Chip Manufacturing

The Biden administration is bent on bringing computer chip manufacturing back into the United States. On its face, that would seem beneficial. However, the administration team he’s formed to oversee the matter and its $39 billion of taxpayer dollars allocated to the program is populated with

investment bankers, private-equity investors, and management consultants.

And apparently no chip engineers or anyone familiar with supplying chip factories.

Uh, huh.

The Manhattan Project and the crash program to develop treatments for the Wuhan Virus were populated, strongly preferentially, with experts in the field, and they just as strongly deemphasized the moneybags experts.

That’s not the case with Biden’s nightmare dream team of money allocators. This isn’t a true crash program, certainly, but it’s still an effort to rapidly guts something up. It needs experts in the field to do the gutsing, it does not need politically connected money handlers.

Biden’s Tightrope

That’s what the editors over on The Wall Street Journal calls President Joe Biden’s (D) move to bar US investments in certain People’s Republic of China technologies and enterprises.

President Biden’s executive order on Wednesday restricting US investment in Chinese military technologies tries to balance national security and business interests. The problem is that Beijing doesn’t distinguish between the two, which is why business risk in China is rising.

This is the fallacy of the editors and of Biden: since the PRC does not distinguish between national security interests and business interests—does not separate out military utility from civilian utility—when it comes to technology there is no balance for our government to seek. All tech, in the PRC’s eyes, has military utility, therefore all tech American businesses and those of our friends and allies might sell or otherwise transfer into the PRC has military utility, and all such American sales and transfers should be barred, and those of our friends and allies should be jawboned against. The transfers threaten our national security as well as that of our friends and allies.

The White House concern is that the Communist Party will weaponize US venture and private-equity investment in technologies such as artificial intelligence.

In a heartbeat the CPC will. Biden’s bar reflects some understanding of PRC President Xi Jinping’s avowed goal, which he facilitates by eliminating

barriers between civilian and commercial sectors and military and defense industrial sectors, not just through research and development, but also by acquiring and diverting the world’s cutting-edge technologies, for the purposes of achieving military dominance.

But then Biden shied away from taking the full step.

open global capital flows create valuable economic opportunities and promote competitiveness, innovation, and productivity.

And:

Auto makers will still be able to invest in Chinese self-driving systems. Drug makers can join with Chinese companies to develop new drugs.

Never mind that self-driving technology has obvious uses in the PLA’s mechanized/armored ground forces, the PLA’s air forces, the PLA’s naval forces. Never mind, either that the tech used in developing new drugs supports the PLA’s ability to develop drugs for treating PLA diseases and casualties and to develop drugs and other biologics for offensive use.

The editors join him in that failure to follow through:

A complete de-coupling of the US and Chinese economies probably isn’t possible, or desirable, given their interdependence.

Yes, it is, and it’s more than desirable, it’s critical to our national economic and military security, and so to our political security. There will be some economic disturbances as our businesses relocate their supply chains—from ore and minerals in the ground up through final assembly components and end products—out of the PRC, and there will be some economic disturbances as our businesses buy and sell technologies with other customers than the PRC. Those temporary disturbances, though, need to be balanced against the long-term costs of being dominated by the PRC.

There’s no tightrope here, except in Biden’s timidity.

Right, But for a Different Reason

The Wall Street Journal‘s editors’ headline and subheadline is on a reasonable track:

Punishing Banks for Regulatory Failure
Regulators want to saddle midsize banks with new capital rules.

The editors the proceed to disparage the regulators’ move, and they’re correct about that. They’re mistaken in their lede, though, and that leads them to the erroneous aspect of their disparagement:

Silicon Valley Bank failed owing to rising interest rates and lapses by regulators, not a shortage of capital.

It’s true that a shortage of capital did not cause SVB’s failure, except as the proximate outcome of the real cause of the failure, an outcome that made the failure inevitable.

SVB did run short of capital value, and that meant it couldn’t survive the rapid outflow of cash through depositor withdrawals. But rising interest rates were only the means of that capital shortfall and bank failure, not the cause. Nor were lapses by regulators—and there were some serious ones, including their lack of oversight diligence, which should have led to better enforcement of existing rules—involved in the bank’s failure.

