Another Progressive-Democratic Party Disregard for Law

The Virginia Progressive-Democratic Party-dominated State legislature tried to amend the State’s constitution to redistrict itself from a 6-5 majority in its Representative delegation to the Federal House of Representatives to a 9-1 majority. The proposed amendment was originally passed four days prior to its State-wide elections for its State government, and the new legislature, on taking office the next January, repassed the proposed amendment, supposedly as constitutionally required. The referendum then passed, narrowly, in the State’s voter referendum on the amendment.

Virginia’s Supreme Court, though, struck the amendment as unconstitutionally enacted, violating as it did the State constitution’s Article XII, Section 1; ruled the subsequent referendum irreparably tainted by that violation; and invalidated that referendum. The outcome is that the State’s prior districting, with its 6-5 Progressive-Democrat-majority of districts, remains in effect for the coming 2026 elections and the primaries beforehand.

The Court’s ruling gave a detailed, multi-page explanation of the constitutional failure, but their explanation boils down to this bit from the ruling:

In this case, voting in the general election for the House of Delegates began on September 19, 2025, and ended on Election Day, November 4, 2025. The General Assembly voted for the first time to propose the constitutional amendment to the electorate on October 31, 2025. By that date, over 1.3 million votes had been cast in the general election, which was approximately 40% of the total vote for that election cycle.

The Court also took note of the State’s argument regarding those 1.3 million voters which was centered on the premise that it was too bad to be them, so sad. The Court waved the BS flag at that argument, and it did so in gruesome (for the State’s arguers) detail.

The Progressive-Democrats making that tough luck argument while overtly disregarding the plain text of their own State’s constitution is a clear and present demonstration of Party’s utter disregard for any law or constitutional requirement that is inconvenient to their push for power.

The Virginia State Supreme Court ruling can be read here.

The Only Even Remotely Legitimate Move Re TPS

The Supreme Court heard last Wednesday in an expedited manner (“certiorari before judgment” for the judicial nerds among us) oral argument in a case centered on whether a President’s Executive Branch agency can withdraw, on its own recognizance, Temporary Protected Status from immigration populations who remain here under that status. Several District and Appellate courts have said no, not without (judge-determined) sufficient interagency review of the matter.

The governing statute is quite clear: granting, withdrawing, extending, or not extending temporary protected status for folks from particular nations is not a justiciable matter; courts have no standing to adjudicate these decisions.

The only legitimate recourse those demanding TPS be extended/maintained for Haitians (for instance) is to argue that that governing statute limit is unconstitutional and should be struck. Even this, though, is itself doomed to failure. Here’s Art III, Sect 2, Clause 1 on judicial jurisdictions:

The [Supreme Court] judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity…to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party….

DHS, which is the agency with TPS responsibility within the United States, most assuredly is “the United States” in this context.

Here’s Art III, Sect 2, Clause 2 on judicial jurisdictions:

…the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

Under the Immigration Act of 1990 as amended, which created the Temporary Protected Status facility, there “is no judicial review of any determination” of the DHS secretary “with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state.”  That’s a pretty clear act of setting such Regulations—limiting the courts’ jurisdiction—here withdrawing TPS actions from judicial scrutiny.

And Art III, Sect 1:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

Federal District and Appellate courts, being inferior to the Supreme Court are bound by those same jurisdictional limits.

For good or ill, US courts have nothing to say regarding any aspect of Temporary Protected Status settings.

The Act, as amended, can be read here. The Act withdrew references to court jurisdiction and placed that jurisdiction within the State or INS district, or in the main, within the DHS.

That’s the Point of the Escort

The DC Circuit court has upheld Pentagon press reporter escort restrictions inside the Pentagon while the underlying case works its way through the judicial system.

Judge J Michelle Childs dissented, and in her dissent, she demonstrated her lack of understanding of the problem:

Reporters can hardly verify sources, gather information, or speak candidly with Department personnel with an escort looming over their shoulders.

