Category Archives: foreign policy

Deterring the PRC

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Deterring the PRC

The editors at The Wall Street Journal are correct in one respect regarding convincing the People’s Republic of China that it cannot successfully fight us at sea, but the editors fall woefully short of what’s truly necessary. And so does the Trump administration, although it is taking more serious steps regarding our national defense and our national security than has any administration since Reagan.

Today’s 296-ship Navy isn’t large or capable enough to prevent a war in the Pacific while deterring bad actors elsewhere. China is amassing military power with one adversary in mind: the US. This threat demands a diverse mix of firepower, including more stealthy submarines, longer-range aircraft, a deep cache of long-range missiles spread across more ships, and an unmanned fleet to deter an invasion across the Taiwan Strait.

Our Navy badly needs that, but it needs much more than that. It needs more combat ships, building rapidly to at least a 500 combat ship fleet, it needs more cargo ships capable of replenishing at sea those combat ships of everything from ammunition of all types, fuel, and such consumables as potable water and food. It needs better ship- and fleet-wide defenses capable of much earlier detection of incoming fires and countering those fires, including the PRC’s ship-, air-, and ground-launched hypersonic missiles. It needs hardening against EMP attacks and cyber attacks against shipborne software. It needs improved capability against PRC ECM measures. It needs its own ECM capability to isolate PRC shipping—surface and subsurface—from its command centers and from each other. It needs countermeasures capable of blinding PRC aircraft and missiles. It needs longer range and better detection systems against the PRC’s growing and increasingly capable submarine fleet.

Our Navy needs also to be backstopped by other services and measures, especially in cyber warfare and in space. When the PRC attacks our fleet, we need to be able to counter those attacks, at least in part, from space, kinetically and electronically. We need to fragment with cyber measures the PRC’s onshore energy distribution infrastructure. We need, with cyber measures, to isolate the PRC government from the PLA, and we need fragment the PRC government, preventing the several branches from talking to each other electronically.

And one more major improvement.

New battleships for the US Navy will “help maintain American military supremacy, revive the American shipbuilding industry, and inspire fear in America’s enemies all over the world,” Mr Trump said Monday. “We’re going to start with two” ships and “quickly morph into 10,” he said, with lasers, guns, missiles, and more.

We need all those things, but we need them now, not in 10 or 15 years. We need to get rid of the development and acquisition bureaucracy that infests DoD and replace it with personnel and procedures that streamline the process and get systems from the drawing board into production much faster than that. In conjunction, design and mission creep must be put to an end, with both frozen early rather than being allowed to continue past laying down keels.

2027 is two years off, and that’s when PRC President Xi Jinping intends to begin his war of conquest against the Republic of China, and in support of that, that’s when he will have the PLA attack our Navy. Nor will his attack be limited to that. His announced goal is to dominate us, and the PLA’s doctrine is total war across the entire spectrum. This has been clear for more than 20 years, since publication of Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui’s Unrestricted Warfare, China’s Master Plan to Destroy America in 2002.

Time’s a-wasting, and our freedom, every bit as much as the RoC’s, is in the wind since what we have in being is not much deterrence.

A Few Thoughts on Trump’s Partial Blockade

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President Donald Trump (R) has been increasing the US navy’s presence in the Caribbean Sea and near the coast of Venezuela. Within that, he’s declared a partial blockade against Venezuela, barring sanctioned oil ships from entering or leaving Venezuelan ports, and he has seized a couple of sanctioned oil tankers in Caribbean international waters. Sanctioned oil tankers carry some 70% of Venezuela’s crude oil.

Trump has made no bones about wanting, directly, some of Venezuela’s oil. It was stolen, and he wants it back, he says. He’s referring to the oil production and refining facilities that Hugo Chavez had seized in the years before Maduro took power.

There are two other factors in play, though, that I’ve not seen talked about. One is that Trump’s partial blockade also denies, I think by intent, Venezuelan oil to the People’s Republic of China. In 2024, the PRC imported a bit over $1 billion of oil from Venezuela, which amounted to a skosh under two-thirds of the PRC’s total imports from Venezuela. That’s chump change from the PRC’s perspective, even as it pushes the PRC a little bit more toward needing Russian and Iranian (sanctioned) oil. That brings me, though, to my other thought.

That other is that the moves deny Venezuela’s ability market its oil nearly entirely. Blocking sanctioned oil tankers would deny Venezuela the ability to sell those 70% of its oil exports. In 2025, before the sanctioned oil shipping blockade, Venezuela exported 900,000 barrels per day. If the partial blockade continues, it’ll reduce that oil export to 270,000 barrels per day. That’s a revenue drop, taking the market price as an outer bound on the price Venezuela can get for its shipping-sanctioned oil—$56.52/bbl for West Texas Intermediate Crude as of 19 December—from $54.8 million to $15.3 million.

