Government-Guaranteed Loans and Taxes

This is a brief tale of taxes and loans as they apply to American education.

In a time when our governments think the answer to correcting our public education system’s decades-long failure to improve our children’s education, as demonstrated by poor and unimproving standard test scores, is to continue their decades-long practice of throwing our taxpayer money at the system (what was it that Albert Einstein said about doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting different results…?), some of our state governments, and the good citizens therein, are rejecting the idea and doing something different.

As  The Daily Caller reports, in the recent special election in Colorado, the voters overwhelmingly rejected a ballot proposal that would have raised, yet again, taxes earmarked for public schools, when no discernable improvements from those increases were expected (by those taxpayers).

Florida, on the other hand, has been doing something different since the turn of the century: it’s lowered taxes by giving tax credits to businesses that donate to a non-profit  K-12 scholarship program that are equal to those donations.  The scholarships then are awarded to low-income families to help pay their costs in sending their children to private schools selected by those parents.  (Notice that phrase, too: “help pay.”  The families have to commit significant funds of their own; by having their own skin in this game, they have incentive to ensure their children do well in the new school.)

The effect of this Florida program is four-fold: the public schools, now having to compete for students, are doing a better job of teaching the children they retain.  The low-income families get better choices in how to get their children educated.  The state saves money: despite losing $1 in education tax revenues, it actually saves nearly $1.50 because despite the stereotype, it’s cheaper to educate a child in a private school in Florida than it is in a public school.  The local communities come out ahead because a dollar taken in taxes is only about six bits actually spent back into the local community due to the internal friction of the various government agencies each taking their taste of that tax dollar, whereas that same dollar left in the taxpayer’s hands is entirely spent in one form or another.

Now let’s look at government-guaranteed student loans for college (those guarantees, don’t forget, are covered by tax dollars from all of us).  What are these loans used for, and what should they be used for?

This table from The Daily Caller is instructive.

Bachelor's Degrees AwardedLook at this table against the backdrop of the global economic competition in which the United States is engaged.  From business, to resource development, to production, to defense, and everything in between, the United States needs well-trained and -qualified scientists and engineers.  What are our students studying?  Visual and Performing Arts.  Education(!?).  Social Science (how are we doing in this field, by the way?).  What are international students, the students of our competitors, studying?  Engineering.  Physical and Life Sciences.

If we’re going to have a government student loan program (I think we should not, but that’s another story), might it not be a little bit beneficial to target those loans in some way?  How about, if we’re going to commit our tax dollars to covering student loans at all, we at least use the program to encourage our students to study—and to stay with through graduation—the engineering and science, technology, and/or mathematics that will actually do our nation and our society some good, instead of just spotting our unformed (and uninformed) high school graduates the bucks they want simply to follow their bliss?

Health and Government

There were two articles in today’s The Wall Street Journal that drew my eye.  In the first article, Joseph Rago interviewed John Lechleiter, CEO and Chairman of Eli Lilly & Co.

Mr Lechleiter offered these comments, among others:

In 1960 the average life expectancy in East Asia was 39…. In 1990, 30 years later, it was 67. Think about that. Does that explain the Asian economic boom? I think it might go a long way….  Wealth follows health, and it ain’t the other way around.

Lechleiter expanded on the point: longer, healthier, more productive lives, and more of them; more workers; an expanding middle class; more opportunities for the formation of capital—this virtuous medical-economic cycle is helping to generate the equally staggering growth in China and elsewhere in the region.

This could very well be a biomedical century, in the same way that the last was a physical and engineering century, with similarly explosive improvements in capability for taking care of our bodies and minds, and lives.  After a period of labor-saving device advances, now perhaps, a period of advances in  life- and quality of life-saving devices and techniques.

But maybe not in the United States.  Genentech’s Avastin is a drug that had been approved for use as a treatment option for women with metastatic breast cancer; that approval has been withdrawn by the FDA.  The rationale for the withdrawal is instructive:

The National Comprehensive Cancer Network, a highly respected consortium of U.S. oncology programs, has four times reaffirmed its recommendation that Avastin is “an appropriate therapeutic option.”

