Ignore Them

The People’s Republic of China’s latest weapon in its economic war against the West, and against the United States in particular, is to slow-walk merger approvals on anti-trust grounds when either party to the merger, or its result, does or would do business within the PRC.

As preconditions for approving some of the transactions, the people said, officials at the State Administration for Market Regulation, China’s antitrust regulator known as SAMR, have asked companies to make available in China products they sell in other countries—an attempt to counter the US’s increased export controls targeting China.
The Chinese demands could put US companies in an impossible position as Washington has enacted legislation restricting American companies’ ability to sell to China and expanding certain types of production there.

And this, especially [emphasis added]:

For multinationals, it doesn’t take much for a merger to trigger a Chinese antitrust review. For instance, if two companies in a deal have revenue of more than $117 million a year from China, the merger needs Beijing to sign off.

This is an easy enough conundrum to solve. The two companies, along with the merged result, could simply stop doing business within the PRC and with businesses domiciled within the PRC, rendering that nation’s slow-walk irrelevant from the PRC’s lack of standing to object.

Companies should already be stopping doing business inside the PRC or with businesses domiciled in the PRC, so a merger agreement that asserts “no business to be done in the PRC” seems completely straightforward.

Studying for the Test

Instead of studying the material. In a Monday Wall Street Journal op-ed, Michael Faulkender and Tyler Goodspeed, University of Maryland Finance Professor and Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, respectively, wrote about bank stress tests and their resulting uniformity of banks’ risk management techniques. Citing a Boston Federal Reserve study, they noted that

banks that performed poorly on the mandated Dodd-Frank stress tests subsequently adjusted their portfolios such that they more closely resembled the portfolios of banks that performed well. The average institution’s portfolio is more diversified, but the system is more uniform. By requiring all of the biggest financial institutions to adhere to the same measures, pass the same tests, and follow the same practices, America has lost diversification in the entire banking sector.

Dodd-Frank, in essence, required individual banks to do better at diversifying their individual portfolios. But that business of all of them having to pass the same test means that all the banks have much the same portfolios, diversified over much the same instruments.

This is the complement of teaching the test rather than teaching the material and then testing that knowledge. Banks are (regulatorily pushed into) learning the test rather than learning the material and then acing the test.

Uniformity is dangerous for species in a biological ecology, and uniformity is dangerous for categories of businesses in an economical ecology.

Mistake

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen wants to extend the Federal government’s intrusion into our banking system.

Our intervention was necessary to protect the broader US banking system. And similar actions could be warranted if smaller institutions suffer deposit runs that pose the risk of contagion[.]

No, it wasn’t. No, it would not be.

Businesses thrive or fail on their managers’—individual Americans acting in concert with other individual Americans—performance or failure to perform. We individual Americans thrive, or not, on our own decisions, made out of our own obligations and determination to get ahead.

It isn’t government’s job to inure us individual Americans or our businesses from the vagaries of the marketplace or—especially—from our own poor decision-making. It’s government’s job to create and enforce a framework within which our free market can operate freely, and within which personal responsibility, whether as individuals or as business managers, can operate freely.

If our decisions are without consequence, we are neither operating freely nor in accordance the requirements of our personal responsibility.

Balancing Act

That’s what conventional “wisdom” says confronts the government of Australia as it contemplates buying nuclear-powered submarines from the US. The buy is part of AUKUS’ combined effort to counter the People’s Republic of China’s military buildup and its continued strengthening of the PLA in the PRC’s occupation of the South China Sea.

Australia is trying to strike a balance between its close relationship with the US and its ties to China, which buys much of its valuable iron ore and is its largest trading partner.

There’s nothing to balance here. There are lots of nations, all over the world, with an interest in buying Australian iron ore, Australia’s iron processed from that ore, such steel as Australia chooses to produce. There is a wide world of existing and potential trading partners for Australia’s other goods and services. Shipping need not be that expensive, either: the nations metaphorically next door that rim the South China Sea, the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan all have need of iron ore and iron and are interested in the plethora of additional goods and services that Australia might sell.

Australia has no need of the PRC’s market, and the sooner it divests itself, the sooner it will shake its dependency on and pressure from the PRC.

Further to the Government Bailout of SVB Depositors

The Biden administration and his…regulators…are, indeed, bailing out all SVB depositors, including those with deposits larger than the FDIC’s insurance of deposits worth $250k or less. This is being done under the administration’s claimed “systemic risk exception” in order to bail out the bank’s uninsured deposits—which is to say the bank’s uninsured depositors.

That is a power that was used during the 2008 financial crisis. Measures such as this can be controversial, with some arguing that it creates what is known as a “moral hazard”—that by letting banks or their customers know the government will backstop them in a crisis, they will think less about risks.

The move was a mistake in 2008, which the House recognized when it rejected that bailout before caving and voting for it, and it’s a mistake now. It does, indeed, create the moral hazard that Uncle Sugar will save investors from their risk folly—or even from accurately assessed risk, but the odds came home against them, so there’s no need for investors to worry about risk. Here is that moral hazard made concrete:

The Federal Reserve took another action on Sunday, which was to establish something called the Bank Term Funding Program. What this will do is ensure that a bank that is holding safe assets, such as Treasurys or government-backstopped mortgage bonds, can bring them to the Fed and swap them for cash for up to a year. They could use that cash to grant customers’ requests for their deposit money.

SVB held most of its assets as precisely those Treasurys.

The problem that SVB…had with its investment securities was that the rise in interest rates last year depressed the market value of even safe assets that will almost certainly repay the banks’ money, just not for a long time. But had the banks gone to sell them now to cover deposit outflows, they wouldn’t have gotten back what they paid for them.

It is an issue that isn’t just concentrated in one or two banks: the FDIC has said that across all banks, there were about $620 billion in what are called unrealized losses as of the end of last year.
The Fed has now promised to swap these securities for cash at face value, meaning banks won’t have to realize any losses on them for now.

That spreads the moral hazard all over the banking system. No banking investor or depositor will take any risks; those risks are being laid off on us average Americans.

And this:

So regulators might have to walk a fine political line: indicating strength and decisiveness to stem further bank runs, but not looking like they are granting a free pass to banks. The regulators said any losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund to cover uninsured deposits would be recovered by a special assessment charged to banks.

No, they don’t have to walk that line at all. They could just say “No.” Instead, they’re planning on making things worse: that bit about making other banks pay for the regulators’ decision to bail out SVB’s investors. Those other banks had nothing to do with SVB management failure or the risks its depositors chose to take. Guilty, anyway, pay up, suckers.

Too, there’s a critical difference between the current situation (and the 2008 predecessor) and the Panic of 1907. The Federal government then had neither the tools nor the finances to stop that depositor run on the banking system. Private citizen, banker, and Evilly Stinking Rich, JP Morgan, along with a number of his fellow Evil Rich guaranteed their fortunes against the banks’ ability to pay depositors. The run stopped. Government intervention wasn’t needed; private citizens acted.

We don’t need government intervention today, even though wealth isn’t nearly as heavily concentrated today as it was those 115, or so, years ago. We certainly don’t need the regulators’ deliberately manufactured moral hazard systemic bailouts.