Tag Archives: defense policy

Japan is Learning the Reasons

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Reasons for ceasing doing business with and within the People’s Republic of China, that is. In response to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks that a PRC attack on the Republic of China (Takaichi referred to “Taiwan”) would trigger a Japanese defensive response,

China has unearthed its old playbook of informal coercive moves. Unlike clear-cut export controls, these disguised measures are harder to manage and pose escalatory risks. Governments and companies must grapple with how to respond.
Since Nov. 14, China has issued a series of escalating restrictions: cautioning tourists and students against travel to Japan; postponing the release of at least two Japanese films; and reinstating a blanket ban on Japanese seafood imports.

The WSJ‘s op-ed authors, Victor Ferguson and Audrye Wong, Hitotsubashi University Assistant Professor of International Relations and USC Assistant Professor of Political Science, respectively, claimed

It is hard for governments and companies to respond to such disguised measures effectively and cohesively.

It’s only hard politically. It’s completely straightforward as a practical and economic matter. It’s time for the Japanese to suck up and grunt through the unavoidably disruptive period of disruption and discontinue doing business with PRC-domiciled companies, with the PRC government, and business of any sort inside the PRC.

Cards on the Table?

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That’s the breakthrough being touted by Just the News regarding “peace” talks between Ukraine and Russia.

This week for the first time, Kiev and Moscow articulated specific visions for a peace deal. And while they remain apart on big issues like land borders and NATO membership, the two sides have a meaningful framework that eluded past negotiations and presidents.

This is inaccurate. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been clear on Ukraine’s vision for peace, and equally specific the requirements for achieving one from the outset following the barbarian’s renewed invasion of his nation four years ago. He has demanded Russia’s departure from Ukraine and specific, material mechanisms for guaranteeing his nation’s sovereignty against renewed barbarian invasion.

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has been equally clear on his requirements for peace. He has demanded recognition of his occupation of Crimea as a Russian oblast, the ceding of all of the Donbas to Russia as additional Russian oblasts, disarmament of Ukraine, and guarantees that NATO will never accept Ukraine.

It’s hard to get any more specific than these; the two sides’ cards have been on the table all along.

There’s this bit of foolishness, also, from Congressman Andy Biggs (R, AZ):

If you’ve ever negotiated anything, and virtually everybody has, if you don’t understand what you want and what the other side wants, you can never get to yes.

This operates from the false premise that “yes” by Ukraine is in any way useful or would be at all reliable given to whom and to what Ukraine would be saying “yes.” It’s not possible to say “yes” to a barbarian that routinely welches on each of its commitments, including, during its present invasion, its universal violation of every cease fire to which it has pretended to agree. That’s local. More universal is the barbarian’s routine violation of international law, particularly including the Geneva Conventions regarding the treatment of civilians in occupied territories and the targeting of civilians in the course of a campaign. Russia’s atrocities—rape and butchery of women and children in occupied Ukrainian cities and its targeting hospitals, churches, residential neighborhoods, and children’s schools during repeated attacks are well documented.

The real breakthrough, the only breakthrough with any security or moral validity, is to transfer to Ukraine the weapons, ammunition, and logistics it says it needs; in the numbers it says it needs them; and on the schedule it says it needs them. The UA has shown its superiority these last four years over the barbarian hordes, despite the barbarian’s superiority in numbers. The only advantage the barbarian has is that it’s far better supported by its allies, Iran and the People’s Republic of China. Ukraine could win the barbarian’s war decisively were the West, led badly by the US, to find some spine and set about supplying Ukraine at least as effectively as are the barbarians’ benefactors supplying the barbarian.

Death for Seditionists?

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Recall the six Progressive-Democratic Party politicians who called on senior military and intelligence officials to disobey “illegal” orders, all the while refusing to identify either the illegal order(s) in question or the statute(s) or constitutional clause(s) they allegedly violated.

President Donald Trump (R) has responded in his inimitable fashion:

“Their words cannot be allowed to stand,” Trump said. “SEDITIOUS BEHAVIOR FROM TRAITORS!!! LOCK THEM UP??? President DJT.”

And later,

SEDITIOUS BEHAVIOR, punishable by DEATH!

Now we have two more Progressive-Democratic Party politicians spouting yet more Leftist conspiracy theory foolishness.

Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D, NY):

When Donald Trump uses the language of execution and treason, some of his supporters may very well listen[.]

House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D, NY):

…disgusting and dangerous death threats against Members of Congress….

Hmm….

