Category Archives: Courts

Another Federal Judge Gets It Right

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Disparate theory is the idea that racial discrimination occurs, even when there is no intent to discriminate. This “theory” eliminates the “discrimination” part of the behavior actually prohibited by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and it is the justification for a HUD rule written to allow a legal finding of discrimination if there is merely a statistical showing of disparity. This “theory” also disregards the fact that there are many factors in play with such disparity besides actual discrimination, things like financial qualifications, criminal history, and so on.

US District Judge Richard Leon has thrown the BS Flag on the concept in American Insurance Assoc v HUD. He also castigated the government for attempting to apply such a standard, and he decried Labor Secretary Tom Perez’ behavior related to the case. AIA is a case in which the insurer sued the government over that HUD rule, arguing that it was illegal as no such authority exists in the FHA to permit it.

A major part of Leon’s ruling centered on the distinction between “disparate treatment” and “disparate impact.” The former represents actual discrimination—the denial of this or mandate of that based solely on the color of a man’s skin, for instance. The latter is only an outcome—the result of a broad-based and broadly applied criterion, like financial qualifications—and an absence of discriminatory intent other than, e.g., those financial qualifications.

After leading the Federal government, as defendants in AIA, through a grade school use of the dictionary in defining the words the government used in its own briefs to justify the HUD rule, Leon pointed out that, not only did the text of the FHA not say what the government claimed it said—that disparate impact, in addition to treatment, was explicitly barred by the Act—Leon pointed out that the Act contains no language barring disparate impact and further that Congress knew how to do so, and so would have done so, had that been part of the Act’s goal [citations omitted]:

Put simply, Congress knows full well how to provide for disparate-impact liability, and has made its intent to do so known in the past by including clear effects-based language when it so chooses. The fact that this type of effects-based language appears nowhere in the text of the FHA is, to say the least, an insurmountable obstacle to the defendants’ position regarding the plain meaning of the Fair Housing Act.

Leon also was unimpressed with the Federal government’s behavior in attempting to keep disparate impact questions out of the courts altogether. In a footnote in his ruling, Leon said

…both Mount Holly and Magner were settled before the Court could decide the issue. The circumstances behind the Magner settlement, however, are particularly troubling. Indeed, a Congressional Joint Staff Report found that—in negotiating a quid pro quo deal that facilitated Magner’s settlement—then-Assistant Attorney General Thomas Perez “exert[ed] arbitrary authority” to settle the case and “placed ideology over objectivity and politics over the rule of law …. Rather than allowing the Supreme Court to freely and impartially adjudicate an appeal that the Court had affirmatively chosen to hear, [Perez] openly worked to get the appeal off of the Court’s docket.”

In his concluding remarks, Leon also wrote,

This is, yet another example of an Administrative Agency trying desperately to write into law that which Congress never intended to sanction. While doing so might have been more understandable—and less troubling—prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, in its aftermath it is nothing less than an artful misinterpretation of Congress’s intent….

This is a blow for freedom and for sound business sense in making decisions.

The opinion can be seen here.

In Which the IRS Gets Away with It

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Judge Reggie Walton, of the DC District Court, dismissed all counts brought by the conservative non-profit, True the Vote, against the IRS for the IRS’ harassment of the organization when it tried to register as a 501(c)(3). The IRS had, on receiving that application

IRS was subjecting [True the Vote founder Catherine Engelbrecht] to multiple rounds of abusive inquiries, with requests to provide every Facebook and Twitter entry I’d every posted, questions about my political aspirations, and demands to know the names of every group I’d ever made presentations to, the content of what I’d said, and where I intended to speak for the coming year.

Under the law defining a c3 organization, none of this information is relevant to the IRS’ application investigation. Indeed, Walton’s ruling explicitly makes no reference to the legitimacy of Engelbrecht’s charges.

Walton dismissed the counts because the IRS—eventually, but before this lawsuit was resolved—registered True the Vote as the c3 for which it had applied.

Unless an actual, ongoing controversy exists in this case, this Court is without power to decide it….

Because

The defendants’ grant of tax-exempt status to the plaintiff, and the defendants’ suspension of the alleged IRS targeting scheme during the tax-exempt application process, including remedial steps to address the alleged conduct, coupled with the reduced “concern about the recurrence of objectionable behavior” government actors….

Never mind that this is a purely voluntary “suspension,” subject to removal at IRS whim, conservative speech remains chilled, other attacks against other conservative entities remain (think Wisconsin), and so on. The present assault has stopped, so there’s nothing for a good judge to decide.

Let me see if my understanding of this is correct. If I stop beating my wife, wholly voluntarily and on my own initiative, I’m home free? My wife has no recourse? Never mind that I’ve only voluntarily suspended the beatings, never mind that my wife remains intimidated and vulnerable, I’ve got nothing to worry about from any court?

Walton’s ruling can be seen here.

A Number of Misunderstandings

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Los Angeles passed an ordinance requiring hotel operators to give up data in their guest registers to the police, even when they don’t have a warrant.

