Free Assembly

Beginning with the freshman class that enters in fall 2017, Harvard University students will no longer be allowed to hold leadership positions in campus groups while also maintaining membership in the exclusive, single-gender final clubs that dominate the school’s social scene.

And

The policy barring students from holding leadership positions in official groups while being members of what the school calls “unrecognized, single-gender social organizations,” also extends to the younger fraternities and sororities.  Students will also not receive the dean’s endorsements for elite scholarships and fellowships if they’re found to be members of the groups.

Whatever happened to freedom of association?  It’s true enough that Harvard is a private institution, but as the Supreme Court has held about private enterprises on a number of occasions vis-à-vis other venues, it has enough of a public institution characteristic—accepting a broad reach of students, just as any other private business, a store for instance, accepts a broad reach of customers—that it needs to act like one here.

It’s also true enough that the 1st Amendment’s right of the people peaceably to assemble only enjoins the Federal government.  However, the principle is no less valid in its applicability to a university.

A Good Thing about Price Wars

…on the geopolitical stage.  Dan Strumpf and Jenny Hsu talked about a broader question in their piece in The Wall Street Journal; I want to focus on one aspect of it.

Stiffening competition from countries such as Russia and Iran is threatening Saudi Arabia’s longtime hold over markets including China, Japan, and India.

It’s certainly true that stiffening competition is threatening Saudi Arabia’s longtime hold over market pricing; however a hold over markets is quite another oil well.  Saudi Arabia has held throughout this supply explosion’s depressing effect on oil prices that it’s not going to reduce production rates and sacrifice its market share—its hold on markets—on the altar of pricing.  Furthermore, the kingdom’s replacement of its aging market share hawk with a younger market share hawk would seem to indicate a continuation of the Saudis’ position that they will do what they need to do to preserver that share (and that hold).

So, what does competition do, particularly with regard to oil-hungry customers like the PRC, Japan, and India?

It generates a price war.  Don’t look for oil prices to rise significantly above current levels (OK, maybe they’ll go as high as $60-ish).

Russia and Iran can’t afford those prices; their budgets can’t hack them.  Saudi Arabia can, for quite some time, yet.  That alone makes this particular price war attractive.