Perhaps the most telling passage in Dr. Hamburg’s apologia arrives when she rejects such practical expertise because the Cancer Network tries “to provide clinicians with ready access to synthesized information they can use in making patient decisions.” She says the FDA’s judgment is superior because its experts “have extensive qualifications in clinical trial design and evaluation.” Rarely are assertions of regulatory purism over the evidence and practice of the real world so chillingly blunt.

Further, Dr Margaret Hamburg, FDA Commissioner, while acknowledging that many women experience dramatic improvements with Avastin, insists that “it is not possible to determine if there is some subset of patients within the population as a whole that may have had a meaningful benefit.”

I suppose, though, there is a bright side to this.  It isn’t every nation in the world that has such august personages in their governments who personally know better than empirical evidence what the correct course must be.

The European Union and the Articles of Confederation

Can the EU be saved?  Spiegel Online International asks this question and outlines some possible paths to a rescue.  Related to this is a question the Europeans dare not ask: should it be saved?

I think the paths outlined are doomed to failure, and I think the attempt should not be made.

The Spiegel authors allude to a similarity with the original American colonies and our Articles of Confederation, and this is an apt comparison, as far as it goes.  Under the Articles, the united States [sic] were as utterly helpless to solve their problems as the EU is today.  In order to achieve anything substantive, the Articles demanded a unanimous vote from 13 independent States, States who had come together under the Articles in a diplomatic conclave, not as a single nation.  Even for less important matters, the Articles required a super majority for enactment.  Thus, 235 years ago, as the ex-European Commission President José Manuel Barroso put it in describing the current condition of the EU, “Any idiot [could] veto anything.”

However, the authors do not explore the comparison enough, and so they do not see a critical difference between the Treaties of Lisbon, Maastricht, and Rome that created the EU, and the Articles of Confederation that created the initial American nation.  There are 27 nations in the European Union, and there are 17 nations in the subset that is the euro zone.  This compares to 13 colonies/States in the Confederation.  The critical difference, though, that allowed the Confederation to transform itself into the United States of America and that stands in the way of a similar EU transformation is this: a very large degree of homogeneity existed among the 13 States that agreed, finally, to toss the Articles and the glorified alliance that they documented and to supplant the mess with a Constitution, a Federal government, and a true nation.  The States also had to give up real measures of their sovereignty to achieve this transformation.

This was only possible due to the American States’ fundamental similarity of thought, particularly the philosophical view of the relationship of men with government and with each other, of the purposes of society, of government, of an economy, of money—in short, of social and political philosophy.

This homogeneity does not obtain in Europe, and so a similar removal of the Treaties and transformation of the nations of the EU into a true European nation is impossible.  Whatever we might think of the various underlying philosophies, the differences among the European nations are as fundamental as were the similarities among the American States.  The views of the Mediterranean nations are not those of western Europe, and northern Europe differs from both, and eastern Europe differs still.  And within each region, particularly western Europe, there are fundamental differences in political and economic philosophy.  Without confluence on philosophy, the unity essential to nationhood is impossible to achieve.  Additionally, so long as these philosophical differences exist, the nations will not yield the sovereignty necessary to allow a central über government with teeth, even a federal one, to exist.

There is, also, a practical difference between the situation of the Confederation of 235 years ago and the EU of today.  This is the age and maturity of the constituent States.  The American colonies still were young, largely unformed in their polities (although they had all the trappings of fully formed governments), and for all their economic competition, were used to working with each other against a hostile outside world.  The nations of today’s European Union are fully formed, mature nations, settled in their political, social, and economic ways, and in many very serious respects, not at all used to wholesale cooperation against a hostile outside world, but they are rather used to conflict in their mutual hostility.

Integration is even harder with money.  Without a common understanding of the purpose and use of money, there can be no hope of a common currency.  Who should pay for a man’s retirement, for instance?  If government should (not a universal belief), then from where will that government get the money with which to pay?  This can only come from taxpayer/citizens.  But if one nation of the Union (or one State of the desired new Federation) believes it appropriate for a man to retire at 55, on what basis will a citizen of another State of the Federation, a State that believes, across its society, that a man should work until 67, agree to pay for that earlier retirement?  If the purpose of money, according to one polity, is current consumption—because government will provide the future—how can another polity, believing that money has also (if not instead) a purpose of storing value against an uncertain future use the same currency?

