FISA and Search Warrants

The House Judiciary Committee is moving to seriously revamp FISA, the Act that was set up to deal with    widespread privacy violations by the Federal government during the Nixon administration.  It was intended to enable the government to surveil foreign persons and to limit the government’s surveillance to those foreign persons, and it includes a secretive and secret court to enable issuance of search warrants supporting that surveillance. The Act was promptly abused by the FBI and the Feds’ intelligence agencies to spy on us ordinary Americans, also, most recently during the runup to the Trump administration and continuing throughout that term, and since.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court earlier this year declassified a report revealing that FBI agents had inappropriately searched Americans’ phone records more than 270,000 times over a two year period, alarming civil liberty experts and generating bipartisan condemnation.

Bad as that abuse is, it’s also bad that that secret FISA court had been hiding that abuse behind its “classified” wall. This secret, Star Chamber court has been contributing its own abuses to the Act: it has acknowledged that the FBI had overtly lied to it on a number of those warrants, but then it had not only exacted no punishment, it continued blithely to accept FBI agents’ word on subsequent warrant applications. All of that is on top of the fundamental abuse that is the secret nature of this court, which aside from violating the spirit, if not the letter, of our court system, allows it to inflict those other abuses on us ordinary Americans.

Any suitable reform of the FISA Act must include disbanding altogether FISA’s Star Chamber Court. To the extent that the government worries about getting a warrant would tip off the bad guys—and it’s a legitimate concern—Article III courts and State courts all know how to seal and protect warrants when that’s…warranted.

Boosting my WiFi Signal at Home

Kurt Knutsson has some ideas for doing this. Luddite that I am, I question a couple of his going-in assumptions, at least as his suggestions apply to my case. Start with his subheadline:

Fix deadzones, speed up slow spots, and make your wireless internet signal reach farther

I have an ordinary-sized, one-story, wood frame, single-family home. I don’t have deadzones or slow zones (I’ve walked signal-assessors around my house). I don’t want my WiFi signal to reach farther, either; that would take the signal even farther outside my house, even farther past my city lot boundaries, making it even easier for wardrivers to capture, or for others to (try to) piggyback off my WiFi Internet connection (despite the several security precautions I’ve taken).

Have you ever wanted to watch your desktop screen on your smart TV, yet found out that the network connection is too weak or unreliable?

Nope. In the first place, I’ll never have a “smart” TV in my house until they’re the only ones left on the market when I need a replacement, and/or I can guarantee the device will never have or get access to the Internet. Smart TVs, currently, are just another piece of the Internet of Things that is so much a security risk.

YMMV. And probably does.

Wrong Way to Punish the FBI?

The Wall Street Journal‘s editors are concerned that doing away with FISA’s Section 702 would be the wrong way to punish the FBI.

I agree. But the editors are missing the point. They too narrowly justify 702 with this:

Congress created Section 702 after 9/11 to address intelligence-gathering gaps. It lets the government collect information without a warrant on non-US citizens living abroad.

That’s a worthy purpose; although the realization has demonstrated the difficulty of using the capability to good effect, and without abusing it. Or the impossibility of that with the current regime. The FBI has demonstrated that, as an institution, it cannot be trusted with 702 output, and the FISA Court has empirically demonstrated that cannot be trusted, either—not after squawking about FBI lies in the latter’s filings and then proceeding to accept unquestioningly further FBI blandishments and warrant applications.

Answering those deficiencies, though, is a separate matter from applying the appropriate responses to the FBI’s misbehaviors and the FISA Court’s yapping about those misbehaviors.

The FBI is irretrievably broken—its lies to a court are only part of the institution’s failures; its stonewalling of Congress under the risible rationalization that its internal procedure policies are superior to Congress’ constitutionally mandated oversight obligations are another—and it needs to be erased from our government altogether. That, not dealing with 702, is the correct response to the FBI’s institutional dishonesty.

