Not Enough

European managers say they’ve made a concerted effort to stop buying Russian oil when the barbarian invaded Ukraine. Then there’s Turkey.

Several times a month, tankers unload tens of thousands of barrels of oil products at a Turkish storage terminal in the port city of Mersin. The vast majority of the ships come directly from Russia.
And several times a month, tankers leave that facility carrying similar quantities bound for the European Union.

In that alleged effort, those managers neglected Turkey. Now they’re claiming to be increasing “scrutiny” of that Turkish port and others.

I claim those managers’ neglect was largely intentional. I claim they consciously chose to ignore Turkey’s long relationship with Russia. Turkish enterprises, and the Turkish government, have long been happy to broker Russian oil.

Even if the increased scrutiny leads to concrete action regarding Turkish ports and transshipments of Russian oil, it’s not enough.

European nations, in addition to actualizing their scrutiny, could stop buying Russian oil that passes through Turkey. It isn’t that hard to trace the provenance of most of that oil, and where the provenance can’t be determined, that should be sufficient reason to not buy that oil.

Deterring the PRC

Deterring the PRC

The editors at The Wall Street Journal are correct in one respect regarding convincing the People’s Republic of China that it cannot successfully fight us at sea, but the editors fall woefully short of what’s truly necessary. And so does the Trump administration, although it is taking more serious steps regarding our national defense and our national security than has any administration since Reagan.

Today’s 296-ship Navy isn’t large or capable enough to prevent a war in the Pacific while deterring bad actors elsewhere. China is amassing military power with one adversary in mind: the US. This threat demands a diverse mix of firepower, including more stealthy submarines, longer-range aircraft, a deep cache of long-range missiles spread across more ships, and an unmanned fleet to deter an invasion across the Taiwan Strait.

Our Navy badly needs that, but it needs much more than that. It needs more combat ships, building rapidly to at least a 500 combat ship fleet, it needs more cargo ships capable of replenishing at sea those combat ships of everything from ammunition of all types, fuel, and such consumables as potable water and food. It needs better ship- and fleet-wide defenses capable of much earlier detection of incoming fires and countering those fires, including the PRC’s ship-, air-, and ground-launched hypersonic missiles. It needs hardening against EMP attacks and cyber attacks against shipborne software. It needs improved capability against PRC ECM measures. It needs its own ECM capability to isolate PRC shipping—surface and subsurface—from its command centers and from each other. It needs countermeasures capable of blinding PRC aircraft and missiles. It needs longer range and better detection systems against the PRC’s growing and increasingly capable submarine fleet.

Our Navy needs also to be backstopped by other services and measures, especially in cyber warfare and in space. When the PRC attacks our fleet, we need to be able to counter those attacks, at least in part, from space, kinetically and electronically. We need to fragment with cyber measures the PRC’s onshore energy distribution infrastructure. We need, with cyber measures, to isolate the PRC government from the PLA, and we need fragment the PRC government, preventing the several branches from talking to each other electronically.

And one more major improvement.

New battleships for the US Navy will “help maintain American military supremacy, revive the American shipbuilding industry, and inspire fear in America’s enemies all over the world,” Mr Trump said Monday. “We’re going to start with two” ships and “quickly morph into 10,” he said, with lasers, guns, missiles, and more.

We need all those things, but we need them now, not in 10 or 15 years. We need to get rid of the development and acquisition bureaucracy that infests DoD and replace it with personnel and procedures that streamline the process and get systems from the drawing board into production much faster than that. In conjunction, design and mission creep must be put to an end, with both frozen early rather than being allowed to continue past laying down keels.

2027 is two years off, and that’s when PRC President Xi Jinping intends to begin his war of conquest against the Republic of China, and in support of that, that’s when he will have the PLA attack our Navy. Nor will his attack be limited to that. His announced goal is to dominate us, and the PLA’s doctrine is total war across the entire spectrum. This has been clear for more than 20 years, since publication of Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui’s Unrestricted Warfare, China’s Master Plan to Destroy America in 2002.

Time’s a-wasting, and our freedom, every bit as much as the RoC’s, is in the wind since what we have in being is not much deterrence.

Who’s In Charge?

State Financial Officers Foundation CEO OJ Oleka noted in his Wall Street Journal op-ed the foolishness of Minnesota’s decision to eliminate its State Treasurer position with effect ‘way back in 2003. Supporters insisted that the position was purely clerical and so not worth the million dollars a year cost. Instead, the position’s responsibilities were scattered around to other State agencies. Oleka added

When no statewide official is clearly responsible for safeguarding public money, taxpayers pay the price.

Like with the multi-billion dollar Medicaid fraud that’s being uncovered in Minnesota. Only it’s not just the citizens of Minnesota who are paying that price; it’s all of us citizens all across these United States.

Oleka also pointed out the value of having someone in charge of watchdogging a State’s public money.

Across the states, financial officers are proving that vigilance works. Kentucky Auditor Allison Ball uncovered $800 million in wrongful Medicaid payments. North Carolina Treasurer Brad Briner found $170 million in unspent funds, while Iowa’s Roby Smith delivered a record $469 million return on investments that help fund state services.

