Category Archives: foreign policy

A Proper Response

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People’s Republic of China’s President Xi Jinping is looking to bully President Donald Trump (R) into stopping arms sales to the Republic of China in order to ease Xi’s coming invasion of the RoC. Xi has ordered the PLA to be ready for the invasion by 2027, and the arms sales to the RoC are critical in forestalling that invasion or defeating it should it come.

As the Wall Street Journal‘s editors note,

giving in to Mr Xi’s threats on Taiwan would send a dangerous signal about America’s reliability as an ally. The Taiwan Relations Act obligates the US to supply defensive weapons to the island. If Mr Trump abdicates on that obligation, China will immediately use it to tell the Taiwanese people that America can’t be trusted to defend them. Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines will also get the message that Mr Trump’s priority in the Pacific is China, not their mutual defense.

It also would tell Xi that the US is a paper tiger, easily cowed, and his pressure on us would only increase.

The proper responses to Xi’s bullying attempt are two. One is to increase the sales of weapons—including offensive weapons, now—and to greatly accelerate their delivery. The other is to increase our own combat suites in and around the South China Sea and the island of Taiwan, with particular attention here to the Taiwan Strait. Every time Xi waxes angry and threatening, we should up the ante further, each time much more than the prior increase.

Mistaken Emphasis

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A letter-writer from the Hudson Institute in The Wall Street Journal‘s Monday Letters section tried to make a case for Europe’s ability to defend itself against a Russian invasion based on Ukraine’s capability.

Despite Russian air superiority and numerical advantages, Ukrainian forces and local volunteers slowed, halted, and ultimately rolled back Russia’s assault on the capital. They did so because they were fighting for national survival, and, in many cases, defending their homes and families as the Russians advanced.

They did so, also, because Ukrainians, individually and as a population, didn’t hesitate to enter a stout defense–The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride. As the letter-writer misconstrued the wargame exercise, Germany did hesitate in the wargame, with fatal effects on the attempted defense against the Russian invasion.

Furthermore, that part about fighting for national survival as well as defending individuals’ homes and families does not obtain in Germany or France. Far too many of those nations’ citizens—including their younger generations and members (of all ages) of their major political parties—would rather not fight even to defend their nation.

Next, much of the reason Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine failed, despite apparent superiority in numbers and equipment, was its mistaken assumption that the invasion would be a walkover. Russia has learned the lesson of that failure, and it won’t underestimate the level of resistance capability of its next target, whether Germany’s and France’s reluctant citizens or the Baltics’ and Poland’s willing but small populations.

And this: the runup to WWI in the aftermath of an Archduke’s assassination was one of a race to mobilize and to achieve a mobilization level conducive to successful attack vs a level conducive to deterrence or to defeat of an attack. In that race, both sides proceeded from substantially equal baselines of military capability and mobilization ability. In the realization, the race ended in a substantial tie, and the German invasion of France, after initial gains of the sort that nearly always accrue to the first aggressor, was brought to a standstill.

That substantial mobilization capability equality does not obtain in today’s Europe.

Russia already has combat-hardened (even if of uncertain quality) troops, a war materiel production capacity already in place and growing, and force buildups occurring, low-key, in Belorussia and in Kaliningrad. The Baltic States and Poland, stipulate arguendo, have similar per capita capacities, but they’re already maxed out due to their small populations and limited, even operating at maximum output, industrial capacity. Behind those front line nations, though, Germany has no serious troop establishment and it cannot even field a combat-ready brigade of armor. Its industrial capacity is not capable of producing materiel in war deterring, much less fighting, much less at mobilizing rates before 2030. Italy and France are little better off.

In a mobilization race today, Russia wins. And that, coupled with the incapacity for defense that even the most dedicated nations have, means Russia wins the war, too.

What He Said

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Senator Tom Cotton (R, AR), wrote of the need for modernizing and expanding our nuclear weapons capability across three dimensions: numbers of warheads and systems to deliver them, the quality of those warheads and systems, and the range of threat—tactical, theater, and strategic—against which those warheads and systems are optimized.

He closed his piece, though, with the most important Statement of Need of his piece:

[T]o those who fear an arms race: The race has already begun. Russia and China have been running it for more than a decade while we sat on the sidelines. The question isn’t whether there will be competition in nuclear forces, but whether America will show up to compete.

To which I add: if we don’t compete, we cannot compete successfully. If we cannot compete successfully, we will find ourselves very quickly faced with nuclear blackmail or a nuclear war that we will certainly lose. In either of those cases, we will see ourselves completely subjugated to our enemies.

Trumpian Tariffs, Who Pays Them, And So What?

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The Federal Reserve now is saying that us Americans are paying 90% of the tariffs put in place by President Donald Trump (R).

In an analysis on the [Federal Reserve] bank’s website, four researchers write that last year “nearly 90 percent of the tariffs’ economic burden fell on US firms and consumers.”
They reach that conclusion by examining import data, to see whether foreign suppliers cut their prices in response to Mr Trump’s added tariff costs. Over the first eight months of 2025, “94 percent of the tariff incidence was borne by the US,” the analysis says, meaning “a 10 percent tariff caused only a 0.6 percentage point decline in foreign export prices.”

Say that’s accurate—and, frankly, I have no reason to dispute it—it seems that the tariffs’ impact on the prices us American consumers face has been effected already, that impact is minimal inflation, and that inflation seems to be coming under control. That’s the case even as individual items—furniture, for instance—do seem to have ongoing price increases that are more closely related to tariff rates.

Overall, that leaves other causes also impacting inflation at least as much, if not more, than tariffs: supply chains dependent on distant foreign nations with the attendant shipping costs, those shipping costs themselves dependent on container rates and fuel costs, and especially our dependency on critical items like rare earth ores and refined rare earths that are controlled by an enemy nation that already is squeezing our economy with greatly reduced and heavily controlled exports to us. Even those rising furniture prices are, in addition to tariffs, strongly impacted by Canadian charges for exporting timber to the US—which costs impact house construction costs as well as costs for the furniture to put into them.

Missed in the Discussion?

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The People’s Republic of China has a “national team” of investors who work at the government’s behest to maintain a measure of stability in the PRC’s stock market.

The group is known by market players as the “national team,” and it functions as a market stabilization fund. It has been a fixture in the Chinese stock market for more than a decade, usually buying exchange-traded funds, and was widely noted when it intervened to prop up prices during a 2015 crash. After Trump announced his “liberation day” tariffs in April 2025, triggering a global stock selloff, the national team stepped in to relieve the pain as a buyer of index funds.

On the other hand,

The CSI 300 benchmark, which tracks shares listed in both Shanghai and Shenzhen, has risen more than 20% over the past year, despite the April dip. Last month, trading volume across mainland Chinese stock exchanges reached a record high.
…
“Substantial yet well-paced selling by the national team is curbing—but not killing—the positive market momentum,” analysts at Morgan Stanley said in a note earlier this month.

Maybe this is the government doing a slow pump-and-dump, which is one way to make money (not legally in most western nations), maybe not. In any event, it’s also textbook investing: buy low and sell high. Either way, this is making a lot of money for the PRC government, which in turn provides serious money for subsidizing its cost of goods production and for offsetting the effects of foreign (mostly US) tariffs on PRC exports. More the former, most likely, since the PRC has been able to increase its exports to Europe and South America, to their economic dependency peril.