The correct FISA-related action is to make the FISA Court a public proceeding court or itself eliminated as well. That’s not punishing anybody; that’s simply getting rid of the stain of a secretive Star Chamber and forcing “court” activities out into the sunlight, or bringing the warrant application/granting process back into a proper Article III court. Those courts, after all, are fully checked out on the process of keeping warrants sealed until execution.

A Valid Beef, But….

It seems the FBI—in its ongoing rogue-ness as a Federal government institution—obtained individual bank records of individuals about whom they had some curiosity without the nicety of the legally required court orders.

Legal experts are criticizing the FBI for allegedly obtaining the financial records of US customers with Bank of America “without any legal process” following the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot.

And

The allegations about subpoena-less bank-records gathering were included in a staff report from the full, GOP-led House Judiciary Committee that was released about an hour ahead of Thursday’s hearing.

From that report:

Just like FBI whistleblowers…retired FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst George Hill provided the Committee with detailed allegations of FBI civil liberties abuses. Specifically, he testified that following the events at the Capitol on January 6, 2021, Bank of America (BoA) gave the FBI’s Washington Field Office a list of individuals who had made transactions in the DC, Maryland, Virginia area with a BoA credit or debit card between January 5 and January 7, 2021.
He also testified that individuals who had previously purchased a firearm with a BoA product were elevated to the top of the list provided by BoA.

All of that is entirely valid, but beyond that is Bank of America’s behavior. Where’s the hue and cry over that bank so willingly giving up its customers’ personal records? Why did that bank’s managers choose to not demand the subpoena that is so clearly required before any bank gives to Government—or to anyone or anything—those personal data?

Alan Dershowitz, Harvard University Professor Emeritus in law:

Banks should not be turning records, private records over, the next thing doctors will be turning over private records and priests and rabbis. You just can’t start violating people’s privacy without a court order.

You bet. And Bank of America needs to be held to account, suitably sanctioned, and required to make serious financial restitution to those of its customers its managers chose to victimize. And those managers should be fired for cause and required to misbehave on some other company’s payroll.

Lose Your iPhone…

…and lose your data, along with access to your financials. For instance,

thieves who stole [one man’s] iPhone 14 Pro at a bar in Chicago wanted to drain cash from his bank account and prevent him from remotely tracking down the stolen phone. They used his passcode to change [his] Apple ID password. They also enabled a hard-to-find Apple security setting known as the “recovery key.” In doing so, they placed an impenetrable lock on his account.

The thieves got his passcode by shoulder-surfing and watching him tap in his passcode before they stole his phone. And Apple can’t help him: without the recovery key, there’s nothing they can do. In addition to the money stolen, the man has lost the only copies of eight years of photos of his young daughters, which he was storing exclusively on his cell phone.

And this example:

After [a man’s] iPhone 13 Pro was stolen from a Boston bar in August, [he] said he spent hours on the phone with Apple customer support trying to regain access to over a decade of data.

Again, Apple was helpless to help without that now thief-altered recovery key.

The recovery key business is specific to Apple’s iPhones, and it’s irrelevant to my questions here. My questions apply to Android phones and other kinds of cell phones just as much.

My first question is this: when the cell phone owner was in any sort of public place—bar, office, park, etc, what was that cell phone doing anywhere but in the owner’s hot little hand or in an interior pocket? Leaving the cell phone out on a counter or a bar or a park bench, even if the owner is right there, is the same as taping a “Free for the Taking” sign on the phone.

My second question is this: convenience comes with a price, and these theft victims provide examples of the price to be paid for that convenience: the loss of those precious personal items, the loss of years of personally important data, or the loss of company or other business data and correspondence (whether text or email), the loss of the moneys in the various financial accounts to which the owner has given cell phone access, and on and on. Why are these data kept on cell phones at all? Why are they not, at the least, backed up on a separate device—a laptop, for instance, or the company’s desktop back at the office or in the home office?

There’s no excuse for the theft, but there’s no excuse, either, for the personal laziness that magnifies the outcome of the theft.