Tag Archives: defense policy

Right Idea, Wrong Plan

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Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, German Marshall Fund of the US President, says three things must occur in order to redress Europe’s defense situation, a situation which I believe currently threatens its ability to survive a war as a collection of sovereign, independent nations. Some of these steps apply to us, and we are also, I believe, in the same war-losing peril of our own sovereignty and independence.

First, Europe must rearm, and fast.

Indeed. But even today, I see little stomach for that in too many of the continent’s nations critical to the continent’s survival against a Russian attack. Both France and Germany are in financial crisis and are showing no political will to correct that. The UK is even worse off; its political management doesn’t even seem aware of the depth of its failure. Until they do gain the awareness and the will to act—and then act—they’ll be unable to be serious about rearming, much less hardening their digital and material (water, fuel, and heating distribution) infrastructure against cyber attacks. Only those nations still fresh from the Russian boots on their necks—Poland, the Baltics, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova—remember what that life was like. Poland and the Baltics are serious about rearming, but they’re smaller even than Ukraine compared to the barbarian’s hordes and equipage. And they have a knife poised at their back in the form of Hungary, which is busily toadying up to Russia in its own effort to mitigate the consequences of being conquered again. Rearming is necessary, but it doesn’t seem promising, much less occurring any time soon.

Second, defense innovation must become a shared transatlantic mission. Neither side of the Atlantic can out-innovate geopolitical rivals alone.

De Hoop Scheffer fleshed this one out a bit; however, she’s mistaken in her proposed execution.

The US leads in emerging technologies, but Europe brings industrial capacity and advanced manufacturing. Joint work on protecting critical infrastructure, countering hybrid threats, and developing secure telecommunications and next-generation defense technologies must continue regardless of political noise.

Yes, and no. The US certainly can out-innovate our enemies alone. That’s how we ran the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics out of existence. We can—and we must—do so again, for all that we’re facing an aggressive Russia and an innovative People’s Republic of China. Our economic players’ freedom to innovate as they see fit gives them, and us as a nation, much more flexibility, and the ability to profit from their innovations, gives them much more incentive to innovate and to run the risks necessary for innovation than can any centrally planned process.

We need, though, to do our own manufacturing. Europe can never be an arsenal of democracy, especially with respect to modern weapons and cyber and space threats. Additionally, the industrial powerhouse of Europe, Germany, is not that anymore. Their industrial capacity is shrinking, and it’s becoming ever more expensive and unreliable as the German government insists on unreliable and expensive “renewable” energy sources while disdaining cheap, reliable oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy sources.

Aside from that, we’re too likely to have to fight two or three wars simultaneously; we need our own manufacturing capacity to meet those equipment expenditure needs.

That doesn’t mean we should not share innovations with our friends and allies; of course, we should and they should with us. Accumulating best practices speeds innovation. We just need to guard against becoming dependent on others. Our dependence on the PRC for far too many items critical to our economy, our health, and our defense capability demonstrates the destructive folly of that. Friends and allies may be less likely to cut us off at critical moments, but that’s a non-zero proposition. See, for instance, an earlier France kicking our military out of that nation. See the German bureaucracy getting in the way of serious training exercises, including joint exercises.

Nor does that mean we shouldn’t buy European manufactures, also. We just can’t be dependent on them. Aside from the continent’s incapacity, two world wars showed vulnerability of US weapons flowing to Europe. That threat applies to the flow of manufactures from Europe to us in the event of another shooting war.

Third, Washington and European capitals must accept that their alignment is no longer automatic.

This is especially true given that fully a third of the European NATO members continue to welch on their financial and equipment obligations to NATO (and in so doing betray the other members of NATO) and continue to freeload off American money and our promise of American blood in defense of NATO Europe, legitimate members and scofflaws alike.

They need to build flexible coalitions outside the usual trans-Atlantic circle based on shared benefits, not only historical ties.

This is especially true for us. We need to stand up a new mutual defense arrangement that incudes the nations of the Three Seas Initiative, us, and the UK; although the latter’s inclusion should depend on its getting its fiscal house in order and then plussing up its defense establishment to something firmer than a secondary school football team. Absent both of those, the UK would be a net drain and so should not be considered.