Indeed, some Europeans understand this today.  Hermann Lübbe, writing in the Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung (I’m paraphrasing from the Spiegel translation; my German is virtually non-existent), acknowledges that a federation of European states is an impossibility, as the current euro zone debt failures demonstrate.  Lübbe writes that there is “no prospect” of achieving consensus among “Finland and Greece, Slovenia and Portugal, Austria and France.”

Even were a pan-European federation workable, though, the solutions offered are incomplete and doomed to failure from that incompleteness.  Joschka Fischer, erstwhile German foreign minister, for instance, suggests a stronger European economic government for the euro zone, an government that would assume fiscal control over the member nations.  But this cannot work without including defense in the government, because defense must be paid for by something, especially in a world where Americans are tired of spending our own treasure and blood for the sake of other nations that choose not to contribute to their own defensive needs.  In fact, none of the solutions suggested consider a common defense requirement.

Any inclusion of a unified defense governance, though, will be as difficult as trying for a common currency, or a common underlying philosophy of government, generally.  The several European nations each have their own defense imperatives, such as they are.  In an anti-terror war in Afghanistan, for instance, can a Spain be required to produce troops after it has decided its own interests lie with bringing the troops it had assigned back home?  Can a Germany be required to provide the bulk of the defense for a pan-Europe, with German soldiers necessarily stationed in the nations of pan-Europe (and how would a France react to that with the border area between the two so recently, and for so long, a common battleground; to say nothing of the wholly different views in these two nations of the role a defense establishment must play, and the differing views of nuclear weapons)?  How, indeed, should the nations that view a war against an amorphous enemy like terror organizations respond to that war?  Yet these questions can only be answered by considering the economics of defense, and the politics of defense, as well as the military nature of defense.

What’s the alternative, then?  Must Europe revert to the 27 separate nationalities of the last century?  Certainly, they could.  The threats of that century—Germany, France, and Great Britain economically prostrate and so looking for national advantage in the early part of the century; the Soviet threat in the latter half of the century—no longer exist.  The nations—even Greece—are relatively prosperous today, and the nations no longer view each other as overt threats.  However, there is profit (in every sense of the word) to be had in reducing the level of economic and political fragmentation that 27 separate nations, each going its own way, demonstrates.

There are natural groupings among the several states, and such groupings could form the core of common currency zones and even federations comprising members of those groups.  But it’s critical even here, that commonality of world view must be the guiding force in creating these Unions.

Some Unions that come to mind are Italy, Spain, and Portugal; Germany, Austria, and (yes) Poland; the Baltic States; Scandinavia to suggest a few.  This leaves Great Britain outside, but this is to the detriment of no one.  For centuries the British have made a prosperous living remaining outside continental Europe, brokering arrangements among the continental powers, when the British were not dealing with the world at large; this is a fine course for Great Britain today through the intermediate future.  This leaves France, also, on the outside—looking in, but also looking outward, and this does no harm to France or to Europe, even though some of the less imaginative think Europe without France to be inconceivable.

These larger Unions, while not pan-European, will have the economic strength to operate prosperously on the global stage, and they can add to their economic strength in the same way that North America has, with its nations of differing world views: with a pan-European free trade zone.

This sort of arrangement necessarily represents a fragmentation of the European Union, but the present whole is unworkable and needs to go another way, anyway.  The several Unions, the several common currencies, with a collective free trade agreement, will be far stronger, and the constituent parts, for being more homogeneous internally, will be far more stable, both internally and vis-à-vis each other.

Update: Corrected typo that changed the meaning of a sentence: opening the 4th paragraph, “However, the authors explore the comparison enough….” has been corrected to “However, the authors do not explore the comparison enough….”

Do Progressives Think Americans are Stupid?

The Daily Caller describes a conversation one of their reporters had with Representative Jerrold Nadler (D, NY) concerning photo IDs for voters.  Nadler says, with a completely straight face, that requiring photo IDs prior to voting in an American election is a “deliberate plot by conservatives and Republicans to suppress votes.”