There’s another factor here, though. Every one of those officials are Republicans.

Hmm….

Rich Want to Pay More Taxes

At least, that’s the claim of Tom Steyer and Mitt Romney. On this, The Wall Street Journal‘s editors are on the right track.

One curiosity of democracy is the rich citizens who tell politicians to raise their taxes. It’s the patriotic thing to do, they [not only Steyer and Romney] say.

And

The rich who favor higher taxes pitch this as an act of civic virtue.

Of course, both Steyer and Romney refuse to specify what a rich man’s fair share is, or how much more is more enough. Still it’s not like rich folks other than these two don’t pay more enough already. This graph makes that clear.

In the end, there’s nothing stopping these two virtue-signalers and their buds from paying more into the Federal Treasury on their own initiative. It would be a simple matter to have their accountant write the check. That they won’t, that they get quite indignant at the suggestion, demonstrates their insincerity and their authoritarian demand to impose their personal views on all the other rich folks around them.

Apparently, it’s patriotic enough to natter on about the situation, and civic duty is fulfilled by yapping.

Right Idea, Wrong Plan

Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, German Marshall Fund of the US President, says three things must occur in order to redress Europe’s defense situation, a situation which I believe currently threatens its ability to survive a war as a collection of sovereign, independent nations. Some of these steps apply to us, and we are also, I believe, in the same war-losing peril of our own sovereignty and independence.

First, Europe must rearm, and fast.

Indeed. But even today, I see little stomach for that in too many of the continent’s nations critical to the continent’s survival against a Russian attack. Both France and Germany are in financial crisis and are showing no political will to correct that. The UK is even worse off; its political management doesn’t even seem aware of the depth of its failure. Until they do gain the awareness and the will to act—and then act—they’ll be unable to be serious about rearming, much less hardening their digital and material (water, fuel, and heating distribution) infrastructure against cyber attacks. Only those nations still fresh from the Russian boots on their necks—Poland, the Baltics, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova—remember what that life was like. Poland and the Baltics are serious about rearming, but they’re smaller even than Ukraine compared to the barbarian’s hordes and equipage. And they have a knife poised at their back in the form of Hungary, which is busily toadying up to Russia in its own effort to mitigate the consequences of being conquered again. Rearming is necessary, but it doesn’t seem promising, much less occurring any time soon.

Second, defense innovation must become a shared transatlantic mission. Neither side of the Atlantic can out-innovate geopolitical rivals alone.

De Hoop Scheffer fleshed this one out a bit; however, she’s mistaken in her proposed execution.

The US leads in emerging technologies, but Europe brings industrial capacity and advanced manufacturing. Joint work on protecting critical infrastructure, countering hybrid threats, and developing secure telecommunications and next-generation defense technologies must continue regardless of political noise.

Yes, and no. The US certainly can out-innovate our enemies alone. That’s how we ran the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics out of existence. We can—and we must—do so again, for all that we’re facing an aggressive Russia and an innovative People’s Republic of China. Our economic players’ freedom to innovate as they see fit gives them, and us as a nation, much more flexibility, and the ability to profit from their innovations, gives them much more incentive to innovate and to run the risks necessary for innovation than can any centrally planned process.

We need, though, to do our own manufacturing. Europe can never be an arsenal of democracy, especially with respect to modern weapons and cyber and space threats. Additionally, the industrial powerhouse of Europe, Germany, is not that anymore. Their industrial capacity is shrinking, and it’s becoming ever more expensive and unreliable as the German government insists on unreliable and expensive “renewable” energy sources while disdaining cheap, reliable oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy sources.

Aside from that, we’re too likely to have to fight two or three wars simultaneously; we need our own manufacturing capacity to meet those equipment expenditure needs.

That doesn’t mean we should not share innovations with our friends and allies; of course, we should and they should with us. Accumulating best practices speeds innovation. We just need to guard against becoming dependent on others. Our dependence on the PRC for far too many items critical to our economy, our health, and our defense capability demonstrates the destructive folly of that. Friends and allies may be less likely to cut us off at critical moments, but that’s a non-zero proposition. See, for instance, an earlier France kicking our military out of that nation. See the German bureaucracy getting in the way of serious training exercises, including joint exercises.

Nor does that mean we shouldn’t buy European manufactures, also. We just can’t be dependent on them. Aside from the continent’s incapacity, two world wars showed vulnerability of US weapons flowing to Europe. That threat applies to the flow of manufactures from Europe to us in the event of another shooting war.

Third, Washington and European capitals must accept that their alignment is no longer automatic.

This is especially true given that fully a third of the European NATO members continue to welch on their financial and equipment obligations to NATO (and in so doing betray the other members of NATO) and continue to freeload off American money and our promise of American blood in defense of NATO Europe, legitimate members and scofflaws alike.

They need to build flexible coalitions outside the usual trans-Atlantic circle based on shared benefits, not only historical ties.

This is especially true for us. We need to stand up a new mutual defense arrangement that incudes the nations of the Three Seas Initiative, us, and the UK; although the latter’s inclusion should depend on its getting its fiscal house in order and then plussing up its defense establishment to something firmer than a secondary school football team. Absent both of those, the UK would be a net drain and so should not be considered.