Will HARP 2.0 Accomplish Anything?

The administration has come out with an updated Home Affordable Refinance Program, what The Wall Street Journal‘s  Smart Money calls HARP 2.0.  With this improvement, underwater homeowners can refinance their mortgages at a lower rate if they have Freddie Mac- or Fannie Mae-backed mortgages, they’re current on their existing mortgages, and they’ve not missed a mortgage payment in the last six months and not more than one payment in the last twelve.

There are a number of items to consider, though.  Why would anyone want to take the lender’s side of such a (refinanced) loan?  The collateral offered has less value than the collateral that was offered for the original loan: it’s the same house, now devalued, often very significantly.  This means that a lender that retains the loan in its portfolio is giving up one income stream for a smaller income stream on a lower-valued home. This decrement often can be worth it, given the reduced loan to collateral value ratio associated with an increase in home value, but in this market…?  Additionally, the lender that sells the loan to a packager or another loan servicer is going to get a smaller sales price for the refinanced loan, since both the collateral and the income stream are smaller.

On the other side of such loans, the borrowers still will be underwater.  To be sure, this isn’t a problem for lenders whose borrowers in good standing or for borrowers who aren’t trying to sell, but is a problem for borrowers looking to relocate—to a different job in a different city, or to a job at all in a different city.  But these borrowers aren’t trying to refinance.

There are mechanical problems with HARP 2.0, also.  Even though the Luddites who underwrite loans manually can begin using the program now, the government’s IT whiz kids won’t have the software in place to support the new rules until early February for Freddie Mac-backed mortgages or March for Fannie Mae-backed mortgages.  This shouldn’t be surprising, though: this performance is of a kind with the government’s IT performance with the IRS’ “upgrade” of their computer systems and of OPM’s government jobs Web site.  Still, I remain amazed that, given as long as the government has known about this HARP variation, the software requirements weren’t able to be satisfied already, much less won’t be for another three+ months.

But beyond the bureaucrats’ lack of thought about how much this this program actually is going to accomplish, the lack of consideration for consequences or for history is…apparent.  Consider what the government holds out as selling points for this update:

  • borrowers who apply to the same lender to whom they make their monthly payments won’t have their credit scores checked, and
  • borrowers won’t be required to provide documentation proving their income.

This just repeats the mistakes that contributed to the housing bubble and burst in the first place:

Hmm….

Herman Cain and the Debate

Herman Cain has withdrawn from the Republican campaign, sidelined by allegations of sexual misbehavior.  Some find it hard to believe that there was nothing to those allegations, even though no substantiation ever has been offered.

Cain himself, and fellow Republicans, thought the allegations too much a distraction, and so he believed himself unable to discuss the real issues at hand.  Apparently none of these worthies have ever heard of gorilla dust.

But this surrender comes against the backdrop of other Republican candidates who’ve been called out for similar misbehaviors—that actually have occurred—and who have successfully answered those manufacturing the distractions, thereby canceling attempts to move the discussion away from the issues facing us.

No, the real problem with Cain’s retreat is that this is another instantiation of the Republicans’ inability to control the debate, their inability to keep the discussion on topic.  They routinely allow the other party to decide the terms of reference, whether it be gutting Social Security with payroll tax cuts rather than giving Americans real, income tax cuts; or ad hominem attacks to which the Republican targets respond, and respond, and respond; or class warfare, to which the Republican response is to…claim class warfare, but not to push a coherent tax reform plan of their own; or a tax and spend plan masqueraded as a jobs bill, to which the Republicans respond by saying, “No,” without offering a coherent jobs plan of their own.  The list goes on.

They don’t even talk about the budget the House passed at the start of the current session that reduces the deficit and addresses the national debt, and that sits ignored in the Democratic Party-controlled Senate.  They don’t even talk about the 15+ jobs bills the House has passed that sit languishing in that same Senate.  Because the Progressives don’t want to talk about these things, the Republicans won’t; they can only respond to Progressive initiatives.

And yet manufacturing “distractions” is exactly what the Progressives intend to do to their eventual Presidential campaign opponent in 2012.  And to all of their Congressional opponents.  Because they have no hope of arguing the issues themselves, and because they know they can get away with it.

Removing the Progressives from office in 2012 is very uncertain, regardless of any early poll suggestions.

Candidate Gingrich

I wrote off Newt Gingrich early on in the present Republican primary campaign.  As he’s done with so many professional pundits, he’s showing me up (how must they feel to be in my company…).

