Tag Archives: foreign policy

A Plan for Rigorous Enforcement

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Mark Dubowitz, Chief Eecutive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies,  writing in The Wall Street Journal, had some thoughts regarding strict enforcement of the Iran nuclear weapons agreement and some thoughts on an alternative path for dealing with Iran and its nuclear weapons.  I’m focusing on the latter.

First, Mr Trump must address the Iranian threat the way Ronald Reagan treated the Soviet one. … The Trump NSC needs a similar plan, one that uses both covert and overt economic, financial, political, diplomatic, cyber, and military power to subvert and roll back the Iranian threat.

Second, the Trump administration, with an assist from Congress, needs to reinvigorate the sanctions regime aimed at Iran’s support for terrorism, ballistic-missile development, human-rights abuses, war crimes, and destabilizing activities in the Middle East.

The Trump administration also needs to put Iran on notice that the US will use force to counter Iranian aggression. Sanctions without the credible threat of military action will always be insufficient to change the regime’s calculus.

With regard to that last, “notice” by itself is just talk.  President Donald Trump will need to act, as well—having the Navy sink Iran’s fast boats that charge in provocatively and too close or other Iranian naval shipping that fire live weapons from too close will be necessary to give force to the rhetoric as well as to the sanctions.

My questions are these.  Do the Republicans in Congress have the stomach for this?  Do the Democrats in Congress have the integrity?

Another Assault on US Intellectual Property

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Beijing has proposed requiring cloud-computing services providers to turn over essentially all ownership and operations to Chinese partners and could result in the transfer of valuable US intellectual property, according to the letter, viewed by The Wall Street Journal.

Not “could result”—technology theft transfer is the point of the requirement.  This comes against the backdrop of the People’s Republic of China’s ongoing technology requirements.

China already places restrictions on investing for foreign cloud providers operating in the country under rules passed in the last two years…including forced collaboration with rivals and technology transfer.

Is the PRC market really worth these losses?

It’s a Start

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The Trump administration is considering sweeping sanctions aimed at cutting North Korea off from the global financial system as part of a broad review of measures to counter Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threat, a senior US official said on Monday.

The sanctions supposedly include economic sanctions against People’s Republic of China banks and other businesses having intercourse with northern Korea and northern Korean entities.

Separately, I have to ask in the current environment: how does this sort of thing get leaked?

Well, It’s About Time, Ollie

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Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has spoken up in a way contrary to his predecessors regarding our policy—our very attitude—toward northern Korea.

Let me be very clear: the policy of strategic patience has ended[.]

That’s not just on Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, though.  Our various administrations have tried for 20 years, or more, the idea of talking, cajoling, bribing (to the tune of $1.35 billion in “aid”) northern Korea’s various Kim dictators.  Baby Kim, in glad response, has only accelerated his drive for sticking nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles (he already has the warheads and the missiles).

Talking is nearly always a better first step than shooting, and we tried that.  Now, though, it’s become time—it’s way past time—to do something else, to stop repeating Einsteinian insanity.

Among the somethings else is taking a harder line vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China.

Mr Tillerson noted that China has been punishing South Korea economically because Seoul is deploying America’s THAAD missile-defense system. “This is not the way for a regional power to help resolve what is a serious threat to everyone,” he said, referring to China. “We instead urge China to address the threat that makes THAAD necessary.”

(It’ll be interesting, too, to see the PRC’s reaction to being called a regional power rather than the global one to which the Warring State is aspiring.)

Other somethings else include increasing further the missile and other defense capabilities of the Republic of Korea, Japan, us, and other friendly and allied nations in the region or with interests in it and the relatively explicit possibility of military strikes ranging from shooting down northern Korean missile launches, whether test or otherwise, to striking northern Korea’s missile launch facilities, nuclear facilities, and long-range artillery facilities that might be used to try to retaliate against Seoul.

Other somethings else include more direct action against the PRC and its interests: barring PRC business enterprises that do business with or in northern Korea from the US financial system.

New PRC Policy

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Robert Blackwill, writing for The National Interest, has suggested we need one.  He’s not far wrong, because as he puts it,

there is no real prospect of building fundamental trust, a peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding, a strategic partnership or a new type of major country relations between the United States and China.

The core of his new policy is this:

  • revitalizing the US economy to nurture those disruptive innovations that bestow on the United States asymmetric economic advantages over others
  • substantially increasing the defense budget and consequently shifting US defense resources to Asia
  • creating new preferential trading arrangements among US allies and friends to increase their mutual gains through instruments that consciously exclude China
  • recreating a technology-control regime involving US allies that prevents China from acquiring military and strategic capabilities enabling it to inflict “high-leverage strategic harm” on the United States and its partners
  • concertedly building up the power-political capacities of US allies and friends on China’s periphery
  • improving the capability of US military forces and allies to effectively project power along the Asian rimlands despite any Chinese opposition
  • all while continuing to work with China in the diverse ways that befit its importance to US national interests.

Expect activities that satisfy that last bullet to be few and far between.  There are very few ways in which the modern incarnation of the Warring State would be willing to work with us.

Someone else <ahem> wrote much the same sort of thing a short while ago, too.