Typically Liberal “Misunderstanding”

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It’s William Galston, this time. Galston, in his op-ed for last Tuesday’s The Wall Street Journal disparaged SecDef Pete Hegseth’s alleged disdain for the laws of war.

Leave aside the fact that Galston cynically and deliberately chose not to cite any of these laws of war. Instead, he actually wrote extensively about Hegseth’s supposed disdain for rules of engagement. In this vein, Galston generalized, without logic or facts, Hegseth’s disdain for particular rules into a disdain for all rules of engagement.

However, Galston’s more serious…error…is this. Rules of engagement are not Laws of War. RoE are the particulars, tailored to specific combat and short-of-combat environments, intended for particularized implementation of those general laws of war. Yet he opened his piece with this lede, and his piece continued solely in that vein.

It’s no surprise the US Navy’s September 2 strike on an alleged drug-carrying boat near Venezuela has been controversial. The man who now leads the Defense Department has ridiculed the laws of war throughout his military career.

I’m not that convinced, though, that Galston’s mistake is a misunderstanding Given his high skill as a journalist for a leading news outlet, for whom words are his stock in trade, I lean more toward outright distortion in his use of rules of engagement and laws of war interchangeably.

Oh, and one more “leave aside:” The controversy surrounding that second strike is entirely a journalistic construction. Those of us with actual military experience and who are not trading on that experience for political gain see no fault in sending in a second strike to finish a task that the first strike had not completed.

Convenient Misunderstanding

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The Trump administration is pressing its campaign in international waters against those entities smuggling deadly drugs into the United States. The Left and too many politicians, the latter from both parties, claim worry about the rights of these smugglers. Others criticize the tactics being used against them.

Critics say the alleged criminals aren’t in an armed conflict with the US, making strikes on them illegal and a possible war crime.

This is a denial flowing from a convenient misunderstanding of the facts of the matter. Last February, the State Department made no bones about who and what these…smugglers…are.

Today, the Department of State announces the designation of Tren de Aragua (TdA), Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Cártel de Sinaloa, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), Cártel del Noreste (CDN), La Nueva Familia Michoacana (LNFM), Cártel de Golfo (CDG), and Cárteles Unidos (CU) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).

Of course these smugglers, these terrorists, are in armed conflict with the United States; that’s what terrorists do vis-à-vis the nations they target. Heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, today’s marijuana carefully bred to drastically increase its potency—all of these are smuggled in with two purposes: make money for the terrorists and hook our population on them to the detriment of our people’s ability to function.

Those are chicken feed attempts, though, and by themselves devastate thousands of lives but present no serious threat to our population as a whole or to our national security. However, that’s not all the terrorists are smuggling in. The terrorists are busily smuggling fentanyl into our nation in truly alarming, security-threatening amounts. In 2024 alone, government agents seized 23,256 kilograms of fentanyl. With a single kilogram being enough to kill 500,000 Americans, that would have been enough to kill more than 11.6 billion Americans—34 times our population.

Wars aren’t fought exclusively with guns and bombs. They’re also fought cybernetically…and with drugs designed to poison whole populations. Fentanyl smuggling, much more than the petty smuggling of those other drugs, is a direct attack on our nation, and these smugglers are soldiers in that war. Keep in mind, too, that the terrorist organizations managing this war assemble the fentanyl that their soldiers smuggle from constituent precursors they import from one of our enemy nations: the People’s Republic of China. The PRC is actively aiding and abetting this attack.

It is no war crime for us to defend ourselves in this war, and killing the enemy soldiers is entirely justified, right along with destroying the weapons themselves. It’s also safer for us to do this on the high seas than waiting for the weapons to enter our nation. The seizures outlined above are only a fraction, if apparently a major fraction given the fentanyl-related deaths actually occurring, of the weapons smuggled in. Like any other weapon of mass destruction, though, it would only take a very few successful mass smugglings to cause vast, national-security threatening damage.