He’s made a lot of mistakes, and he carries a lot of baggage.  It’s suggested that his flip-flopping skills rival the best of others.

But he also has an aspect that few politicians have: an openness about his positions, a willingness to acknowledge his mistakes rather than to weasel-word those positions.  A willingness to address directly the premise that his positions have evolved.

A few examples will illustrate.  He did a spot with Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi supporting government responses to global warming; now he freely—and repeatedly, since television talking heads can’t get enough of it—admits to the error: “that is probably the dumbest single thing I’ve done in recent years. It is inexplicable.”  He endorsed a liberal Republican congressional candidate, Dede Scozzafava, who wound up supporting taxpayer funding of elective abortions.  He’s since acknowledged his foolishness in this endorsement.

On the beef about his flip-flopping, the argument assumes that men cannot change, that once they’ve taken a position, it’s been carved in adamantine, never to be reconsidered.  This is little more than hubris on the part of those who would exclaim this about a man.  Gingrich, for instance, once supported an individual mandate for health care programs.  What he said, later, to explain that “support,” was this: “I agree that all of us have a responsibility to help pay for health care.  I’ve said consistently, where there’s some requirement you either have health insurance or you post a bond or in some way you indicate you’re going to be held accountable.”  One can argue that this evolution of a position is a flip, but there’s clearly been no change back to the original—no flop to reverse the flip.  And the argument ignores the fact that Gingrich’s “responsibility” is a far cry from the version of individual mandate that is the heart and soul of Obamacare: buy the government-approved program or pay a fine.  Every year, pay the fine or buy the government-approved program.  There is no option to otherwise demonstrate that an individual has his health care costs covered in some way satisfactory to him and costlessly to his neighbors.

Then there’s his consulting work with a GSE, for which he was paid a ton of money.  The beef here is as much about the amount he was paid as it was for the advice he actually provided.  Some of us think, though, that we should be paid for our labors at the rate we can get an employer, or a client to pay us.  It’s only a Progressive meme that it’s somehow wrong to aspire to be a part of the 1%.

As to the work itself, part of that included his touting of Freddie Mac as an exceptionally viable business model.  Frankly, I agree with him.  Any time I can start up and run a business where I can con someone else into picking up a significant fraction of my costs, I’ll go for it.  Freddie Mac succeeded in that, and Gingrich acknowledged it.

There’s also the beef that “He used the influence he had earned while he was in the political field….”  I’m not convinced that’s, of necessity, wrong.  Certainly such influence can be used abusively.  Certainly there are advantages to being a true outsider, and so devoid of such influence in one’s tool kit.  But influence strongly affects how things work, too, at all levels of government, and in the board room and the cubicle farms.  Having political influence and the skills to use it isn’t all bad.

To be sure, the heaviest baggage he carries is the way he’s comported himself in his private life: working on his third marriage while having cheated on his previous two wives.  However, as Bob Vander Plaats, President and CEO of The Family Leader, puts it, “He did not have a road to Des Moines conversion. He’s had five, six, seven years where he’s been repentant, he’s been humble, he’s been transparent….”  Certainly, once integrity has been broken, we can never be sure again.  All we can do is observe the man’s behavior since, and if that behavior warrants, make a leap of faith in trust.  This is as true with Newt Gingrich as it is with any man.

In short, Gingrich has shown himself to be an imperfect man who makes mistakes.  It might seem that he’s made a lot of them—too many, in fact—but we have to consider other factors, as well: whether he’s really made all that many more mistakes than his rivals or than politicians generally; or whether his mistakes are more visible, both because of his personal baggage and because his rivals, and politicians generally, work hard to conceal their mistakes, or explain them away with current rationale so they don’t seem like mistakes anymore.

On the other hand, Gingrich has strong attractions.  He’s not averse to pushing back against journalists who ask foolish questions, and calling them out over their foolishness.  (That’s a particularly favorable characteristic to me.)  We may disagree with him on the legitimacy of a particular question, but it’s hard to miss the fact that he’s willing to try to keep a conversation on track.  He’s also alone among the present Republican candidates who actively refuses to criticize his rivals during the debates, preferring (correctly) to argue why he’s the best candidate to beat the incumbent, rather than why the other candidates are dolts.

But more substantively, he’s not afraid to take a position because he believes it, even if it’s politically risky.   He has, for instance, proposed immigration reform that would allow illegal aliens who’ve been here for 25 years and are otherwise upstanding members of their community to stay—just not as citizens or with a right to vote.  This has drawn “illegal immigrant magnet” criticism from many conservatives.