And these, also, two side effects of the military buildup near Venezuela’s coast. One is Maduro has suddenly stopped gradually building his military presence in eastern Venezuela and threatening to invade Guyana with a view to seizing that nation’s oil fields.

The other is the potential for a cutoff of oil to Cuba, threatening that nation’s ability to function at all. In 2025, Cuba’s two largest sources of imported oil and fuel (Cuba imports more oil than it produces for itself) were Mexico, at 5,000 barrels per day and Venezuela at 27,400 barrels per day. That’s out of a total of 45,400 bpd that Cuba imports. That’s against Cuba’s domestic oil production of 40,000 bpd and the 120,000 bpd that the nation needs to meet demand.

Right Idea, Wrong Plan

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Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, German Marshall Fund of the US President, says three things must occur in order to redress Europe’s defense situation, a situation which I believe currently threatens its ability to survive a war as a collection of sovereign, independent nations. Some of these steps apply to us, and we are also, I believe, in the same war-losing peril of our own sovereignty and independence.

First, Europe must rearm, and fast.

Indeed. But even today, I see little stomach for that in too many of the continent’s nations critical to the continent’s survival against a Russian attack. Both France and Germany are in financial crisis and are showing no political will to correct that. The UK is even worse off; its political management doesn’t even seem aware of the depth of its failure. Until they do gain the awareness and the will to act—and then act—they’ll be unable to be serious about rearming, much less hardening their digital and material (water, fuel, and heating distribution) infrastructure against cyber attacks. Only those nations still fresh from the Russian boots on their necks—Poland, the Baltics, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova—remember what that life was like. Poland and the Baltics are serious about rearming, but they’re smaller even than Ukraine compared to the barbarian’s hordes and equipage. And they have a knife poised at their back in the form of Hungary, which is busily toadying up to Russia in its own effort to mitigate the consequences of being conquered again. Rearming is necessary, but it doesn’t seem promising, much less occurring any time soon.

Second, defense innovation must become a shared transatlantic mission. Neither side of the Atlantic can out-innovate geopolitical rivals alone.

De Hoop Scheffer fleshed this one out a bit; however, she’s mistaken in her proposed execution.

The US leads in emerging technologies, but Europe brings industrial capacity and advanced manufacturing. Joint work on protecting critical infrastructure, countering hybrid threats, and developing secure telecommunications and next-generation defense technologies must continue regardless of political noise.

Yes, and no. The US certainly can out-innovate our enemies alone. That’s how we ran the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics out of existence. We can—and we must—do so again, for all that we’re facing an aggressive Russia and an innovative People’s Republic of China. Our economic players’ freedom to innovate as they see fit gives them, and us as a nation, much more flexibility, and the ability to profit from their innovations, gives them much more incentive to innovate and to run the risks necessary for innovation than can any centrally planned process.

We need, though, to do our own manufacturing. Europe can never be an arsenal of democracy, especially with respect to modern weapons and cyber and space threats. Additionally, the industrial powerhouse of Europe, Germany, is not that anymore. Their industrial capacity is shrinking, and it’s becoming ever more expensive and unreliable as the German government insists on unreliable and expensive “renewable” energy sources while disdaining cheap, reliable oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy sources.

Aside from that, we’re too likely to have to fight two or three wars simultaneously; we need our own manufacturing capacity to meet those equipment expenditure needs.

That doesn’t mean we should not share innovations with our friends and allies; of course, we should and they should with us. Accumulating best practices speeds innovation. We just need to guard against becoming dependent on others. Our dependence on the PRC for far too many items critical to our economy, our health, and our defense capability demonstrates the destructive folly of that. Friends and allies may be less likely to cut us off at critical moments, but that’s a non-zero proposition. See, for instance, an earlier France kicking our military out of that nation. See the German bureaucracy getting in the way of serious training exercises, including joint exercises.

Nor does that mean we shouldn’t buy European manufactures, also. We just can’t be dependent on them. Aside from the continent’s incapacity, two world wars showed vulnerability of US weapons flowing to Europe. That threat applies to the flow of manufactures from Europe to us in the event of another shooting war.

Third, Washington and European capitals must accept that their alignment is no longer automatic.

This is especially true given that fully a third of the European NATO members continue to welch on their financial and equipment obligations to NATO (and in so doing betray the other members of NATO) and continue to freeload off American money and our promise of American blood in defense of NATO Europe, legitimate members and scofflaws alike.

They need to build flexible coalitions outside the usual trans-Atlantic circle based on shared benefits, not only historical ties.

This is especially true for us. We need to stand up a new mutual defense arrangement that incudes the nations of the Three Seas Initiative, us, and the UK; although the latter’s inclusion should depend on its getting its fiscal house in order and then plussing up its defense establishment to something firmer than a secondary school football team. Absent both of those, the UK would be a net drain and so should not be considered.

Convenient Misunderstanding

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The Trump administration is pressing its campaign in international waters against those entities smuggling deadly drugs into the United States. The Left and too many politicians, the latter from both parties, claim worry about the rights of these smugglers. Others criticize the tactics being used against them.

