Tag Archives: foreign policy

The Apocalypse is Upon Us

Posted on by
Reply

Or so Lauren Collins would have us believe in her fearful piece in the New Yorker, titled The Future of Europe Hinges on a Face-Off in France about this weekend’s money round of the Presidential election in France.

After all, this election is a referendum between a globalist economy and a globalist identity (Macron) and a nationalist economy and a nationalist identity (LePen).  That does sound apocalyptic, but really, it’s more apocryphal.

As a practical matter, and as is the case with most democratic-oriented governments, French government power is divided between an executive, the President, and the legislative, which elections are next month.  French government power is divided further: the legislative branch’s majority party appoints the Prime Minister, who has serious executive authorities of his own.

A President Le Pen will face two obstacles to her agenda: a Prime Minister from another party (Front National is unlikely to win more than a few legislative seats) and a hostile legislative.  A President Macron may well have to work with a Prime Minister from another party (his En Marche! is all of a year old and unlikely to win many more seats than Front National), and while he would face a not particularly hostile legislative, its agenda most assuredly will not be his.

Either President will find Executive ambitions greatly dampened.  That’s a purely domestic matter, but it spills across French borders.

As a (n international) political matter, Europe’s political future is not much influenced by either President.  Aside from the domestic dampening, which must also dampen these potential Presidents’ influence externally, both Europe and the European Union are made of sterner stuff.

I’ve written of the lack of long-term viability of the EU, but that weakness stems from weaknesses internal to the EU as an institution, not from pressures from within this or that member State, for all that France is an important member State.  No, the EU is good for several more years, the British departure won’t hurt it or Europe, German continued prosperity definitely won’t hurt Europe or the EU, not even the continued brink-of-bankruptcy state of Greece won’t hurt it.

And neither will a staunch EU-supporting President Macron significantly enhance the viability of the EU, nor will a staunch anti-EU President Le Pen significantly diminish the EU.  Indeed, Le Pen has promised a referendum on French membership in the entity, and the French citizenry are strongly more in favor of Remain than of Exit.

What is a threat to Europe is the aggressively acquisitiveness of Russia and most of Europe’s timidity in responding to that.  Nor Macron’s election nor Le Pen’s will have much impact on Europe’s attitude or what France might do about either that timidity or Putin’s acquisitiveness.  Even with Le Pen’s affinity for all things Putin.

EU Bad Faith

Posted on by
Reply

The European Union now says that any trade deal discussions with Great Britain must come after the terms of Great Britain’s going out from the EU have been agreed.  Fair enough; it’s tough to negotiate a trade deal before the nature of the relationship between the two has been identified.

But now there’s this, too.

…EU courts must continue to have a role in Britain after Britain’s exit from the bloc.

And

They [the EU leadership] emphasize the importance of ensuring no hard border is re-established between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and even touch on issues like the future legal status of Gibraltar….

Say, what?  The internal territories of a nation are the business of that nation, and no one else’s.  Gibraltar’s “future legal status” is the same as it has been; Great Britain’s going out has no more effect on the place than it does on Wales.  The borders of a nation are the business of that nation, and no one else’s.  Great Britain’s outward-facing border along Northern Ireland is the business of Great Britain; the EU has nothing to say about this domestic matter.  The courts of a nation are the business of that nation, and no one else’s.  British courts consist of the British court system.

One of the reasons the Brits decided to leave was to regain British sovereignty over their own nation.  Either the EU peerage inhabiting Brussels haven’t been listening, or they’re being entirely disingenuous in their affront over the Brits’ impertinence in rejecting these persons’ superior abilities to govern.

It’s a Start

Posted on by
Reply

The Secretary of State wants to cut 2,300 jobs at State.  That might seem like a lot, until you recall that State has 13,000 Foreign Service employees, 11,000 Civil Service employees, and 45,000 Foreign Service local employees.  That’s 69,000 folks on the payroll (some estimates put the number higher, to 75,000); Tillerson wants to cut all of 3% of the employees.

Contra The Wall Street Journal‘s subheadline (The plan underscores the Trump administration’s preference for military spending over diplomacy), this is a good start on the true priority—downsizing the Federal government physically as well as fiscally.  Here’s hoping Secretary of State Rex Tillerson can follow through, and Congress and the other Cabinets and Agencies join the party.

It’ll be even better if the ones cut by Tillerson (et al., I hope) aren’t merely reallocated elsewhere on the government’s payroll but are instead returned to the private sector.

Naturally, politicians are all in a tizzy at the thought of actual downsizing—including an embarrassing number of politicians who caucus with the Republican Party.

…43 Republican and Democratic senators signed onto a letter to congressional appropriators arguing for “robust funding” for foreign aid and diplomacy.

“At a time when we face multiple national-security challenges around the world, deep cuts in this area would be short-sighted, counter-productive and even dangerous,” the letter said.

It is, though, entirely possible to do the same amount of work with fewer folks and less money—just using them both more efficiently.  In fact, it’s entirely possible to do more work with fewer folks—the lesser number won’t get in each other’s way so much.