He’s actively pushed for oil drilling off the South Carolina shore, saying this will produce 8,800 jobs and $1.3 billion for the South Carolina economy.  This has drawn the ire of environmentalists and NIMBYers alike,

He’s proposed, however clumsily in the minds of the politically correct, paying local students to take care of their school.  The kids would actually do work, they would have cash that they’ve earned, they would develop a measure of pride in their school, they’d “begin the process of rising.” (One might pay the students out of the funds saved by reducing the janitorial staff.  One might let the VoTech shops (remember those?) do some of the plumbing and carpentry maintenance.) This is a technique that works very well in Japan; although those students aren’t paid for the work—it’s viewed as part of their duty.

He’s proposed a far more active and direct strategy for dealing with Iran than anything put forward by President Obama.

He’s proposed privatizing much of Social Security, but maintaining a Federally funded floor under retirement payouts.  He’s proposed a dual track of maintaining the current Social Security system for those who don’t want the privatization.  He anticipates the current system will wither and disappear as more and more opt into the private system.

All of these ideas pose political risks, if only by their existence as targets for rivals.  But his ideas are worth articulating openly so they can be discussed openly, as few other candidates are willing to do during their campaigns.  As Gingrich said about Herman Cain and his 9-9-9 plan, at least he’s gotten serious conversation going on the matters.

Newt Gingrich is a flawed man, but who among his rivals, who among the Progressives, who among any of us, is not?  Gingrich also is a man who’s entirely willing to say what must be said, regardless of the risks to him.  That counts for something, too.

It’s the Wrong Fight

Republicans say that any tax cuts must be paid for with spending cuts elsewhere, and this is certainly true.  But what they’re talking about in the present case is payroll tax cuts.  Certainly, these cuts also must be paid for with spending cuts from somewhere else, but the logic ends there.

Senator Dick Durbin (D, IL) even calls out the Republicans on the matter, as I’ve written elsewhere.  But why are the Republicans letting themselves be drawn into this at all?  They’re ceding the terms of the debate and the entire debate to the Progressives.

On what basis do the Republicans—or anyone—agree that funding for Social Security should be cut?  This is a program that is already widely acknowledged to be desperately in need of reform or it’s destined for failure, yet the Progressives refuse to allow any reform.  Cutting funding by cutting payroll taxes that are intended for the Social Security Trust Fund only hastens that collapse.  Instead, we get Senator Jon Kyl’s (R, AZ) lame answer that “The payroll tax doesn’t go into general revenue. It supports Social Security.”  While true, it misses the whole point.  What is the Republican’s plan for reforming Social Security (and Medicare)?  Congressman Paul Ryan (R, WI) put forward ideas for both programs in the budget the House passed in 2010 that are worth serious discussion.  Yet Republicans have barely mentioned those ideas since: were they not serious about these reforms?

More to the point, why didn’t Kyl turn the argument back on Durbin and ask him why he’s opposed to really leaving money in the hands of Americans and our businesses by supporting income tax cuts for everyone?

Senator Durbin has agreed that tax cuts are good for Americans (he said so with the payroll tax cuts); Republicans should be arguing for income tax cuts, and permanent ones, not just via the annual argument over extending the Bush tax cuts, or some subset of them.  Republicans should be challenging the Progressives to offer legislation that provides for permanent income tax cuts for individuals and for businesses; they have a willing ally in Senator Durbin.  Or he’ll be shown by the debate to be disingenuous.  Republican candidates for President have offered real, broad tax reform; Republicans should be discussing these ideas more—in town hall meetings, on the floor of the House and Senate, on the radio and TV talk shows, at every chance they get—and they should make chances to talk about them.  Since they don’t do any of that, I have to ask: of what are they afraid?

The US already has the most progressive individual income tax structure in the developed world.  The President is openly engaging in class warfare as he campaigns for reelection and for his More Taxes More Spending ideology.  The Progressives in the Senate have not allowed the Senate to satisfy its statutory duty to propose an actual budget—of any sort—for nearly three years.  The Progressives nearly blew up the debt ceiling negotiations over their refusal to cut spending and their demand to raise taxes.  The Progressives did succeed in blowing up the Super Committee with their nonnegotiable demand to raise taxes by $1 trillion dollars.  The Republicans need to be calling out the Progressives on all of this.

Instead, Republicans let the Democrats control the argument and limit it to a narrow, doomed to fail path.

