Broken Windows Enforcement?

The Trump Doctrine in progress. That’s Matthew Continetti’s thesis in his Free Expression piece, The Trump Doctrine in Action. His subheadline summarizes:

Major military operations in Venezuela and Iran make America, and the world, safer.

This is the mechanism for that increased safety:

Mr Trump cares less about a regime’s structure and ideology—whether it’s authoritarian or democratic, Chavista or Islamist—than its conduct. He cycles between negotiations and war, between economic punishment and military force, until he elicits the desired behavior.

Maybe, though, Continetti’s understanding doesn’t go far enough. Maybe what President Trump (R) is doing is this. Instead of taking on our peer and near-peer enemies directly—they are, after all, the most serious and direct threats to our nation’s sovereignty and freedom–he’s going after their satraps and clients, which weakens those enemies and limits their long-term and larger scale activities.

Is this broken windows enforcement on a nation-level scale? Broken picture windows enforcement, maybe? Or maybe hogwash. We’ll have to see over time whether Russia and/or the People’s Republic of China change their behaviors with the success of one window enforcement—Venezuela—the so far apparent success of another—Iran—and whether the next—Cuba—is attempted and, if so, successful.

Be Nice if they Can Get It

The headline and subheadline demonstrate a dangerous misunderstanding.

Iran’s War-Shattered Economy Means It Has an Urgent Reason to Negotiate
Damage done by US and Israeli attacks will take years to repair, putting pressure on Tehran to seek financial relief in talks.

No, it doesn’t. The claim here egregiously wrongly assumes that those in control of Iran, those reigning over the Iranian people, think like we do. Assuredly, they do not. Their view of this war is that they’re not dead yet, so they haven’t lost. They consider themselves winning, and they will consider themselves to have won (and here, they’d be correct by Western standards, too) if the fighting stops with them still in charge (their primary war aim) and in a position to continue pursuing nuclear weapons (their close second war aim).

Full stop.

Yes, it will take years to rebuild the economic and infrastructure damage done them, but the only economic and infrastructure functions that interest them are those necessary to their nuclear weapons development and building program. The rest, that which would ease the lot of the Iranian people, are of no interest to these rulers. That narrow view greatly shortens the timeline for repairing and rebuilding.

There is one parallel with Western values that does obtain here, more or less. The news writer had this in the piece at the first link:

The US blockade of Iranian ports will further strain the country’s budget.

So, too, was our own Revolutionary War a strain on the allied 13 colonies’ budgets. They ran out of money and just freely and willy-nilly printed up paper dollars, with consequent runaway inflation and refusal of so many suppliers, colonial and foreign, to accept that paper. This is the meaning of “not worth a Continental.” The colonies stayed in the fight, though, for eight (more or less, depending on when you mark the beginning and the end of the war itself) long years, ultimately outlasting more than defeating the British. There is one critical difference, though. The colonies and the colonials suffered that as a free people who were in charge of their destinies. Iran’s despotic rulers are the ones in charge of Iran’s their destinies, and they don’t care about their subjects.

Sure, getting financial relief would be welcome to Iran’s despots, but that’s nothing more than a happy side effect for them.

I’ve quoted Rafsanjani before; here he is again:

If one day, he [Rafsanjani] said, the world of Islam comes to possess the weapons currently in Israel’s possession [meaning nuclear weapons]—on that day this method of global arrogance would come to a dead end. This, he said, is because the use of a nuclear bomb in Israel will leave nothing on the ground, whereas it will only damage the world of Islam.

They’re Lying

Iran’s rulers, that is, but what else is new? Iran Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi last Friday:

In line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, the passage for all commercial vessels through Strait of Hormuz is declared completely open for the remaining period of ceasefire, on the coordinated route as already announced by Ports and Maritime Organisation of the Islamic Rep. of Iran.

Those Ports and Maritime Organisation-mandated routes are through the narrow channel between Iranian-held islands and the Iranian coast that’s on the northern, Iranian shore, of the Strait of Hormuz. That leaves ships in those routes under direct and immediate threat of seizure of destruction if the ships’ captains or owners don’t suit Iranian rulers’ whims. That’s not a completely, or even a little bit, open.

Furthermore, Araghchi was carefully silent on the matter of protection money tolls Iran’s rulers are charging those ships for “free” passage.

It’s good that President Donald Trump (R) is keeping the US blockade of Iran’s ports in place for the duration of the current cease fire.

In the realization, the IRGC has begun shooting at shipping attempting to leave through the Strait via the proper, international waterways. The IRGC has further announced that the Strait remains under strict management and control of the armed forces, regardless of what the civilian side of the Iranian government might say.

Iran’s rulers are busily making promises they can’t–or don’t intend to–keep.

A European Plan to Hold Open the Strait of Hormuz

They’re finally getting around to talking about setting something up—after declining to help force it open in the first place. That would be too dangerous for fragile European militaries, they say. Might get poked in the nose. Or as French President Emmanuel Macron so carefully euphemistically put it,

…reopening the strait by force would be “unrealistic[.]”

What’s really interesting, though (as an aside, I do wonder why those nations have military establishments if they’re not intended to fight), is who has been invited to this diplomatic coffee klatch and who has not (of course the US has not, but that’s not the interesting part). They’ve invited the People’s Republic of China and India. But they’ve apparently chosen not to invite the Republic of Korea, Japan, or Australia, each of whom also has a serious interest in the free flow of cargo, oil, and natural gas through the Strait. Of course, they chose not to invite the Republic of China; that would offend the PRC, and Europe is much too fearful of the PRC to do anything that would even remotely hint at that.

Saudis Want Negotiations

Saudia Arabia is worried that the Houthis, a terrorist client of Iran, will close the Bab al-Mandeb and thereby block Saudi oil shipments from leaving the southern end of the Red Sea enroute to India, Asia, and points east. They fear an Iranian push on the Houthis in response to President Donald Trump’s (R) move to block the Strait of Hormuz against Iranian oil leaving, ships entering with a view to loading up on Iranian oil, and ships exiting that have paid the Iranian protection money.

Never mind that ships leaving with non-Iranian oil or other cargo—including the Saudis’ oil—and that have not paid the protection vig are free of the Trumpian blockade.

Against all that, the Saudis want Trump to go back to negotiating with the Iranian terrorists. Negotiate, the Saudis want, anything, anything to keep the Bab al-Mandeb open. Please.

No. Trump’s blockade must stay in place, and the destruction of the IRGC’s small boat fleet must resume forthwith, along with the resumed destruction of Iranian missiles and rockets and their launchers, along with the destruction of Iran’s drone inventory, launchers, and ability to manufacture any weapons of any type. It’s not possible to have meaningful negotiations with terrorists.

If the Saudis really are that married to negotiations and attendant terrorist accommodations, let them reach their own accommodation with the Houthi terrorists. Alternatively, the Saudis could get serious about fighting and destroying the Houthis themselves in place of their years of desultory, perfunctory potshots at the occasional Houthi enclave.