Tag Archives: economics

Trump, Boudreaux, and Trade

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Don Boudreaux, at Cafe Hayek, recently took issue with President-Elect Donald Trump on the question of trade.  While there’s much about which to argue with Trump about his potential trade policies, here I must take issue with Boudreaux.  Boudreaux argued that a Trump remark in a PBS interview about the EU beating [his emphasis] the US in trade demonstrates Trump’s ignorance of trade matters.

I suggest that Boudreaux has demonstrated his lack of understanding of what Trump believes it means to be beaten in trade.  Boudreaux based his argument on a free market environment in which I have bags of peanuts, you have pears, the two of us agree on an exchange, and thus

If I accept, then we trade.  You gain; I gain.  We both gain.  No one “beat” the other.

Of course.  There’s no reason to believe Trump doesn’t understand that; he’s too successful a businessman.

Boudreaux then threw in a complication: Jones, who’s now nearby with his own supply of bags of peanuts.  You are then able to do a better (in some sense) deal with me to get more of my peanuts for the same number of your pears or to get the same number of my peanuts for fewer of your pears.

[B]oth you and I gain.  No one gets “beat.”  Each of us, to use Trumpian language, is “a winner.”

Again, of course.  We’re both still better off than had we not done the deal; competition just changed the degree of “better off.”  Again, there’s no reason to believe Trump doesn’t understand that; he’s too successful a businessman.

But this isn’t the sort of thing Trump is talking about when he decries existing trade deals (not trade, and not multi-party trade).

Here’s another scenario that Boudreaux omitted from his vignettes.  You and I have our supplies of peanuts and pears for trade, and Jones has his peanut supply to trade, just as before.  This time, though, Jones offers his peanuts below his cost of getting them.  Further, he does this, not because he’s offering a temporary loss leader to introduce himself to a new customer or to a new market, but because he has a Sugar Momma who’ll make good his losses for as long as it suits her and for her own reasons.  Now you do your deal with Jones, or you divide your custom between Jones and me, for many fewer pears or for many more peanuts than would be the case without this nonmarket intervention.  Instead, the terms are driven by Jones’ artificially low, subsidized price.

You and I both are beaten in this arrangement.  I lose immediately because I don’t get the price for my peanuts I might have gotten in a fair negotiation; the price I am able to get—if I can trade at all—is governed by Jones’ subsidized price.  You lose later because after you’ve become accustomed to those low prices, something changes in Jones’ environment (perhaps his Sugar Momma no longer can afford her subsidizing Jones), his price suddenly rises, and you must deal with that price shock to your trading.

Given Trump’s repeated (if under-reported) emphasis on fair trade deals, good trade deals, this would seem to be what Trump means by being beaten by the EU, by China, etc.

It’s puzzling that Boudreaux doesn’t understand that. He’s too good an economist.

The Financial Stability Oversight Council

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Ryan Tracy, writing in The Wall Street Journal, thought Republicans should love this Council and be at pains to keep it, even as they look to “quickly scal[e] back Obama-era policies.”

I demur.

Tracy suggested

Consider the powers [FSOC] grants the Treasury secretary: As chair of FSOC—whose members include the chairs of the Federal Reserve and Securities and Exchange Commission—[Treasury Secretary nominee Steven] Mr Mnuchin  can convene a meeting of the top financial regulators at any time, and set the agenda.

SecTreas already can do this.  While he can’t compel attendance, the regulators would have hard time declining to attend or explaining to the rest of us their decision to stay away.

FSOC can make public statements or recommendations that have a name-and-shame effect.

SecTreas already can do this, too, as can any Cabinet Secretary and Agency head, did any of these have the courage to speak without hiding behind the comfortable numbers of a council.

FSOC’s greatest power is to designate “systemically important” financial firms outside the banking system for stricter federal oversight.

Mere existence of this authority is abusive overreach by Government. The Feds have no business in this business at all.

If Mr Mnuchin sympathizes with FSOC detractors, he could call fewer meetings with lighter agendas.

SecTreas doesn’t need the existence of a Council to decline to call meetings of regulators.

It’s past time for this abusive Council, and Dodd-Frank, to be done away with.

Full stop.

Fiat Chrysler, the EPA, and Diesel Engines

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The EPA has decided to accuse Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV of using software to cheat on diesel emission limits during tests, sort of reminiscent of Volkswagen’s peccadillo.

The problem for the EPA, though, is that

the EPA is not yet accusing Fiat Chrysler of installing illegal software patches on its diesel engines, but of failing to disclose potentially legal ones.

Never mind that if the software is legal, there’s nothing to disclose.  Not to fear, though, the problem with Fiat Chrysler is that

[i]t’s the company’s finances that make it vulnerable.

The company in the hole with a debt pile of some €6.5 billion ($6.9 billion) as of last September.  And the EPA knows that.

With any other agency, this might be a legitimate beef.  With this EPA, though, it smacks of legal blackmail.  “Nice business you got there; be too bad if something were to happen to it.  I know you’re short of cash; maybe there’s something we can do for each other to help you out.”