Obama-Iran Axis

Posted on by
Reply

It sort of makes any Trump-Russia connection look awfully tenuous.  Politico has a long report out on what actually transpired during Obama’s “negotiation” of the Iran nuclear weapons deal, particularly with regard to the seven folks in American detention whom Obama released to Iran as a deal sweetener.

A couple of highlights (read the whole thing; it’s important):

In reality, some of them were accused by Obama’s own Justice Department of posing threats to national security. Three allegedly were part of an illegal procurement network supplying Iran with US-made microelectronics with applications in surface-to-air and cruise missiles like the kind Tehran test-fired recently, prompting a still-escalating exchange of threats with the Trump administration. Another was serving an eight-year sentence for conspiring to supply Iran with satellite technology and hardware.

And

[I]n a series of unpublicized court filings, the Justice Department dropped charges and international arrest warrants against 14 other men, all of them fugitives.

And

Three of the fugitives allegedly sought to lease Boeing aircraft for an Iranian airline that authorities say had supported Hezbollah, the US-designated terrorist organization.

As a probably unrelated aside, recall that Boeing has just concluded a deal to sell 100 passenger aircraft to “an Iranian airline.”

And this:

The biggest fish, though, was Seyed Abolfazl Shahab Jamili, who had been charged with being part of a conspiracy that from 2005 to 2012 procured thousands of parts with nuclear applications for Iran via China.

Even regarding others we were on the verge of capturing or were tracking, Obama got in the way so he could have his deal.

…Justice and State Department officials denied or delayed requests from prosecutors and agents to lure some key Iranian fugitives to friendly countries so they could be arrested. Similarly, Justice and State, at times in consultation with the White House, slowed down efforts to extradite some suspects already in custody overseas, according to current and former officials and others involved in the counterproliferation effort.

And as far back as the fall of 2014, Obama administration officials began slow-walking some significant investigations and prosecutions of Iranian procurement networks operating in the US

This is the sort of thing then-President Barack Obama (D) was covering up in his rush to get a deal—any deal—with Iran concerning the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

And not a peep about this out of the current Democrats in Congress.

Again, RTWT.

Timidity Is

Posted on by
Reply

…as timidity does.  The Japan Times has it, too, as demonstrated in its editorial last Wednesday.  The editorial board is worried about Japan actually achieving an ability to defend proactively itself.  The board’s concern was triggered [sic] by a Liberal Democratic Party proposal that

Japan consider developing the ability to strike enemy missile bases.  …a response to North Korea’s repeated ballistic missile launches….

The board fretted that

an attempt by Japan to build up the capability to attack enemy bases could result in destabilizing the region’s security environment by giving an imagined enemy an excuse to carry out pre-emptive strikes on our country.

Never mind that the region’s security environment already is at risk from Japan’s current inability strike (back) at an “imagined” enemy who attacks (including a Japanese ally?  That’s the implication of the Times board’s term); Japan can only to receive such a strike, potentially without post hoc answer.

The editorialists did raise a legitimate Constitutional question on the matter:

In 1959, defense chief Shigejiro Ito stated that possessing offensive weapons on the grounds of potential danger of enemy attack as mentioned by Hatoyama runs counter to the Constitution.

However, Ito misunderstood the Japanese Constitution and the duty of any nation’s government.  No government may, legitimately, surrender its people, the government’s master, into slavery or destruction; government must mount the means to defend itself.  With today’s technologies, that of necessity includes the obligation (not merely the right) to act preemptively if the situation demands it.

Preemptive defensive actions thus still defensive actions, and so they are well within the bounds of Japan’s Constitutional limits on military activity.

The Times‘ board went on:

To equip the Self-Defense Forces with the ability to pound enemy bases would require advanced technologies and equipment…. Possessing these kinds of technologies and equipment could go beyond the principle of defense-only security that the nation has adopted under the postwar Constitution.

Aside from the board’s lack of understanding of the nature of self-defense and the government’s obligation to be able to act preemptively, there’s the question of the board’s limiting principle here.  Would, for instance, concluding a treaty with another nation that obligates that nation to defend (and so to conduct preemptive actions for the sake of) Japan be a close enough possession of such technologies to violate the Japanese Constitution?  Would concluding a treaty with another nation for that nation to use its technologies to advise Japan and guide Japanese systems to the enemy bases be a close enough possession of such technologies to violate the Constitution?  In both cases, after all, Japan would deliberately be making use of these apparently proscribed technologies, if only indirectly.

And:

Japan’s attempt to obtain capabilities to strike enemy bases could be reciprocated by potential enemies, including North Korea, potentially leading to an arms race between the two countries.

Stipulated.  Is that better or worse, though, than Japan leaving itself exposed to the enemy’s initiative and the enemy’s possibly nuclear initial attack?  Does the board think Japan could survive a nuclear attack, much less answer it successfully?

Does the board think northern Korea (for instance) can maintain such an arms race for a longer time than Japan before it must leave off?

The Times‘ position is just the potential hostage preemptively surrendering itself into hostage status.

And it’s shameful.