British Snap Election

British Prime Minister Theresa May called for a snap election (early next June), and her public reason was that Whitehall was too divided for her to be able to negotiate effectively with Brussels over the terms of the British departure from the EU.  She wanted a mandate from the people.

Yesterday the British Parliament voted in favor of her call (under a 2011 law, the PM no longer can require a snap election on his/her own initiative; two-thirds of Parliament’s 650 seats must agree) by 522-13, much wider than those two-thirds (the Scottish National Party was among those who abstained from the vote).

Her real reason, magnified by the implosion of the Labour Party, is that her own Conservative Party, the majority party in Parliament, is itself too fractured.  Conservatives can’t agree among themselves over the nature of Britain’s departure: should it be a hard, sharp, prompt break, or should it be a graduated withdrawal?  Should there be compromise with Brussels over immigration into Great Britain, should there be a continuation of British payments into the EU in return for freer access to the EU’s common market?

Here’s what’s interesting to me about the aftermath of that June snap election (not the election itself, which general outcome seems a foregone conclusion).  Polls, pols, and pundits all think the Conservatives can gain as many as 100 seats in Parliament, which would give them 430 out of the 650 seats, just three seats shy of a two-thirds majority (not so small aside: the election is scheduled to occur before the size of Parliament shrinks to 600 seats).

I’m curious about whether she gets those 100 seats, and I’m curious whether a seat gain of any significant size will reduce her party’s fractiousness or magnify it.

Her win in the snap could backfire on her.

Warnings

The just concluded Kansas special election, held to fill the seat left by Mike Pompeo’s departure to become the CIA MFWIC, was much closer than it should have been, with the Republican Ron Estes winning by a narrower margin than originally expected.  Yet the Republican won, and the Democrat James Thompson lost despite the national effort (albeit a lackluster one) by the national Progressive-Democratic Party to get Thompson elected.

The just concluded Georgia special election first round (the nominal winner had to get 50% plus one vote of the total count to win outright, otherwise the top two go to a runoff) had the Democrat Jon Ossoff getting 48% of the vote and the Republican Karen Handel getting a skosh under 20%.  Yet the Democrat failed to win outright, despite a now far more enthusiastic national Progressive-Democratic Party push and more than $8 million of Progressive-Democratic monies, most from out-of-state, pouring in to this district-level by-election, and the Republican, who also competed against 10 other Republican first-round candidates (as did Ossoff also run against 4 other Democrats and 2 Independents), finished a solid, if diluted, second and remains the favorite to win the one-on-one final round.

These results should stand as warnings for both parties.

In addition to getting their party back together (or recognizing that the nation now has three prominent political parties, the Progressive-Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and the Freedom Caucus of No), Republicans have to guard against complacency.  The Progressive-Democrats, on the other hand, must guard against giving up; instead they must develop policies of actual value to Americans instead of the We Know What’s Good For You plots they’ve been pushing.