Category Archives: defense policy

It’s a Start

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Germany has shown, with its welching on its commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on bolstering NATO, that it has no interest in Europe’s mutual defense.  That, though, does not alter the threat to European security represented by Russia other than to increase it.

I’m reminded of a remark President Abraham Lincoln made about General George McClellan and the army the latter commanded: If McClellan does not want to use the army, I should like to borrow it a while.  Since Germany isn’t interested in Europe’s defense, isn’t even interested in getting up a serious defense establishment of any sort (McClellan was strongly interested in this much), our forces are better placed elsewhere.

Enter Poland, which sits on the front line of the threat and has only just gotten out from under the Russian jackboot.

President Trump signed an agreement to send 1,000 additional US troops to Poland while treating his visiting Polish counterpart to a military flyover at the White House as thanks for a commitment to buy F-35 jet fighters.

Trump also suggested that those soldiers could come from the contingent—52,000 of them—currently based in Germany.  After all, Germany isn’t using them.

This should only be a start, though.  We need to be working toward a NATO-like mutual defense treaty that involves the eastern European nations, Great Britain, and us to work in parallel with, and perhaps eventually to supplant, NATO.

Another Reason

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…to not have these things in our homes.

According to internal documents seen Wednesday by local media, German interior ministers are considering a proposal that would allow data from speech assistants to be legally permissible as evidence for the prosecution of crimes.

“Speech assistants”—is that what the kids are calling these things?  The speech assistants to which those German interior ministers refer are “smart” home devices like Alexa, Siri, smart TVs, presumably Cortana, and on and on—any device we allow in our naivete into our homes—that listen to our every word, every sound we sigh, and records the most current of them.

Those interior ministers say those “digital data saved on devices” are there to be “collected and evaluated by authorities.”  Those data, those interior ministers piously claim, are “‘increasingly important’ for investigating capital crimes and preventing terrorist threats.”

All very high-minded and pure of intent.  There’s no need of any natural limiting principle to constrain this surveillance.  Because no government would ever grow…curious…of the doings inside a private home.  No government would ever get so protective of its own prerequisites that it would look preemptively for untoward, or rude, criticisms.  No government’s bureaucrat would ever eavesdrop on the sounds of pleasure flowing through a home for his own jollies.

No.

This is the People’s Republic of China’s overt, face-by-face surveillance of citizens in the public square brought into the privacy of a home. And, like the PRC’s surveillance, this one would be done solely with speculative intent.

So far, this effort is overt only in Germany, but we need to be vigilant against its spread and to ensure our own government doesn’t try to embrace such an invasion of our castles, our homes—our privacy.

Venezuela is not Grenada

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That, there, is a true fact. The University of Georgia’s Emeritus Professor (of Agricultural and Applied Economics) Glenn Ames used that as an argument for why the US ought not invade Venezuela in his Letter to the Editor of The Wall Street Journal.  After all, he wrote,

Venezuela is a large, complex country politically, not a tiny island in the Caribbean.

Also a true fact.  But then he went astray, here and on a couple of other points.  For one, our military is not the disjointed, uncoordinated collection of disparate forces that went into Grenada; it’s much better integrated, and it has demonstrated that improvement many times since.

The Venezuelan military is indebted to President Nicolás Maduro for their perks and subsidies. They are not going to give them up easily.

This badly overstates the case. The Venezuelan military leadership is indebted to Maduro.  The field-grade officers and especially the junior officers and soldiers have no such “loyalty;” they are not going to fight seriously in support of that “leadership”—which steals from their paychecks as much as they do from the civilian citizens of Venezuela.

Cubans and others are embedded in Venezuela’s security apparatus.

As Cubans were in Grenada, and they folded rapidly in the face even of that confused operation.

That Venezuela is not Grenada also is an irrelevant fact.

“Normalize Relations”

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Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif travelled to the People’s Republic of China in an effort to get its help in saving the nuclear weapons deal with Iran that the US walked away from and that Great Britain, Germany, and France, along with Russia and the PRC, remain in.  Zarif insisted that

the world must normalize economic relations with Tehran and take “practical steps” to save the nuclear accord….

No, we don’t.  There’s nothing to save: all the accord did and does is create a brief delay in Iran’s drive to obtain nuclear weapons so it can use them against Israel and, through its proxies and affiliates, others.

Aside from that, though, again: no, we don’t.  Not until Iran normalizes relations with the other nations in the Middle East and then with the nations of the world at large.

Full stop.

It Already Is

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European diplomats warned Monday that Iran is preparing to abandon parts of a landmark nuclear deal in response to new US sanctions….

It’s a vapid fear, and only the EU’s foreign affairs diplomats could be so…naïve.

Iran already is violating the nuclear weapons agreement, and it has been all along.

A senior European diplomat said Iranian officials have been considering a partial withdrawal from some parts of the multination accord….

This would only publicly formalize Iran’s behavior.  Consider, for instance:

Iran’s ballistic missile tests and satellite launches explicitly allow testing nuclear warhead carriers, guidance systems, rocket engine capabilities, and a host of other capabilities related to delivery of nuclear warheads.

No one is allowed to inspect Iran’s military sites, which is where weapons development occurs.

For those sites Iran does allow to be inspected, there must be long-lead time notice given prior to any inspection, which allows Iran’s developers to clean up after themselves before the inspectors arrive.

Not that much of this matters, anyway, beyond timing.  The nuclear weapons deal only held up—supposedly—Iran’s development for a few years, after which it will be free to develop (and subsequently to employ, as it has said it would do) all the nuclear weapons it wanted.