Trump has, indeed, suggested, in 2016 campaign “lock her up” rhetoric style that the Six should be locked up for their seditious behavior. But death threats? No. He’s only saying sedition warrants execution, not anyone in particular. Not even in context.

Thus: the only way he could be calling for the execution of the six is if they actually are convicted of seditious behavior. From that, the only logical conclusion of Schumer’s and Jeffries’ claims is that they’re confessing the Six’ guilt of sedition.

New Acquisition Strategy

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Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth wants one, and he’s on the right track. Critical to that will be his willingness and ability to fire the bureaucrats in DoD who stay in the way of the critical changes Hegseth wants, but that’s a separate story. What Hegseth wants is faster, more flexible acquisition processes that enable, rather than hinder, competition in acquisition and production and that foster rapid contract letting and fast production of the contracted for articles. In loose sum,

… Overregulation, diffused accountability, and insufficient competition [must be eliminated]. “Every process, every board, and every review must justify its existence,” the secretary said.
The Pentagon essentially wants to make faster and more flexible contracting authorities the default instead of the exception, and give more priority to the private economy to solve military problems.

One step along this evolution was this that the WSJ editors noted:

Welcome is concentrating more authority in a “portfolio acquisition executive,” who could oversee a suite of programs and make tradeoffs on cost and performance. The current system includes far too many layers of authority. “Program managers answer to dozens and dozens of folks” and “have to go get permission to move a dollar to a better priority,” a former US Navy secretary for acquisition told Congress this year.

Hegseth needs to be absolutely draconian in removing those extraneous layers and terminate the vast majority of the bureaucrats incumbent in them. Very few bureaucrats will warrant reassignment within DoD, and there are—or should be—very few open slots for reassigning into.

I add a couple of improvements to all of this. Hegseth wants to buy the 85% solution and iterate together over time to achieve the 100% solution, but as articulated, it’s insufficient, with too much room for weasel-wording added pricing costs by the contractor. Rather than simply jawboning against endless specs, requirements creep must be stopped cold. Changes to the specs often are warranted, but better is the enemy of good enough, preventing the good enough from being acquired at all, leaving us completely without. “Better” should be included in follow-on contracts—or new contracts—and only after “good enough” has been in operation for some years. That will determine whether that “better” really is and, if so, will provide justification for that “better” going to testing and production.

In parallel with cutting off requirements creep by the contractor, requirements creep by DoD personnel must be cut off, also. Those new and better requirements that come from Pentagon bureaucrats (and here I include the myriad flags and O-6s and O-5s looking for Efficiency Report material for the sake of their personal careers and/or for post-retirement employment with those contractors) must only be considered after the system they’re “improving” has been in the field, operationally employed for some years.

A second parallel is cutting off mission creep by DoD personnel. The system under consideration is being designed, built, and employed for a particular class (narrow or broad) of missions. If the mission changes, or a new mission is identified—and they will be—those needs can only be considered for the next upgrade to the existing system, or the changed/new mission’s needs will call for a new system.

And this: those systems will consist of a platform for carrying and delivering to the targets those bullets, bombs, missiles, drones, what-have-you that will do the destruction of the targets. Those platforms must be as generic as possible so as to be able to carry new and improved bullets, bombs, … with as little physical modification as possible, requiring only software upgrades (which means the platform’s computers must be capable handling the newer generations of software). The flip side of that must include the requirement that the upgraded/replacement bullets, bombs, … and software must be designed to fit onto the existing platform as much as possible. It’s certainly the case that a platform will wear out or the new and improved bullets, bombs, … and software will truly need a new platform, but those should be the greatly infrequent exception rather than the norm.

Immorality

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The men and women of the People’s Republic of China government, led overwhelmingly by President Xi Jinping, are behaving in an utterly immoral fashion when it comes to lethal, illegal drugs and the precursors for manufacturing them.

Those men and women have been continually welching on the agreements they pretend to make to curb fentanyl and fentanyl precursors exports.

Even when Beijing toughens regulations on individual precursors, as it has done several times in recent years, including this summer, Chinese producers can get around the rules by slightly altering the chemical structure of their products.

This bit saucers and blows it.

China calibrates its cooperation on counternarcotics in response to the overall US relationship, said Vanda Felbab-Brown, a counternarcotics expert at the Brookings Institution.

That’s a polite way of saying that the PRC’s government men and women will continue to poison our children unless and until we kowtow to their demands.

Or maybe Xi and his syndicate simply are amoral, with no concept of what’s right or wrong or the differences between the two—only naked power for themselves, nationally, and egoistically globally.

This, more than any military or cyber superiority, is what makes the PRC exceedingly dangerous.