The US Nuclear Force

Steven Pifer, a Brookings Institute denizen, wrote some thoughts for Politico in response to a President-Elect Donald Trump tweet about our need to “expand [our] nuclear capability.”  Typical of his piece is this bit:

[O]ne should keep perspective. The North Koreans are building their small nuclear arsenal, and no one knows for certain whether they have miniaturized a weapon that could fit atop a ballistic missile. But nothing North Korea does could stop the US military—with its current nuclear capability—from obliterating the small country.

One should, indeed, keep perspective.  The perspective that Pifer has omitted to notice is that when northern Korea gets an ICBM with a warhead on it that’s capable of reaching American (or Republic of Korean, or Japanese, or Australian) cities, it will be too late to develop upgraded nuclear weapons with which to deal with the barbarians of the north.  Once northern Korea’s nuclear weapons are destroying American (or RoK, Japanese, or Australian) cities, certainly we can obliterate the small country, but our cities or those of our friends and allies, and all the millions of people in them, will already be dead.

Russia and the People’s Republic of China are modernizing and expanding their nuclear weapons suite, also.  Against these two, the US has fewer than 1,500 nuclear warheads.  Despite their power, that’s not enough to fight a war with (especially not a two-front war), even one that starts out as, and stays focused on, conventional arms.  Russia and the PRC know that; that’s one of the motivations for their upgrades.  What we have doesn’t deter those who are deterrable very much anymore.

Our nuclear weapons, including the warheads sitting on them, also are old, and untested for some time other than via computer simulations. (Scary thought: given the Russians’ and PRC’s penchant for attacking and penetrating our government computer systems, what if they are altering or have altered those simulation databases so they don’t give accurate results?  Frankly, that’s not likely at all, but “not likely” is not “impossible.”)

Pifer made this claim, too:

There is no need…for a new US nuclear weapon in Europe.

Except for those Russian nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, and those Russian tactical nuclear missiles moved to forward deployment locations in western Russia, from where they can reach not just cities and military forces in the Baltics, Poland, and Ukraine, but well into Germany.  Would US nuclear weapons in Europe counter those Russian nukes?  No, and yes.  They wouldn’t be used to attack the Russian nukes; they’d be used to deter Russia’s use of those nukes by holding at risk Russian targets.

And one last thought in favor of expanding our nuclear capability, including numerically.  We, strapped as we are, can afford an arms race and the technological race associated with one; Russia and the PRC cannot.  We should welcome an arms and technology race enthusiastically—one might say with open arms.  An arms and technology race is how we buried the USSR.

Slow-Motion Surrender

Victor Pinchuk, a Ukrainian industrialist and philanthropist, seems to want one.  Here’s his suggestion in a Wall Street Journal op-ed with the subheadline Crimea should not get in the way of a deal that ends the war. The lives that will be saved are worth it.  In particular, Pinchuk recommends the following for Ukraine to agree:

  • Ukraine should consider temporarily eliminating European Union membership from our stated goals for the near future. We can build a European country, be a privileged partner, and later discuss joining.
  • While we maintain our position that Crimea is part of Ukraine and must be returned, Crimea must not get in the way of a deal that ends the war in the east on an equitable basis. It will take Ukraine 15 to 20 years to generate enough economic growth and stabilize our infrastructure, social safety net and financial system. Everyone from Crimea will then want to live in this future Ukraine—just as East Germans wanted to become part of West Germany.
  • Conflict in the east was initiated from abroad and is not a genuine autonomy movement or civil war. There will not be conditions for fair elections until Ukraine has full control over its territory. But we may have to overlook this truth and accept local elections. Such compromises may mean letting down Ukrainians from the east who have suffered enormously. But if this is what it takes to demonstrate Ukraine’s commitment to peaceful reunification, then we may have to make this compromise to save thousands of lives.
    We must focus on helping those who had to leave their hometowns, and cannot return to live under repressive and unsafe conditions, by offering them all possible support to rebuild their lives in a new reality.
  • Finally, let’s accept that Ukraine will not join NATO in the near- or midterm. The offer is not on the table, and if it were, it could lead to an international crisis of unprecedented scope. For now, we should pursue an alternative security arrangement and accept neutrality as our near-term vision for the future.

No.  This is nothing but slow-motion surrender.

And give up Crimea, even for “only” those 15-20 years—a generation—as the price of peace?  Neville Chamberlain tried that, and got Anschluss.  That’s what Russia is doing today with its partition of Crimea and its occupation of two oblasts and parts of a third in eastern Ukraine.

Crimea should not get in the way of a deal that ends the war. The lives that will be saved are worth it.

No, surrendering seized territory, whether Crimea or those other oblasts, just rewards the invasion and occupation, and it encourages further such invasions and occupations—at the cost not just of sovereignty of the victim nations but of far more lives, as well.

Fair Share

Here, via AEIdeas, are some more data on the relative shares of income taxes members of various economic strata pay. 

The 1,400 citizens in the top one-thousandths of one per cent of income tax payers paid 30% more in taxes across the class than did the 70 million citizens in the bottom 50%.  Singling out the top 400 for special consideration, they paid 78% of the total that those in the lower half paid in aggregate.

It works out, too, to $35.6 million per Privileged One compared to $540 per Poor Downtrodden one.

It works out, too, to a tax rate of 23% for those top 400 vs 24% for those Privileged Ones vs 3.5% [sic] for the Poor Downtroddens.

But the Progressives and Democrats refuse to say what the fair share of the successful is—beyond “more.”

A Market Prediction

Because hubris—I has it.

In an article on the future relationship of Central Banks with economies and markets, The Wall Street Journal had this datum tossed in:

…shares in the S&P 500 are currently trading at 17 times the earnings they are expected to generate during the next year, compared with a 10-year average of 14.4[.]

That’s not a very large premium; all this P/E ratio means is that, in the coming year, stock market growth will be slower than in the last couple of years (recall that I’ve written, too, about the disconnect between the stock market and the underlying economy in the last few years).  Prices will slow their rise as earnings catch up; prices won’t fall back toward earnings.

It takes a P/E above 20 for the markets to begin to approach drops in prices longer than day to day or week to week micro-corrections—otherwise recognized as noise.

Disclaimer for the legalists among you: I am not a registered or licensed advisor of any sort, nor do I play one on the radio.