voters are equal under law—regardless of skin color, or religion, or….

In fine, as citizens, as voters, we’re all exactly alike. Gerrymandering to create districts that favor one group over any others necessarily disadvantages those others—and it denies all groups, and more importantly, every individual regardless of group equal protection of the laws, and so it is unconstitutional.

As an aside, and one of the more favorable aspects of earlier times, the entire CRA fits within seven Word® pages, and contains less than 5500 words, at least as it is presented at the link.

More on Birthright Citizenship

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Jed Rubenfeld, Professor of Law at Yale Law School, had an op-ed in Sunday’s Wall Street Journal in support of the concept of birthright citizenship. In it, he hung his hat on the “visitor” aspect of our Constitution’s 14th Amendment jurisdiction phrasing.

The 14th Amendment guarantees citizenship to everyone “born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” The opacity of the “jurisdiction” language allows reasonable people to land on either side of this issue. But in 19th-century legal usage, being “subject to the jurisdiction” of the US had a long-settled, straightforward meaning. As Chief Justice John Marshall explained in Schooner Exchange v McFaddon (1812), it meant being subject to US law.
Could you be prosecuted in an American court and imprisoned in an American jail for violating American law? If so, you were subject to US jurisdiction.

That “vulnerable to prosecution and jail” means “subject to US law” is at the core of the misunderstanding here (I’m eliding the question of whether a then-56-yr-old “settled meaning” remained settled after the 14th Amendment was ratified), including to birth tourism—whereby a pregnant woman enters the US for the express and sole purpose of giving birth on US soil so as to garner citizenship for her baby, after which the now-mother leaves with her baby to return to her home nation. Such “visitors,” while so subject, are not subject to US jurisdiction, but only to US government power and authority.

Birth tourists subject themselves only to some of our laws—that small subset of them that lets them enter our nation legally and then avail themselves of our medical-related duty of care laws. They otherwise remain within the control of their home nation laws and so retain the jurisdiction of their home countries, to which they fully intend to return as soon as they’re able to travel after giving birth. They’re holding themselves apart from and outside of our nation’s full and complete jurisdiction—which is what our 14th Amendment requires, even for birth tourists.

Illegal aliens go even farther: they hold themselves completely outside our jurisdiction by holding themselves completely outside our laws: they’ve disregarded our laws from the outset by their entering illegally. They render themselves subject only to the power of our government even as they, too, are subject prosecution and jail—or deportation.

This misunderstanding by Rubenfeld (and others) expands on the matter:

When a foreign army invades and conquers another country’s territory, that land becomes subject to the conquering country’s laws.

Not at all. That conquered territory becomes subject only to the conquering country’s power and ability to impose its laws. Even as long ago as Emer de Vattel, in his The Law of Nations, this was well understood.

The Left’s repeated ignoring of these simple facts does not make those facts nonexistent.

Unfortunately (cynically?), Rubenfeld, like others pushing this argument, leave wholly unaddressed those last.