Let’s look at the Progressive reasoning he offers in support of this thesis.

He says

It doesn’t have to be photo ID.  You get Social Security with Social Security cards and, by the way, plenty of voter IDs—you have a photo ID issued by a state university as a student or as a teacher, and those—in a lot of states, those aren’t valid.

However, none of these require proof of citizenship, as Congressman Nadler knows.  Social Security is for anyone who works in the US and earns wages—explicitly including non-citizens.  Additionally, our higher education system welcomes citizens from other nations (for very good reason), and the universities’ photo IDs are for their internal purposes: access to university facilities.  Finally, these documents don’t require any sort of background check, for instance to see whether even a US citizen is eligible to vote in the particular election: is the person a resident of the jurisdiction in question, for instance, is the person not a felon, and so on.

He continues

And there’s no valid reason why those shouldn’t be valid for voting purposes….

Except for the above, unless there’s concern that Chicago-style ballot box stuffing might be reduced with a photo ID.

Congressman Nadler also says

People generally have voter IDs because they drive cars, but lots of people don’t drive cars….

But as Nadler knows full well, states are happy to issue photo IDs to people who don’t drive.  It takes about as much time as it does to get an actual driver’s license.

He does address this, though.

A lot of these states that are passing these laws are making it very difficult to get the underlying document so it will take you a lot of time; it will cost you a lot of money to get it.

What laws, exactly, in what states?  Certainly, it’s easy enough to toss off these accusations without substantiating them.  Furthermore, while there is some time expenditure required, that simply means an adult American citizen needs to plan ahead a little bit and get the documentation and then the photo ID in advance of the election.  Some years ago, I needed to get a copy of my birth certificate from California pursuant to getting my passport (another of those photo IDs that would be accepted at a polling place, and also one of those photo IDs that’s required to fly or to reenter our country after having traveled abroad—is Congressman Nadler suggesting the DHS is deliberately throwing roadblocks in the way of honest Americans wanting to come home?).  That copy would cost me $21 today (so much for “a lot of money”) and a couple of weeks.  It took six more weeks for State to issue my passport.  Perhaps Congressman Nadler would like to address that “lot of time” with State.

Congressman Nadler finishes with this:

We don’t have 5 million cases of voter fraud. You don’t have 50 cases of voter fraud in the country of the kind of voter fraud that an ID card might deal with.

Again, he offers no evidence that the small number he tosses out is an accurate one.  However, stipulating that the number of voter fraud cases is small, what might happen, anyway?  In 2004, a Washington Governor was elected by a 129-vote margin out of 2.6 million votes cast, and in 2008, a Minnesota Senator was elected by 312 votes out of 2.4 million votes cast.  And in 2000, some might remember that a state’s electoral votes were awarded on the basis of 537 votes out of nearly 6 million cast.  It wouldn’t have taken much fraud at all to have swung those outcomes.  And accusations of such fraud were (and are) widespread.

Yet Congressman Nadler assures us that requiring photo IDs in order to vote is nothing less than a “deliberate plot by conservatives and Republicans to suppress votes.”

Hmm….

America’s Future—Foreign Policy Principles, Part II

In an earlier post, I wrote about the necessity of redefining the basic principles of American foreign policy in order to have a successful future.  In that post, I also expanded on one of them, the need for American national interests to come ahead of all other considerations in our global relations.  In this post, I’d like to talk about another of those principles, the need to support our friends and allies.

It is possible, though enormously expensive, for us, among a very few nations, to satisfy our national needs unilaterally—that is, we do what we need to do without regard to the imperatives of any other nation.  Even for us, however, it’s also possible only for a short period of time, before both we run out of funding and resources and enough of the rest of the world joins together to overwhelm us.  Thus, while it is imperative that we retain the ability and the will to act alone when necessary, it will be more efficient and cheaper to work with other nations, informally, via a specific treaty, and/or via alliance to achieve our ends.

When it comes to supporting our friends and allies, though, we need to answer some additional questions, for these answers must shape the nature of our relationships.  These questions are first, why should we support our friends (or, why not leave them to their own devices?), followed by understanding who are our friends and why are they our friends, as well as who our enemies are, and why they are so.