“How Barack Obama rescued the US economy”

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That’s the headline on a recent Financial Times piece (sorry, the FT has a paywall) by Martin Wolf.  It’s a silly headline, for a silly article.

How should we assess the economic success or failure of Barack Obama’s presidency?

This is a difficult question to answer.

No, the question is easy to answer.  Obama’s economic policies have been abject failures.  It’s also straightforward to lay the bulk of responsibility on Obama and his administration.  While it’s true that the Panic of 2008 began in the prior administration, it was Obama’s “stimulus” package that both blew up the nation’s debt and failed in its purpose of stimulating our economy with shovel ready jobs in a massive so-called Keynesian stimulus and its bailout of failing large banks.  It was his Federal Reserve’s policies (yes, yes, the central bank is supposed to be independent, but it was Obama’s Ben Bernanke, extended at Obama’s decision, and his Janet Yellen appointment) that degraded money discipline with their decisions to ease the money supply and hold interest rates artificially low.  It was his excessive—explosively so—regulation that limited business’ ability to function in the market, that limited small business’ ability to get started, that limited job growth and employment recovery.

It was the Obama administration’s Dodd-Frank, with its too big to fail policy that distorted those big business’ risk-taking decisions, decisions that used to be made in a free market but that under Dodd-Frank are made with the perception—courtesy of that “stimulus” bailout—that if the business messed up, Government would bail them out.

[S]hockingly, most congressional Republicans opposed all significant monetary, financial and fiscal actions taken to deal with the crisis.

This isn’t shocking at all; what’s shocking is the blind, knee-jerk rejection of free market principles by a Democratic Party (soon to become a Progressive-Democratic Party) suddenly in complete control of our government and cut loose from any restrictions on their power.  Absent the “stimulus,” the Panic might have been steeper, but it also would have been much shorter.  One only has to compare the Depression of 1920-21 with the Great Depression to see the efficacy of government non-response compared with Government intervention, and the Panic of 1907 with both to see another example of the efficacy of private response compared with Government intervention.  Of course, the Democrats knew—and know—this history, yet they acted as they did, anyway.

He tried to move the US closer to the universal health insurance taken for granted in other high-income countries. The Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) has added an estimated 20m adults and 3m children to the insurance rolls.

He didn’t try, he did it by Party fiat and then by Executive diktats—lots and lots of diktats.  Further, while Obamacare has provided health welfare to those adults and children, it also has thrown millions more out of their health insurance plans and denied them access to their doctors in direct—and knowing—contravention of Obama’s explicit promises that these denials would not happen.  The claim of cost growth reduction is a cynical one, also, being limited as it is to the cost of selected groups of Americans.  In fact, the cost has exploded, with premiums rising in double-digit per centages, deductibles going to 10s of thousands of dollars—an annual expense—the departure of heretofore health insurance companies from the health welfare plan “market,” and the cost to taxpayers similarly growing rapidly to pay for the subsidies of those given essentially free access to this health welfare.

Wolf’s discussion of our “jobs” recovery is misleading, also. Labor force participation rate is at historic lows, held back by those policies’ suppression of job creation.  Even the male labor force participation rate, which has been in a declining trend since its early ’50s peak, is farther below that long-term trend than it ever has been in that time frame.

Finally, this graph summarizes the efficacy of the Obama administration “recovery” as compared to post-WWII economic dislocation recoveries.

Even at the end of 2016 rate of 4.7% unemployment of 4.7%, the Obama administration’s economic policies have held back the recovery by years.

Linkages

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They didn’t work when Nixon and Kissinger tried it, even though the Soviet Union generally complied, because the revolutions that the USSR was fomenting continued to occur apace after the Soviets stopped fomenting in return for nuclear and economic concessions.

Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew warned ignoring recent steps by Beijing to liberalize its economy would endanger Chinese cooperation on other major geopolitical issues, particularly containing North Korea’s nuclear program.

They’re not working now with the People’s Republic of China, but for a different reason.

And

The departing Treasury secretary further warned against steps that would prompt China to withdraw its support for tougher sanctions against North Korea.

The PRC still isn’t taking steps to “liberalize its economy,” not when it’s actively interfering with its cross-border yuan flows, manipulating domestic interest rates with a view to control who gets to lend or borrow rather than an effort to maintain a stable monetary policy, manipulating its domestic stock markets as it did in 2015 and today with manipulating the legal environment, and on and on.

Nor has the PRC ever cooperated in any meaningful way with respect to sanctions connected to northern Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  The PRC routinely slow walks its agreement to sanctions (which is why their occasional prompt agreement is such news), and it ignores sanction violations as those occur across its border with northern Korea.

And—ignored by Lew—the PRC is accelerating its aggression in the East and South China Seas and increasing its pressures on the nations rimming the South China Sea to deal with them exclusively and one at a time on trade questions.

Before today’s linkages can have effect, the parties at both ends of the lever must be willing to be responsive.