Free Markets

President Donald Trump revived his tough talk on the North American Free Trade Agreement Tuesday, warning Canada it must stop protecting its dairy farmers from US competition.

Canada’s trade policy, after all, manages dairy production through a quota system (which is anathema in itself to a free market, but that’s mostly a Canadian domestic problem), and it seriously impedes foreign competition with tariffs designed for the task.

Circularly, Canada controls dairy prices by matching them to “average” production costs, and then controls production by setting allowed quotas.  With prices thus under government control, Canada sets tariffs to achieve prices for imports of foreign dairy products that aren’t competitive.

Of course, there’s a flip side to this: the US must stop shielding American farmers from the United States’ own free market and eliminate Big Government price supports for dairy and other farm products as well as corn price support achieved via ethanol mandates.

Good luck with either.

British Snap Election

British Prime Minister Theresa May called for a snap election (early next June), and her public reason was that Whitehall was too divided for her to be able to negotiate effectively with Brussels over the terms of the British departure from the EU.  She wanted a mandate from the people.

Yesterday the British Parliament voted in favor of her call (under a 2011 law, the PM no longer can require a snap election on his/her own initiative; two-thirds of Parliament’s 650 seats must agree) by 522-13, much wider than those two-thirds (the Scottish National Party was among those who abstained from the vote).

Her real reason, magnified by the implosion of the Labour Party, is that her own Conservative Party, the majority party in Parliament, is itself too fractured.  Conservatives can’t agree among themselves over the nature of Britain’s departure: should it be a hard, sharp, prompt break, or should it be a graduated withdrawal?  Should there be compromise with Brussels over immigration into Great Britain, should there be a continuation of British payments into the EU in return for freer access to the EU’s common market?

Here’s what’s interesting to me about the aftermath of that June snap election (not the election itself, which general outcome seems a foregone conclusion).  Polls, pols, and pundits all think the Conservatives can gain as many as 100 seats in Parliament, which would give them 430 out of the 650 seats, just three seats shy of a two-thirds majority (not so small aside: the election is scheduled to occur before the size of Parliament shrinks to 600 seats).

I’m curious about whether she gets those 100 seats, and I’m curious whether a seat gain of any significant size will reduce her party’s fractiousness or magnify it.

Her win in the snap could backfire on her.

Warnings

The just concluded Kansas special election, held to fill the seat left by Mike Pompeo’s departure to become the CIA MFWIC, was much closer than it should have been, with the Republican Ron Estes winning by a narrower margin than originally expected.  Yet the Republican won, and the Democrat James Thompson lost despite the national effort (albeit a lackluster one) by the national Progressive-Democratic Party to get Thompson elected.

The just concluded Georgia special election first round (the nominal winner had to get 50% plus one vote of the total count to win outright, otherwise the top two go to a runoff) had the Democrat Jon Ossoff getting 48% of the vote and the Republican Karen Handel getting a skosh under 20%.  Yet the Democrat failed to win outright, despite a now far more enthusiastic national Progressive-Democratic Party push and more than $8 million of Progressive-Democratic monies, most from out-of-state, pouring in to this district-level by-election, and the Republican, who also competed against 10 other Republican first-round candidates (as did Ossoff also run against 4 other Democrats and 2 Independents), finished a solid, if diluted, second and remains the favorite to win the one-on-one final round.

These results should stand as warnings for both parties.

In addition to getting their party back together (or recognizing that the nation now has three prominent political parties, the Progressive-Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and the Freedom Caucus of No), Republicans have to guard against complacency.  The Progressive-Democrats, on the other hand, must guard against giving up; instead they must develop policies of actual value to Americans instead of the We Know What’s Good For You plots they’ve been pushing.

The False Premise of a Madboy

Harry Kazianis, writing in The Week Monday, portrayed northern Korea’s weekend military parading not as sabre rattling but as a demonstration of the fruits of development driven by military necessity.

Kim Jong Un—the leader of a nation that has an economy smaller than Ethiopia—knows all too well he has no way to match the United States, South Korea, and Japan ship for ship, plane for plane in a symmetrical sense. The only way he can hope to deter his enemies is to build the ultimate game-changer: nuclear weapons paired with missiles that can strike all the way across the globe.

But Baby Kim, assuming Kazianis’ description is reasonably accurate, is operating from a false premise.  Northern Korea has no enemies (other than the enemies any street gang has, I mean).  Northern Korea has no enemies because northern Korea has absolutely nothing that any other nation wants: not resources, not technology, not an industrial base worth the candle, not tourist attractions, not pleasant climate for vacationing, not even a pile of cash.  Nothing.

The only thing Kim’s behavior is generating is increasing urgency and necessity to spend the bandwidth and resources necessary to bring him and his government down, since the only real purpose he can have in developing his nuclear weapon suite is to attack his neighbors with it, whether they’re near or far, and so he must be preempted.

Either that, or he’s truly a mad boy—which increases the urgency and necessity of bringing him and his government down before he can do his fever-inspired damage.

Kazianis’ own offered alternatives are…useless.

First, Washington must work with the international community—that means you, China, as well—to contain North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs as robustly as possible. Secondary sanctions would be applied to any nation, financial entity, company, or individual who dared help the regime build such weapons.

We’ve “worked with the international community”—the Six Party Talks, for instance—for nearly 25 years, including sanctions, and including the PRC in the Six.  The result of all of that is Baby Kim’s current status of having 20-40 nuclear warheads and nearing the ability to stick them onto missiles capable of reaching as far as the western US.

Second, we can’t just use sanctions to limit Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile systems—we need to go further. The Trump administration must use cyber weapons, just as the Obama administration did in the case of Iran’s nuclear program, to slow the speed at which these programs can grow.

Certainly a useful thing to do, but just as the Iranian case has demonstrated, cyber weapons (ours or someone else’s) didn’t stop Iran—and as Kazianis implies, they won’t stop northern Korea.

Finally, and most importantly, we are well past the point where it is makes sense to open talks with North Korea—as repulsive as that sounds.

Not repulsive, just stupid.  We’ve talked to the northern Koreans for years, both via those Six Party Talks and directly.  The talks have been a waste of breath, and doing so again would simply be a demonstration of our own insanity: repeating past behaviors and expecting different results this time.

No, sterner measures than idle chit-chat, petty economic sanctions (against an economy smaller than Ethiopia, yet), and idle chit-chat are going to be needed.

Update: corrected an importing error.

Deal Outcomes

In a Sunday op-ed, The Wall Street Journal opined about whether President Donald Trump had reached an actual deal with People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping concerning putting an end to northern Korea’s nuclear weapons program and associated threats, or whether an agreement reached during the recent meeting between the two was merely a cosmetic exchange of niceties.

The editors closed their piece with this remark:

Mr Trump needs to make clear what he will do if China won’t make a Korean deal.

Of course he does. However, he doesn’t need to do so by telling the Precious Press in advance, nor does he need to do so by engaging the PRC with Obama-esque chit-chat and finger-wagging.  He needs to do so with concrete action, carried out in immediate response to the misbehaviors.