On top of this, the only jobs program that gets debated is the Progressives’ tax and spend Jobs Bill, while the Republicans don’t even have a coherent jobs message of their own, much less an actual plan.  Oh, yeah, there’s that Ryan bill from nearly two years ago.  About which they’re absolutely silent.

By letting the Progressives have the debates on their terms—again—and by having no coherent message of their own, the Republicans are in danger of giving control of the House right back to the Progressives in 2012 and of leaving control of the Senate and of the White House in their hands, too.  We’ve seen how well that’s worked for our country.  Four more years will only extend the damage to national disaster proportions.

America’s Future—Foreign Policy Principles, Part IVa

In this companion post to Part IV of my foreign policy principles, I offer some means (far from exhaustive) of recognizing friend, ally, enemy, and foe.  The ideas I describe may seem obviously simplistic; however, in light of the incoherence of the present administration’s foreign policy—and that of prior administrations post-Reagan—it seems that an enumeration is useful.

In general, in any dispute there will be those who are “with us” and those who are “against us”—and some will always try to sit out the affair.  Of those who are “with us”, we need to know who is a friend, and who is an ally. An initial filter might seem to be a shared core set of beliefs.  This characteristic is highly useful, but I suggest that it’s only a secondary filter whose value is greatest when used to assess the potential durability of a relationship and thus to help discriminate a friend from an ally; it cannot, though, define either.

What are the essential differences between a friend and an ally?  The distinction lies in motive and purpose of the relationship.  An ally is with us against a common foe, for so long as the joint opposition suits our individual purposes—the allies of WWII, for instance.  Similarly, an ally is with us to achieve a common purpose for so long as the coordinated effort in the achieving suits us both—the building and manning of a space station, for instance.  For a friend, these short-term common ends are irrelevant; indeed, we might not work together on very many endeavors at all.  We simply associate with each other freely and easily.  Our bond is deeper, and far less a matter of convenience.

How might we recognize a friend?  A friend is a nation that moves to stand with us, that sends its assistance unasked in our moment of need, or that moves to stand with us in a conflict that has been thrust on us by another.  Our common efforts—military, political, diplomatic, economic, etc.—are joint endeavors, not merely coordinated actions of allies.  An example of a friend might be England and Poland, who stood with us in Iraq and Afghanistan despite their own misgivings about those wars or their duration.  An example might be the United States, who at Japan’s request, sent an envoy to northern Korea to support Japanese efforts to recover their citizens, stolen by the northern Koreans in the ’70s and ’80s, despite the harm sending an American envoy did to our efforts to prevent this entity from acquiring nuclear weapons.

This is not to say that a friend always takes our side uncritically, although one might on occasion.  Having criticisms and standing with us despite them is the mark of an even stronger friendship.  Their doing so with criticism, though, puts a premium on us: it creates in us a moral obligation beyond our simple duty to reciprocate in their hour.  We owe a friend thoughtful consideration of their criticisms; even more than that, we owe either a change in our own behavior where their criticism is legitimate, or a clear and unequivocal answer where we disagree with the criticism.

And that’s it.  It’s a short list containing a single way to tell a friend, especially compared to the much longer list of ways by which to recognize an enemy or a foe.  But that’s as it should be.  Our friends are “high, bright, and clear,” while our enemies and foes lurk in the shadows.

How do we recognize an ally?  Some recognition keys include offers, or accepting our offers, to work toward a common goal, whether this be sharing costs in a resource development project, or sharing financial data concerning a third nation of common interest.  Recognition keys also include offers, or accepting offers, to jointly oppose a third nation or non-national entity interfering with matters of mutual interests.  Nations working together to reduce piracy off the Horn of Africa are allies, for instance, as well as those nations of WWII mentioned above.  Recognition keys further include willingness to permit over-flight, transit transportation, staging, and so on in their territory to facilitate our prosecution of a conflict or other endeavor.  Granting basing rights to facilitate supply delivery to a combat zone is an example of an act of an ally.

While understanding who is our friend and who is an ally is important, it’s arguably even more important to recognize those who are “against us,” including distinguishing between our enemies and our foes.