Critics say the alleged criminals aren’t in an armed conflict with the US, making strikes on them illegal and a possible war crime.

This is a denial flowing from a convenient misunderstanding of the facts of the matter. Last February, the State Department made no bones about who and what these…smugglers…are.

Today, the Department of State announces the designation of Tren de Aragua (TdA), Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Cártel de Sinaloa, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), Cártel del Noreste (CDN), La Nueva Familia Michoacana (LNFM), Cártel de Golfo (CDG), and Cárteles Unidos (CU) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).

Of course these smugglers, these terrorists, are in armed conflict with the United States; that’s what terrorists do vis-à-vis the nations they target. Heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, today’s marijuana carefully bred to drastically increase its potency—all of these are smuggled in with two purposes: make money for the terrorists and hook our population on them to the detriment of our people’s ability to function.

Those are chicken feed attempts, though, and by themselves devastate thousands of lives but present no serious threat to our population as a whole or to our national security. However, that’s not all the terrorists are smuggling in. The terrorists are busily smuggling fentanyl into our nation in truly alarming, security-threatening amounts. In 2024 alone, government agents seized 23,256 kilograms of fentanyl. With a single kilogram being enough to kill 500,000 Americans, that would have been enough to kill more than 11.6 billion Americans—34 times our population.

Wars aren’t fought exclusively with guns and bombs. They’re also fought cybernetically…and with drugs designed to poison whole populations. Fentanyl smuggling, much more than the petty smuggling of those other drugs, is a direct attack on our nation, and these smugglers are soldiers in that war. Keep in mind, too, that the terrorist organizations managing this war assemble the fentanyl that their soldiers smuggle from constituent precursors they import from one of our enemy nations: the People’s Republic of China. The PRC is actively aiding and abetting this attack.

It is no war crime for us to defend ourselves in this war, and killing the enemy soldiers is entirely justified, right along with destroying the weapons themselves. It’s also safer for us to do this on the high seas than waiting for the weapons to enter our nation. The seizures outlined above are only a fraction, if apparently a major fraction given the fentanyl-related deaths actually occurring, of the weapons smuggled in. Like any other weapon of mass destruction, though, it would only take a very few successful mass smugglings to cause vast, national-security threatening damage.

An Empty Promise?

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Supposedly, the US has offered a security guarantee to Ukraine in the form of support[ing] European security guarantees and seek[ing] Senate backing for Washington’s promised role as a means of breaking the current peace talks impasse.

This supposed guarantee

would include monitoring, verification, and deconfliction, the officials said, and would lay out the role the US would play if Russia breached a peace deal and came back to attack Ukraine. They would also include the provision of weapons to deter a Russian force.

Yeah, sure. “Monitoring:” we see you, Russia, resuming your invasion, we’re watching the hell out of you. “Verification:” Yup, Russia really is resuming its invasion. “Deconfliction:” What does this mean? European forces entering Ukraine to fight the barbarian alongside Ukrainian forces? Traffic control to deconflict traffic jams on Ukrainian roads for Ukrainian forces and civilians moving in the other direction? Something else?

“Provision of weapons for deterrence:” This is risible. Europe already is refusing to provide the weapons the UA needs, in the numbers it needs them, or on the schedule it says it needs them. Excuses range from fear of provoking the barbarian to insisting the UA doesn’t really need them like that to claims they don’t have the weapons to provide the UA, having drawn down their armories already with transfers. That last, given Europe’s disdain for any thing military, at least has a measure of plausibility.

The supposed guarantee also purports to include

legally-binding commitments to come to Ukraine’s aid in the event of a Russian attack.

What is the timeline for implementation of a related peace agreement? Would the agreement go into effect before or after “Senate support” had been secured? If after, what support for Ukraine’s continued fight for its survival would be in the offing pending that Senate agreement? If before, how would Ukraine recover or be aided in recovering, from the barbarian’s virtually guaranteed violation of the terms? What would be the Or Else should the barbarian violate the agreement—more monitoring, verification, and…”deconfliction?” All the nations’ governments—including, shamefully, our own—have already been slinking away, their tails covering their crown jewels, from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nattering on about nuclear weapons.

However sincerely offered, this seems like an empty promise. There’s no guarantee that the Senate, with its two-thirds majority treaty ratification requirement, would support such a thing. A simple Senate majority-voted resolution of support would be meaningless, legally, politically, and morally. Nor is there any guarantee that an alternate path to securing support—bills passed in both the House and Senate, which would require only majority votes (after a 60-vote cloture success in the Senate)—would succeed.

There’s this bit, too, that overhangs any security “guarantee” that might be offered Ukraine. Three of the participants in the Budapest Memorandum—the US, the UK, and France via its separate individual assurance—already have betrayed Ukraine by dishonoring the security and territorial integrity guarantees contained in that document. The Memorandum also was a legally binding commitment.