Telecommunications Security

The US is concerned about People’s Republic of China’s cell phone company, Huawei, and the threat it poses to our national security, through an ability to use its equipment to conduct espionage and to shut down our communications networks, were it to get a significant foothold in our cell phone network, whether via its cell phones or its network equipment—its routers, switches, and cell-tower gear.  The concern stems from Huawei’s relationship with the PRC government, which makes the company an arm of that government.

The British government, on the other hand, is embracing Huawei with open arms, even as it seeks ever more intimate economic ties with the PRC.  Brit intel has warned the government of these risks, but the government has said to pay no mind.  After all, in answer to the concerns, Huawei set up and funds a lab that tests its equipment.

30 people with UK security clearances disassemble Huawei equipment and evaluate hardware and software for security vulnerabilities. Huawei funds and operates the lab, and the staff are Huawei employees. Overseeing the operation is a board composed of mostly senior British intelligence and government officials, as well as three Huawei representatives.

Does anyone seriously expect that “senior British officials,” as isolated from the actual work as they are, will be able effectively to oversee the “evaluations?”

The wolf is minding the flock. How braindead is that?

Trusting Russia on Ukraine

The US and Russia, along with NATO and Ukrainian officials, talked about setting up a peace-keeping force to get and maintain peace in Ukraine.  Interestingly, that force would be placed along the front that separates the Russian and rebel-held eastern Ukraine from the rest of the nation instead of being on the Ukrainian border with Russia.  The proposal also carefully ignored the status of Russia-occupied Crimea.  A US counterproposal, offered by the US’ chief negotiator, Kurt Volker, suggested that the force should include, also, that border—not instead of the front—while still ignoring Crimea.

During a panel discussion held by a number of former US diplomats that included Mike McFaul, former US ambassador to Russia and Volker, McFaul asked Volker

Tell us why the factors are different in this particular case that would lead to a different scenario than a permanent division that we have in Cyprus[.]

Volker’s answer?

Mr Volker said the peacekeeping plan would only work if both the Ukrainians and Russians want peace.

Who’s definition of “peace?”  Russia doesn’t want peace except on occupation of eastern Ukraine, retention of Crimea, and control over rump Ukraine.

Volker is a rabbit remonstrating with a Russian bear. Volker thinks the Russian ways are wrong. Russia thinks Volker is lunch. He’s embarrassing us.

Diplomacy and Northern Korea

The Wall Street Journal‘s Gerald Seib had a piece extolling the virtues of the Republic of Korea’s willingness to engage in formal, summit-level diplomacy with northern Korea coupled with President Donald Trump’s sub rosa willingness to talk.

There were, though, some serious misunderstandings in the article.  Here are a couple:

[T]here is no way to know for sure what the North Koreans are willing to give up without testing their intentions.

Apparently Seib has been doing a Rip van Winkle impression. For the last 25 years, the northern Korean government has said they’ll never give up their nuclear weapons goals.  We know for sure that what northern Korea is willing to give up is nothing.

If the North Koreans are talking rather than testing, that alone would be a positive development.

It would be, but this is incredibly naive. The northern Koreans are fully capable of talking and testing at the same time, and there’s no reason to believe they’d not continue that easy multitasking now, just as they’ve already been doing for those 25 years.

Talk, certainly. But do it in clear recognition of the fact that northern Korea will continue to test and that talking will not slow, much less halt or reverse, its drive to accumulate deliverable (and marketable) nuclear warheads.

We should keep the economic and military pressure on and increasing.  We can multitask, too.

Costs, and Costs

The fight to drive the Daesh out of Iraq (while killing too few of them IMNSHO) has caused more than $45 billion in infrastructure damage to Iraq.

That’s roughly half the cost of the damage a couple of hurricanes did in Texas and Florida last year, an even smaller ratio when Puerto Rico is figured in.  But it’s a lot of damage for a nation like Iraq.

What might that imply, besides the relative wealth of the two nations?

One is the relative dependence we have on our more highly developed, and so expensive, infrastructure compared to Iraq.  Iraq is scraping by with that level of damage and already beginning to recover.

If we suffered the same relative level of damage to our infrastructure, particularly our electric grid, how well would we fare?