It’s Really Pretty Straightforward

The House Select Committee on China has laid out the breadth and complexity of the People’s Republic of China’s cornering of the rare earth production, refining, and manufacturing markets. The report allegedly

provides a roadmap on how the US can stop—or at least slow—the effort by its biggest global economic competitor to prevent the US from breaking into the market.

A road map? It’s really quite straightforward, if politically difficult.

The US has vast supplies of rare earths within our own borders. Canada, who would be better for us (and themselves) as a trading partner than as a State, has similarly vast supplies. We’ve just concluded a trade deal with Australia to export rare earth to us from its vast supplies. African nations have similarly vast supplies, although doing deals there would have more value in denying those earths to the PRC than in getting exports to us, vast as that value would be.

What’s needed, and this is the straightforward but politically difficult part—though the difficulty lies in timid politicians not those determined to do what’s best for our nation—is getting regulations, environmentistas, and climatistas out of the way of each of the mining, processing, and manufacturing phases of getting to the products of rare earths: primarily, but not exclusively, magnets and chips.

The report recommends a variety of market-manipulating measures, and those might be near-term effective, but the problems with government market interventions center on two things: the “government” part, and government interventions are open-ended; they don’t die. The best way for our government to manipulate our economy, our market, is to get out and stay out of the way.

And there’s be nothing at all that the PRC could do to stop us from doing any of that.

Be Still, my Heart

Visa and Mastercard, two of the largest credit card issuers, may be reaching a deal with merchants over fees charged merchants. This could settle a dispute that’s gone on for two decades.

Under terms being discussed, Visa and Mastercard would lower credit-card interchange fees, which are often between 2% and 2.5%, by an average of around 0.1 percentage point over several years[.]

A whole tenth of a percentage point. That miniscule fraction adds up, some, over many years, for the card issuers, but it does nothing for the individual merchant—or the merchant chain.

To put that magnanimity in perspective, imagine an investor—one of those merchants, perhaps—investing in an instrument that grows at 0.1% per year.

Were he to start with a $10,000 investment, after 10 years, his pile will have grown to $10,100.451.001. After 20 years, the duration of the current dispute, he would have a $10,201.91 golden egg.

Be still, my heart. With friends like this in the merchants’ world, I’ll continue to do business, as much as possible and especially with local mom-and-pops, in cash, which lets the merchant keep all of the money I’m paying for his good or service.

Some Thoughts on Tariffs

The Wall Street Journal‘s editors have twisted their panties on tariffs, again, this time showing their lack of understanding of tariff rebates to us low- and middle-income American citizens (in addition to their lack of understanding of tariffs as foreign policy tools. That President Donald Trump (R) has muddled that use is not an excuse for the editors’ failure).

Begin with a couple of things the editors have elided.

President Donald Trump (R) early on said tariffs would let him reduce income taxes—something the editors completed ignored in their present missive. Trump wants to give a $2,000 tariff rebate to us American citizens. While this isn’t a direct reduction of our income taxes, it certainly offsets that much of each of our income tax bills. As a first step in reducing income taxes, it’s not bad.

Then there’s this:

In arguing [before the Supreme Court] that tariffs aren’t really taxes and are mainly a tool of foreign policy, Mr Sauer said “these tariffs, these policies, it is clear that these policies are most effective if nobody ever pays the tariff. If it never raises a dime of revenue, these are the most effective use of these—of this particular policy.”

Sauer went on to say that these foreign policy tariffs do, in fact, generate revenue, but that’s deeply secondary to their purpose, which is to persuade the tariffed nation to change its ways. The editors acknowledged that in an earlier editorial, though only by deeply burying it near the end of that piece. This time, the editors completed elided it.

Then there’s this bit of illogic, even as the editors deride the Trump administration’s logic.

If tariffs are most effective if no one ever pays them [as Sauer also argued], then how are they going to raise the revenue Mr Trump needs to pay those rebates?