An enemy is actively attacking us or planning to do so.  The difficulty here sometimes lies in recognizing the attack.  It isn’t always as open as a Schleiffen Plan’s storming across a border or an Operation AI’s aerial bombing attack on a naval base.  In the 21st century, there are many more ways of executing an attack and of prosecuting the subsequent war than merely shooting at us.  It might not even be a formal nation-state conducting the attack; rather the entity might be a non-national organization of terrorists.  Attacks might consist of cyber-attacks that impede or destroy nationally critical networks or that plant malware to be used for this at a different time.  Attacks might consist of economic embargos.  Indeed, the war may be purely one-sided, ranging from the asymmetrical warfare perpetrated by non-national terrorist organizations to a war where only one side is actually fighting because the victim of the war isn’t even aware of it: those cyber-attacks, for instance.

On the other hand, our enemy may “merely” be carrying out a collection of acts, short of legally defined war, that are designed to harm our friends and allies or us to the point of tightly circumscribing freedom of action or even to the point of subjugation.

In particular, we cannot accurately estimate other nations’ relationships to us or their intent by actively offering excuses for their behavior (vis., the Chinese want sea bottom resources, and this justifies aggressively seeking control of the South China Sea, at the expense of that area’s other bordering nations: the Republic of the Philippines, The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the Republic of China).  On the contrary, such actions must be assessed, and their underlying motives must be estimated, by their effect on our friends and allies and on us.  And we must understand that the other nation’s imperatives and motives may be nothing like ours.  It is legitimate, despite this though, to assume that the other nation’s leadership, in taking those actions, are neither stupid nor ignorant; they understand fully the impact—and so the implications—of their actions on our friends and allies and on us.  In essence, then, a nation’s publicly-stated intent is largely irrelevant; we must read their actions and assess their motives in light of those impacts.

How do we recognize an enemy, then?  Only by recognizing the shadowy keys of inimical behavior.  To repeat, understanding the other nation’s or non-national organization’s imperatives, so that we can (better, if still imperfectly) understand its motives, is critical, as is the fact that we must work from the premise that the leadership in question is highly intelligent and highly motivated: they know what they are doing, and they know the effect of their actions on us. We can infer their goals from their actions’ predictable effects.

What are our recognition keys?  Acts of enmity include these (a non-exhaustive list) in addition to classic military attacks:

  • deliberately restricting our access to critical resources—oil, for instance, or rare earth metals—for the purpose of damaging us.
  • actively moving to seize control of international waters whose free navigation and/or freedom of access to undersea resources are important to us or to our friends or allies.
  • harassing our ships in international waters or our aircraft in international airspace.
  • shipping, as part of ordinary trade, poisoned products: formaldehyde-laced gypsum board, or toxic baby food, for instance.
  • manipulating their currency value so as to damage our economy.
  • attacking our computing and/or communications networks, or our computer-controlled infrastructure, with cyberware capable of damaging/destroying those targets, or planting malware that will be used “later” for that purpose.
  • providing aid to terrorist organizations plotting, or which have carried out, attacks on us or our friends or allies.
  • moving to facilitate the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by other nations or non-national organizations that are hostile to us and/or our friends or allies.
  • actively arming those who intend to use those weapons against us or our friends or allies.
  • directly threatening our allies with nuclear attack if we don’t comply with the threatening nation’s wishes.
  • deploying nuclear weapons so as to carry out those threats.

As the number actions from this such a list which a nation or non-national organization carries out goes up, so does the clarity of that nation’s enmity toward us increase.

There is one more class of nation or non-national organization to be identified, and that is what I’ll call a foe.  In this usage, I consider a foe to be an ally of our enemy, loosely analogously to an ally of us.  A foe works deliberately against the interests of our friend or ally or of us as a common goal with another nation, but only for so long as that commonality of purpose exists.  As with identifying an enemy, the recognition keys are shadowy and unclear by themselves.  That list, though, is the same as the keys to identifying an enemy, with the single difference of motive.  This difference is that the foe, of its own volition, is following another nation’s lead in the actions; it is not acting as the primary decision-maker.  (As an aside, a nation or non-national organization forced into the role of foe, but which would not act inimically were it left to its own choices, represents a point of fracture within the enemy’s structure.  This, though, is the subject of a different thread.)

There are two items which I have deliberately elided in order to maintain a certain clarity, and these are the overlaps possible between the actions of an enemy or foe and the actions of an aggressive competitor, even the (less common) overlap with the actions of a friend or ally.  This overlap is a major factor in the need to understand the nation in question and its motives.

The other item is the nation that is neither friend or ally nor enemy or foe, mentioned briefly above.  Such spectators are neutral in some sense, and by holding themselves on the sidelines, tend to render themselves irrelevant to the essentials of the struggles of the active players.