The bank’s managers failed in their own fiscal duties, overbalancing as they did the nature of their capital holdings in the face of those rising interest rates: those managers chose not to balance the interest rate risk related to their deposits and the rates they were paying against the interest rate risk related to their capital holdings and the way rising rates were devaluing their holdings.

Those managers could see as well as any of us, and as well as their depositors, what rising rates were doing to their bank’s capital, and those managers could see as well as any of us, and as well as their depositors, the increasing risk to the bank of the decreasing interest rate spread between what the bank paid depositors and what it earned on its loans, loans the bank was increasingly unable to make in the face of those rising interest rates. And that exacerbated the impact of the bank’s decreasing capital holdings, which those managers could see as well as any of us, and as well as their depositors.

Nor did lack of overt regulator intervention have much of anything to do with SVB’s failure. Bank managers, any enterprise managers, are paid to act on their own initiative, not to wait until they’re told what to do and then, subsequently, told to go ahead and do it.

SVB’s managers were no exception to that.

This was an SVB management failure, and Regulators have no place for writing new capital rules. It’s sufficient for the market place to apply the appropriate sanctions, even if that deprives government bureaucrats of an opportunity to feel good about themselves by Doing Something.

A Thought on Russia-PRC Relations

The subheadline on a Wall Street Journal article that was centered on falling exports from the People’s Republic of China says it all regarding the growing relationship of the PRC with Russia.

Slide in outbound shipments reflects fraying trade ties with the Western world, even as exports to Russia boom

But at what cost to Russia are those exports? Russia hasn’t much with which to pay for them. The nation is short of hard currency, and its own goods are famous for their shoddiness. Russia, though, does have things of particular importance to the PRC: vast Siberian resources of oil, natural gas, coal, timber, and a variety of rare earths and ores whose extracted metals are critical for making batteries. To that end, Russia and the PRC concluded, a few short years ago, a trade treaty that has the PRC developing those fields and mines, extracting that output for PRC use alongside Russian use and in some cases for primary PRC use, and with PRC workers and their families moving into Siberia to do the work of development and extraction.

That last reveals one more item that Russia has to exchange for the PRC’s exports to it, an item of critical importance to the PRC: all that Siberian land.

And this, which subtext emphasizes the PRC’s dependency on Russia’s imports:

For China, weakening exports signal more trouble for its domestic economy….

July’s 14.5% drop in Chinese outbound goods shipments was sharper than the 12.4% year-over-year decline in June and outpaced the 12% decline expected by economists polled by The Wall Street Journal.
Chinese goods shipments to the US fell 23% in July compared with a year earlier. Shipments to the European Union and to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a group of 10 countries that includes Singapore and Indonesia, each dropped by about 21%.
Chinese shipments to Russia, a country under Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine, rose 52% in July from a year earlier, helped by sales of high-value goods including automobiles. For the first seven months of this year, Chinese exports to Russia soared 73% from a year earlier, even as China’s total exports have fallen 5%, data from Chinese customs show.

Thus, the dependency goes both ways, even as the PRC increasingly dominates the codependent relationship. As the West pulls back from buying goods and services from the PRC, the PRC becomes ever more dependent on Russian goods and services, especially those basic commodity goods of oil, natural gas, coal, timber, and Russian rare earths and battery-centric ores.

That growing PRC dependency makes the PRC’s land acquisitiveness even more dangerous for Russia.

Inadequate Electricity Infrastructure

There is a move afoot, spearheaded by a number of car companies, to expand the number of battery car charging stations in the US. iSeeCars.com says that planned expansion is inadequate. The company’s Executive Analyst Karl Brauer:

[E]ach of these fast chargers can cost $50,000 or more to install, and this joint effort claims it will utilize 100 percent renewable energy to power the new chargers, which can only mean higher costs for each unit[.]

And that’s just for a few midwestern States.

Bauer is right about the infrastructure’s inadequacy, but the shortfall is much deeper than just battery cars’ electricity demands.

Our electrical infrastructure is inadequate because it’s built on antiquated wiring/cabling, too few and too restricted fossil fuel-powered generating stations; too few generating stations of any sort; lack of spares, particularly transformers and transformer parts and fluids; poor-to-nonexistent (still!) cybersecurity; and on and on.

Those shortfalls need to be filled regardless of the number of battery cars and trucks are on the road.