Here the editors are exposing the fantasy of their world. “No one” ever pays tariffs because they work perfectly, nations are persuaded, and Hallelujah. No. The world isn’t an ideal place, no foreign policy measure ever works perfectly, friction occurs, and nations adapt according to their own imperatives. Foreign policy tariffs will still raise revenue, even as they do move nations to change, if not completely so, in desired directions.

Finally, this bit of editorial foolishness.

This is a teaching moment for a high school logic class. Start with the contradiction that Mr Trump can both pay a tariff rebate and pay down the national debt. The annual federal budget deficit is roughly $1.8 trillion even with tariff revenue, so paying a rebate would add to the national debt, not reduce it.

Start with the derision of Trump both paying a tariff rebate and paying down the national debt. Of course, both can be done. The rebate won’t, of necessity, absorb all of the current tariff revenue raised, and there’s no reason to expect it to do so in the future. Tariff revenue easily can be committed to, and split between, both goals.

And this: paying a rebate would add to the debt? The editors announce this as received wisdom, declining to provide any facts or logic to support their announcement. That’s because they cannot. The debt arises from spending more of individual and business taxpayer money than the government receives in individual and business taxpayer money. Tariff money is outside of that path. Even if foreign policy tariff revenue were taxes, their expenditure is outside the citizen and business tax revenues the government receives, and spending that revenue adds nothing to our national debt, even if all of the foreign policy tariff revenue were committed to rebates.

And this, straight from the horse’s mouth (which postdates the editors’ missive):

All money left over from the $2000 payments made to low and middle income USA Citizens, from the massive Tariff Income pouring into our Country from foreign countries, which will be substantial, will be used to SUBSTANTIALLY PAY DOWN NATIONAL DEBT. Thank you for your attention to this matter! President DJT

Interesting Idea

This one from President Donald Trump (R), who has one on occasion.

I am recommending to Senate Republicans that the Hundreds of Billions of Dollars currently being sent to money sucking Insurance Companies in order to save the bad Healthcare provided by ObamaCare, BE SENT DIRECTLY TO THE PEOPLE SO THAT THEY CAN PURCHASE THEIR OWN, MUCH BETTER, HEALTHCARE, and have money left over[.]

The idea wants study to identify any hidden implications, good or bad. It also wants a couple of criteria attached. One is a means test for eligibility for the payments. The Federal Poverty Guidelines do a good job of locating the threshold for poverty. Anyone or any family with income above the poverty guideline is, by definition, not living in poverty, and so should be ineligible.

The other criterion is a sunset clause. The subsidies, even as direct payments to the individuals, should have a hard expiration date beyond which they end, irrevocably (or as nearly so as a Congress can make a statute, which frankly isn’t much). The duration of the payments should be only long enough to allow the individual and family make their own budgetary adjustments, plus what might be called an engineering slop cushion—perhaps six months.

All in all, though, this is a good initial consideration.

Well, Yeah

David Malpais, Treasury Undersecretary during Trump I’s first two years, has misunderstood what the Federal Reserve Bank must do. He undergirded his misunderstanding with this:

…the Fed’s demand-side model treats economic and job growth as inflation risks and prescribes higher interest rates.

Well, yeah. Economic growth in demand, without a parallel growth in economic supply is inflationary, and job growth increases business’ costs and so applies upward pressure on prices businesses must charge.

The correct answer for the Fed, given its dual mandate of price stability and full employment, is not just to stop reducing its benchmark interest rates—they’re too low already—but to raise them a quarter point to the level (4.75%-5%) historically consistent with its price stability goal of 2% inflation. Then the Fed should sit down and let the market fluctuate interest rates and let the inflation rate bounce around those 2%. A free market, in an environment of reduced regulatory constraints (over-regulation being one of President Donald Trump’s (R) bugaboos) will easily correct on its own, both those market interest rates and that inflation rate. That will allow the market to flourish, and that, in turn, will produce full employment.

Artificially suppressing interest rates is far more inflationary than are stable rates in the 4.75%-5% range. Lowering the cost of money artificially, rather than letting market forces deal with that, only stimulates demand without stimulating production (which by the nature of the two, strongly lags changes in demand), and that’s directly inflationary; it’s the textbook basic cause of inflation.