Mistaken Emphasis

A letter-writer from the Hudson Institute in The Wall Street Journal‘s Monday Letters section tried to make a case for Europe’s ability to defend itself against a Russian invasion based on Ukraine’s capability.

Despite Russian air superiority and numerical advantages, Ukrainian forces and local volunteers slowed, halted, and ultimately rolled back Russia’s assault on the capital. They did so because they were fighting for national survival, and, in many cases, defending their homes and families as the Russians advanced.

They did so, also, because Ukrainians, individually and as a population, didn’t hesitate to enter a stout defense–The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride. As the letter-writer misconstrued the wargame exercise, Germany did hesitate in the wargame, with fatal effects on the attempted defense against the Russian invasion.

Furthermore, that part about fighting for national survival as well as defending individuals’ homes and families does not obtain in Germany or France. Far too many of those nations’ citizens—including their younger generations and members (of all ages) of their major political parties—would rather not fight even to defend their nation.

Next, much of the reason Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine failed, despite apparent superiority in numbers and equipment, was its mistaken assumption that the invasion would be a walkover. Russia has learned the lesson of that failure, and it won’t underestimate the level of resistance capability of its next target, whether Germany’s and France’s reluctant citizens or the Baltics’ and Poland’s willing but small populations.

And this: the runup to WWI in the aftermath of an Archduke’s assassination was one of a race to mobilize and to achieve a mobilization level conducive to successful attack vs a level conducive to deterrence or to defeat of an attack. In that race, both sides proceeded from substantially equal baselines of military capability and mobilization ability. In the realization, the race ended in a substantial tie, and the German invasion of France, after initial gains of the sort that nearly always accrue to the first aggressor, was brought to a standstill.

That substantial mobilization capability equality does not obtain in today’s Europe.

Russia already has combat-hardened (even if of uncertain quality) troops, a war materiel production capacity already in place and growing, and force buildups occurring, low-key, in Belorussia and in Kaliningrad. The Baltic States and Poland, stipulate arguendo, have similar per capita capacities, but they’re already maxed out due to their small populations and limited, even operating at maximum output, industrial capacity. Behind those front line nations, though, Germany has no serious troop establishment and it cannot even field a combat-ready brigade of armor. Its industrial capacity is not capable of producing materiel in war deterring, much less fighting, much less at mobilizing rates before 2030. Italy and France are little better off.

In a mobilization race today, Russia wins. And that, coupled with the incapacity for defense that even the most dedicated nations have, means Russia wins the war, too.

What He Said

Senator Tom Cotton (R, AR), wrote of the need for modernizing and expanding our nuclear weapons capability across three dimensions: numbers of warheads and systems to deliver them, the quality of those warheads and systems, and the range of threat—tactical, theater, and strategic—against which those warheads and systems are optimized.

He closed his piece, though, with the most important Statement of Need of his piece:

[T]o those who fear an arms race: The race has already begun. Russia and China have been running it for more than a decade while we sat on the sidelines. The question isn’t whether there will be competition in nuclear forces, but whether America will show up to compete.

To which I add: if we don’t compete, we cannot compete successfully. If we cannot compete successfully, we will find ourselves very quickly faced with nuclear blackmail or a nuclear war that we will certainly lose. In either of those cases, we will see ourselves completely subjugated to our enemies.

A Couple of Regulatory Environments

These need to be dealt with along with the EPA’s effort to deregulate energy production. “These” are the FAA’s regulation of rocket launches—the conservative right blames the FAA’s climate impact concerns, but those are not the only ones—and the FCC’s regulation of satellite deployment. Here, Progressive-Democrats are letting their hatred of all things Evil Rich get in the way of intelligent decision making.

The Federal Aviation Administration separately evaluates the environmental impact of rocket launches in the US, which has in the past delayed satellite launches.

And

Maria Cantwell objected because the bill [that would streamline and accelerate FCC satellite approvals] would help Mr Musk’s AI space ambition.

As The Wall Street Journal‘s editors closed their piece,

Permitting difficulties are America’s economic Achilles’ heel. Let’s hope they don’t get in the way of US space innovation.

Time to Be Draconian

DoD is beginning a period of ostensibly serious performance review of the department’s several contractors.

Michael Duffey, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment:

We have completed initial reviews to assess company performance as part of this executive order and will now undergo an extended period of review in which we will make noncompliance determinations[.]
Following the upcoming decision period, we will be in touch with identified companies to begin remediation plans[.]

And this from Sean Parnell, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs:

If progress doesn’t continue to be made, we will take enforcement actions. The Department of War will partner with those who perform—and hold accountable those who do not.

This has been a long time coming, assuming it’ll truly be a serious assessment with truly serious outcomes. If DoD is serious, then included high on that list of remediation plans should be cancelation of contracts. If the contractor has been noncomplying for some period of time, the cancelation and subsequent opportunity costs will be limited to the scofflaw business; there would be no loss to DoD from the contractor management team’s decision to fail to perform, and the losses to us taxpayers would be capped at what’s already been wasted on the scofflaws.

Remediation progress should be assessed on short time frames with closely spaced major milestones and a firm, nearby deadline for finally coming into full compliance. That compliance measure also should include concrete, measurable plans for staying in compliance and blocking drift away from requirements.

Shirking and throwing the contractor’s metaphorical shoes up on the desk, calling it job well done, and collecting us taxpayers’ money must be at an end. The only way to promote that is to be draconian in the department’s corrective actions. Pour encouragement des autres. Or, to fit today’s environment, il est bon de résilier un contrat avec un prestataire de temps en temps pour encourager les autres.

Sending a Message, Or…?

House Intelligence Committee Chairman Rick Crawford (R, AR) is worried about a proliferation of People’s Republic of China hidden biolabs throughout the US. One of his points of concern regarded the apparent occasionally sloppy setup and operation of the labs.

“Why would you have some illicit labs set up in an Airbnb, except for, maybe, you’re trying to create some sort of, you know, patient zero scenario, that you might infect someone, that you might create another COVID-like scenario.”
Crawford said the alleged handling of dangerous pathogens appeared careless at best, and possibly deliberate. “Why would you do it in such a slipshod way, if it wasn’t almost deliberately to try to maybe attract attention? Are they trying to send a message to us?”

Sending us a message about how easy it is for the PRC to reach out and infectiously touch us is certainly one possibility.

Another possibility, though, is that these are the biolabs we were supposed to find and to be distracted from noticing the other, more serious biolabs with the more serious and disruptive, if not lethal, pathogens.