Why, indeed, should we support our friends?  The simple utilitarian view is that it’s more efficient to support friends because then they will support us.  Most actions on the global stage are done more cost effectively if done with the assistance of others than if done by us alone, bearing all the costs, even if we then retain all the benefit.  The benefits are greater from the greater joint effort because the mutual support magnifies the benefit/cost ratio.

More importantly than a pecuniary reason, though, it’s our moral duty to support our friends.  The protection and enforcement of the natural rights of all men, rights we acknowledge explicitly in our Declaration of Independence, require that each of us act to support our fellows when those rights are threatened.  Such an obligation, further, is made explicit by the social compact that free men form when we create our nations.  So it is among these free nations.  When a nation that is a friend of the United States is threatened, it is our duty as fellow men to aid the men of that nation, and to do so explicitly in our common cause.

To do this effectively, though, we must know and be willing publicly to acknowledge who our friends and our enemies are.

I suggest that there are two types of friends and two types of enemies.  Of those who are friends, some are so because of our shared heritage and our common interests.  Others are so through our common objectives and/or the threats we both face.  This is not a symmetrical relationship, though; commonality is not a guarantor of a relationship; it only makes such types of relationship more likely.

While not everyone with whom we have some commonality will be our friend, most of them can be, and few of them will be hostile.  One example is Great Britain.  We were colonized primarily by Great Britain; although a significant minority of our forebears came from continental Europe.  We fought a number of wars, both shooting and economic, over the several decades surrounding our breakaway.  We’ve since stood shoulder to shoulder when one or the other of us needed support, even when we disagreed with the means used to answer the crisis.  This friendship is greatly facilitated by our common heritage and by our common interests: respect for the individual liberties of all men, respect for the power of a sound, free economy in supporting and enhancing that freedom.

Commonality of objectives or threats contributes to a measure of friendship; although the ties are not necessarily as strong.  Japan is an example of this.  Even though in the aftermath of WWII, the Japanese government was replaced with a Western-style democracy, Japanese culture remained largely intact and is only slowly—and in accordance with Japanese needs—moving closer to a Western nature: it remains Japanese in its essentials.  Nevertheless, we face together powerful foes in the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, as well as the destabilizing risk of an irrational, nuclear-armed northern Korea.  Aside from the common objective of facing down these threats, we have other common objectives that tie us together: an interest in free trade, the economic welfare of our citizenry, the rights of our citizenry to have a powerful voice in our respective governments, peaceful, profitable relations with our neighbors.  Working together in supporting these objectives has created a strong association between the two of us.

Of those who are our enemies, some are so because their cultural imperatives drive them to open hostility toward any culture different from their own.  Others are so through political or economic philosophical competition and/or through competition for the same critical resources.

Iran is an example of an enemy from its cultural imperatives.  Iran’s political culture drives it toward the bigotry of considering it appropriate to exterminate whole peoples solely because those peoples worship differently than the ayatollahs.  Iran’s historical culture drives it to attempt to control its neighbors simply because Iran needs the control; it cannot bring itself to trust to the peaceful intentions of those neighbors.  These are antithetical to everything for which the United States stands, and so Iran has concluded that we must be its enemy as well as the nations of its immediate region.  We must clash because Iran is intent on destroying a close ally, Israel.  We must clash because Iran is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and then delivering them to terrorists for their use.

The People’s Republic of China is an example of a nation whose enmity toward us flows from its competition for resources (oil and innovation talent) and for political thought (the sovereignty of the people vs. the sovereignty of the government).  As long as these competitions exist—especially the political-philosophical competition—the PRC will remain hostile to us.  We must clash because the PRC feels itself threatened by the competition over political ideas.  We must clash because the United States supports the right of a people to determine for themselves their future and their government, which puts our two nations specifically at loggerheads over the future of the Republic of China.  We must clash because the United States, as most Western nations, insists on protecting the intellectual and inventive products of its citizens, while the PRC freely seeks to acquire that output through any means possible.  We must clash because we insist on the right of all nations to have access to the resources on sea floors beneath international waters.

In another post on this subject, I’ll expand on the matter of identifying who our friends and enemies are, and why they are our friends or enemies.