An Empty Promise?

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Supposedly, the US has offered a security guarantee to Ukraine in the form of support[ing] European security guarantees and seek[ing] Senate backing for Washington’s promised role as a means of breaking the current peace talks impasse.

This supposed guarantee

would include monitoring, verification, and deconfliction, the officials said, and would lay out the role the US would play if Russia breached a peace deal and came back to attack Ukraine. They would also include the provision of weapons to deter a Russian force.

Yeah, sure. “Monitoring:” we see you, Russia, resuming your invasion, we’re watching the hell out of you. “Verification:” Yup, Russia really is resuming its invasion. “Deconfliction:” What does this mean? European forces entering Ukraine to fight the barbarian alongside Ukrainian forces? Traffic control to deconflict traffic jams on Ukrainian roads for Ukrainian forces and civilians moving in the other direction? Something else?

“Provision of weapons for deterrence:” This is risible. Europe already is refusing to provide the weapons the UA needs, in the numbers it needs them, or on the schedule it says it needs them. Excuses range from fear of provoking the barbarian to insisting the UA doesn’t really need them like that to claims they don’t have the weapons to provide the UA, having drawn down their armories already with transfers. That last, given Europe’s disdain for any thing military, at least has a measure of plausibility.

The supposed guarantee also purports to include

legally-binding commitments to come to Ukraine’s aid in the event of a Russian attack.

What is the timeline for implementation of a related peace agreement? Would the agreement go into effect before or after “Senate support” had been secured? If after, what support for Ukraine’s continued fight for its survival would be in the offing pending that Senate agreement? If before, how would Ukraine recover or be aided in recovering, from the barbarian’s virtually guaranteed violation of the terms? What would be the Or Else should the barbarian violate the agreement—more monitoring, verification, and…”deconfliction?” All the nations’ governments—including, shamefully, our own—have already been slinking away, their tails covering their crown jewels, from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nattering on about nuclear weapons.

However sincerely offered, this seems like an empty promise. There’s no guarantee that the Senate, with its two-thirds majority treaty ratification requirement, would support such a thing. A simple Senate majority-voted resolution of support would be meaningless, legally, politically, and morally. Nor is there any guarantee that an alternate path to securing support—bills passed in both the House and Senate, which would require only majority votes (after a 60-vote cloture success in the Senate)—would succeed.

There’s this bit, too, that overhangs any security “guarantee” that might be offered Ukraine. Three of the participants in the Budapest Memorandum—the US, the UK, and France via its separate individual assurance—already have betrayed Ukraine by dishonoring the security and territorial integrity guarantees contained in that document. The Memorandum also was a legally binding commitment.

Foolish

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But a matter of little choice and less practical change.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has—reportedly—dropped his insistence on a path to NATO membership as a condition to an end of the war that Russia has inflicted in his nation. Instead, Zelenskyy has said that he would be open to a security arrangement that has

Washington and European states offering security guarantees in the event of another invasion, according to the Financial Times. “We are talking about bilateral security guarantees between Ukraine and the United States—namely, [NATO] Article 5-like guarantees…as well as security guarantees for us from our European partners and from other countries such as Canada, Japan, and others,” he said.

Zelenskyy had little choice in making this offer, since Ukraine had little chance of joining NATO for all the pre-war favorable talk about such a thing. The acceptance of a new member requires the unanimous agreement of the existing members, and too many members, out of timidity, ego, or being too close to Russia would say no to the accession.

The offer represents even less as a practical matter. Many of the same nations that would guarantee Ukraine’s national security in the event of another invasion are the same signatories to the Budapest Memorandum that guaranteed Ukraine’s national territory and sovereignty and who promptly betrayed Ukraine over 10 years ago when Russia invaded and occupied Crimea and first invaded Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Still, Zelenskyy has little choice but to make such an offer, regardless of its practical foolishness. That’s the outcome of the West’s collective decision to withhold from Ukraine the wherewithal to defeat the barbarian and drive him back out of Ukraine, a victory that Ukraine almost certainly could achieve were it not being held back.