Category Archives: defense policy

Tradeoffs

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We, as a nation, have three questions that we must answer in order to proceed optimally into the future, according to Matthew Slaughter, of Dartmouth‘s Tuck School of Business, and David Wessel, of Brookings‘ Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy. They’re largely correct, but they miss one Critical Item without which our path into a prosperous and growing future would be severely constrained, if not blocked altogether.

In their question regarding “walls or bridges,” the two argue against walls—tariffs—and for trade globalization as the path to prosperity via competition and its heavily encouraged innovation rates that such free trade creates.

[R]esearch has long shown that globally engaged companies tend to create the good jobs at good wages for which so many Americans are yearning. In 2023, the US parent companies of US-based multinational companies paid their 29.9 million workers in America an average total compensation of $97,078—about 20% above the average in the rest of the private sector.

They didn’t address, though, the downside of their largely unfettered free trade regime. That downside was amply illustrated by the recent Wuhan Virus situation, during which our dependence on the People’s Republic of China’s medicines—and not just for Virus medical supplies, but also for over the counter pain killers and anti-inflammatories, even a variety of flu medicines—was exposed, along with the world’s dependence on the PRC even for simple things like face masks.

The downside was graphically demonstrated much more recently by the PRC’s control over rare earths, from ore through processed rare earths to finished products, and its use of that control to throttle their export and thereby threaten our economy and that of Japan’s.

The Critical Item is this tradeoff. Carry out free trade globalization; it is valuable, but do it within this framework. There are a few items that are critical to our national security and to our economy (there is a lot of overlap between them): those rare earths, the raw materials for medicines. For these, we need to have our own supply paths, wholly contained within our borders, that stretch from dirt in the ground through final product deliverable to the domestic end user. These nationally-contained supply lines need not be the only sources for these materials; it’d be sufficient for them to be in place, actively used, and able to be rapidly expanded during periods when overseas sources become constrained.

That tradeoff will be expensive, but that cost is simply—and necessarily—a cost of maintaining our national security, our ability to defend ourselves, whether militarily or economically. The cost of being unable to will be far greater, and not only fiscally.

Sitzkrieg

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As President Donald Trump (R) seeks a deal with the terrorists reigning over Iran, two primary problems continue: the need to foreclose altogether the terrorists’ ability to acquire, even to do research and production of preliminary materials for, nuclear weapons, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz without constraint—viz., tolls,  “protection” fees, etc, any semblance of Iranian control over this international water—and those terrorists’ insistence that Iran should be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and should have control of the Strait.

In pursuit of that deal, Trump and Iran’s thugs agreed and have largely maintained a ceasefire for these last five weeks, to allow space for negotiations to proceed. During this time, all the terrorists have done is repeat their demands in varying terms: they will continue their drive to acquire nuclear weapons and they will continue to control the Strait and charge their tolls and protection vig. Oh, and they will have all sanctions lifted and frozen accounts unfrozen.

Those reigning over Iran are continuing to demonstrate their bad faith and their decision to not negotiate in any serious manner. The terrorists are, in Trump’s own phrase, just tapping us along.

It’s time to put an end to this sitzkrieg. It’s time to begin reducing to rubble the terrorists’ ability to move oil and natural gas from their wells to their refineries and ports by breaking the pipelines at the wells, destroying those refineries, and closing those ports while destroying the pipelines, roads, and railroads entering them. It’s time to eliminate the factories that produce war materiel and civilian/military dual use materiel and to destroy those factories’ input sources and routes. The terrorists’ missile and drone stockpiles, launching facilities, and production ability must be eliminated. The terrorists’ mosquito fleet of small boats must be sunk, and the naval and naval-usable ports must be destroyed. The assault must continue apace and without letup until the terrorists are physically incapable of continuing or have agreed terms.

If the terrorists decide to engage in serious negotiations, they must send decision-makers, not intermediaries, to the table. Safe passage can be granted to these persons while the attacks on the terrorists’ war-making and shipping-threatening capabilities continue apace.

An Additional Reason

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The Wall Street Journal‘s editors took notice of President Donald Trump’s (R) waiver of the Jones Act, which mandates sea shipments of goods between American ports be done by American-built, -owned, and -crewed ships. The waiver has been a resounding success during the disruptions of the Iran war and Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. From this, the editors suggested that

if the Trump Administration thinks its waiver is helping oil supply during the Hormuz crisis, why not make that success permanent by repealing the Jones Act?

That’s an excellent suggestion, and it’s bolstered by a much more cogent rationale, as well, peripherally touched on by the editors. The purpose of the Jones Act when it was enacted was to stimulate American shipbuilding. It’s only necessary to observe Trump’s lately effort to push a hard acceleration in building dual use cargo ships to both expand our commercial shipping fleet in competition with the People’s Republic of China’s burgeoning commercial fleets and to facilitate the Navy’s ability to move supplies, equipment, and reinforcements around the world into combat areas. In all those years since this law was passed, there has been zero growth in our shipbuilding capability.

It’s past time to rescind the Jones Act.

Removing American Troops from Germany

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President Donald Trump (R) has said that he’s going to withdraw 5,000 American soldiers from Germany and that he’s contemplating withdrawing many more. Those many more include, potentially, troops stationed in Spain and Italy. Progressive-Democrats and too many Republicans are upset over the move, but they’re both premature and too narrow in their focus.

The withdrawal itself is no big deal from a US security perspective. What matters is where Trump puts the troops he’s going to withdraw. It would be a net gain in security for us and for (eastern) Europe were those troops taken out of Germany (and Spain and Italy) redeployed into Poland and the Baltic States. Other useful redeployment locaitons would include Slovakia, Hungary, or (back into) Romania, even Moldova.

On the other hand, pulling them back to the US would be a serious mistake.

That’s the Point of the Escort

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The DC Circuit court has upheld Pentagon press reporter escort restrictions inside the Pentagon while the underlying case works its way through the judicial system.

Judge J Michelle Childs dissented, and in her dissent, she demonstrated her lack of understanding of the problem:

Reporters can hardly verify sources, gather information, or speak candidly with Department personnel with an escort looming over their shoulders.

Nor should those Department personnel be able to speak “candidly.” They’re possessed of too much classified information, and that information is classified for very good reasons. Passing that information to reporters, whether deliberately or accidentally, would do damage to our national security, potentially very severe damage.

Aside from that, we—and she—have no reason to believe the reporters are verifying any sources, since those reporters refuse to identify any of them.

These personnel have no business talking to reporters inside the Pentagon, anyway; they should be referring the reporter to the relevant Public Affairs Officer, who is well-trained in answering reporters’ questions as candidly as classification limits allow, as well as obfuscating and weasel-wording in response to a reporter’s obvious gotcha and trolling questions.