Nor should those Department personnel be able to speak “candidly.” They’re possessed of too much classified information, and that information is classified for very good reasons. Passing that information to reporters, whether deliberately or accidentally, would do damage to our national security, potentially very severe damage.

Aside from that, we—and she—have no reason to believe the reporters are verifying any sources, since those reporters refuse to identify any of them.

These personnel have no business talking to reporters inside the Pentagon, anyway; they should be referring the reporter to the relevant Public Affairs Officer, who is well-trained in answering reporters’ questions as candidly as classification limits allow, as well as obfuscating and weasel-wording in response to a reporter’s obvious gotcha and trolling questions.

No Question Here

Federal District Judge Loren AliKhan is the presiding judge in Soffer v George Washington University, a case centered on allegations that antisemitic activity is rampant on the GWU campus. While serving in that capacity, the GWU Law School hired the judge as an adjunct professor.

The overlap has prompted questions about a potential conflict of interest, given federal rules requiring judges to avoid cases in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. AliKhan did not immediately step aside but issued a 10-day stay in late March to consider whether recusal is warranted. Since the April 20 status conference, no final decision has been publicly announced.

??

How is this even a question? Those Federal rules don’t just bar judges’ conflicts of interest, nor is this merely a matter of questions of impartiality. Those rules bar judges from actions that create even the appearance of a conflict of interest, a requirement that, if honored by judges, preempts any questions of impartiality.

It’s more than that, though. While AliKhan was presiding, she should never have even considered the GWU offer of employment, or she should have resigned from the bench altogether: teaching in a law school hews too close to the ethical line and creates that barred appearance of conflict.

That she hasn’t even deigned recuse herself yet (as I write on Sunday) is instructive of her level of ethics. Given that lack, GWU’s Law School should reconsider its hiring of her, and if the Law School can’t figure it out, GWU should act in its subordinate Law School’s stead. Either of those entiities’ decision to do nothing would be instructive, also.

Right Answer, Wrong Reason

In 2023, Texas enacted its Senate Bill 4, which

makes illegal entry into Texas a state crime. It gives Texas law enforcement the authority to return illegal foreign nationals to a port of entry and/or arrest them for unlawful entry, among other provisions.

Governor Greg Abbott (R) justified the law on the basis of the Biden administration’s open borders policy which required Texas to act on its national Constitution Art I, Sect 10 obligation to resist the functional invasion that resulted. Progressive groups promptly sued.

Last Friday, the 5th Circuit upheld that law. That was the correct answer, but the court did it for the wrong reason, so the critical underlying question remains unaddressed.

On Friday, the court issued a 12-page ruling solely on procedural grounds, arguing the plaintiffs didn’t have standing to sue. It didn’t address the merits of the claims.

This ruling, avoiding as it does the constitutionally important question that was raised by the suit, is badly flawed. That question is this: does a State have the right (much less the obligation) to enforce its own border with another country when it believes the Federal government is not enforcing that same border, and material harm to the State and to its citizens result?

Chief Justice John Mashalll writing for the Court in 1803’s Marbury v Madison, made all judges’ obligations crystalline:

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.

To say what the law is, to speak up, not to avoid that duty by deflecting on procedural grounds.

That’s not to say judges should never consider questions of standing or other procedure; that way lies tons of fee-seekers bringing cases without regard to necessary procedure. As the 5th Circuit wrote,

Federal courts have a solemn responsibility to apply neutral principles, such as standing, to the cases that come before them and must resist the temptation to confer Article III standing any time an advocacy group or political subdivision challenges a law it passionately dislikes.

But the province and duty of judges does require them to say what the law is and to act on that saying. Doing so need not automatically confer Article III standing for every case concerning a passionately disliked issue. The Supreme Court has begun applying the Major Questions Doctrine to cases involving the limits of Executive Branch power vs the Legislative Branch’s. The Court needs to apply a similar Major Controversies Doctrine to its decisions regarding whether a case’s core question is more or less important than the specifics of procedure in that case.

The 5th Circuit’s ruling can be read here.