The ordinance, approved by the city in 2006, requires hotels to collect and maintain guest information such as name and address, the number of people in the guest’s party, vehicle information, arrival and checkout dates, room number, and method of payment. Hotel operators who fail to comply with it face as many as six months behind bars and a $1,000 fine.

A motel operator demurred, and at this point, the 9th Circuit agrees: they struck the ordinance as unconstitutional under the 4th Amendment.

There are a couple of fundamental misunderstandings, though. One is in the 9th‘s ruling, paraphrased by Joe Palazzolo at the above link:

[H]otels have an interest in keeping guest records private, even if the guests themselves have no such privacy rights because they willingly give their information to a third party.

Guests do have a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding “their information,” though. They’re not giving their information to “a” third party; they’re giving it to a particular third party as a necessary thing so that the particular third party can provide the contracted service. Moreover, much of the information that is given over is not necessary for the transaction to occur; it’s mandated by a different third party—a government entity, for the government’s convenience.

A second misunderstanding is in the argument offered by LA’s lawyers.

These laws expressly help police investigate crimes such as prostitution and gambling, capture dangerous fugitives and even authorize federal law enforcement to examine these registers, an authorization which can be vital in the immediate aftermath of a homeland terrorist attack[.]

Say that’s all true. Get a warrant. Time hardly seems of the essence in these hypotheticals, even with the apocalyptically offered “homeland terrorist attack:” the cops are unlikely to be near the hotel or motel when an attack goes in. If time really is of the essence, come armed with a warrant in the first place; they’re disappointingly easy to get.

A third misunderstanding is in Judge Richard Tallman’s dissent, again summarized by Palazzolo.

[T]he hoteliers challenging the ordinance failed to show that police were applying the statute in an unconstitutional way.

The hoteliers had no requirement to do so. The law must be constitutional in the first place; its application by the police is wholly irrelevant after its unconstitutionality is shown.

The matter now is before the Supreme Court, and we’ll learn later who’s right. Legally, anyway.

The Government and Privacy

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The government is continuing to misunderstand the import of the 4th Amendment’s stricture regarding searches, the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects and especially Warrants…particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized, and of the major purpose of our Constitution generally.

Even accepting things like Edward Snowden’s leaks and the NSA’s overbroad and non-particular descriptions of things for which to be “searched” in our cell phone metadata as being aberrations, the existence of the aberration demonstrates the fragility of government handling of that much searching capacity.

I wrote nearby about the FBI’s dangerous zeal in demanding that cell phone operating system software be made vulnerable to government-desired searches. Following is another demonstration of the government’s misunderstanding.

“This sort of encryption creates a virtual sanctuary for criminals who are very determined and smart,” warned Ron Hosko, the former head of the FBI’s criminal division….

So does the 2nd Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms give criminals who are very determined and smart access to tools for supporting their efforts. So does the 1st Amendment’s acknowledgment of a range of freedoms give criminals who are very determined and smart access to tools for supporting their efforts.

That’s a risk we members of our social compact have agreed to accept in order to have a government with the strength otherwise to protect and enforce those freedoms. We’ve done nothing to alter those terms of our compact—our Constitution—since then.

Our Constitution was written the way it was, in fact, to limit our government’s powers as far as we could and still leave it the necessary strength with which to effect those protections. The powers of our government are, by design, few and defined. Our Constitution was, in fact, written to restrain our government, and to carry out that restraint before our government could act, not to attempt to redress a situation after government has acted. This relationship between us compact members, us citizens, and our government, furthermore, is neither symmetrical nor reciprocal.

We restrain our government before the fact; it does not engage in prior restraint of us. Yet, this government demand for ready and broad, non-particular access to the contents of our communications—the contents of our private speech—through a third party and not through us is exactly that attempt by our government to priorly restrain us, if only through the chilling of our speech through government snooping with its implied threat of subsequent harassment. Think IRS. Think Federal whistleblower treatment.

This final thought:

“I don’t think the legislative branch or the judicial branch can sit idly by while destruction comes,” said Hosko….

Neither can We the People sit idly by while the destruction of our inalienable rights comes.

Privacy and the Government

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This time, as represented by the FBI.

The head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation urged Silicon Valley Thursday to reverse course on encrypting phone data, suggesting the pendulum on privacy issues “has swung too far” against the government in the wake of revelations by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden.

No. It hasn’t swung far enough, as too many judges’ attitudes illustrate.

FBI Director James Comey added,

We also need a legislative and regulatory fix.

Again, no. We have too many laws on the books already; the government, including the FBI, aren’t capable of enforcing those existing. And this elides the premise that the government has made illegal and has outright criminalized too many things. Beyond that, we have far too many regulations already, every one of them written by Federal agencies and Cabinet departments that are only tenuously accountable to us citizens.

And

Mr. Comey’s speech [at the Brookings Institution] was another indication of how far apart the two sides remain. He denied they wanted a back door, saying that using a warrant to gather evidence is the equivalent of walking through the front door.

Say that’s true about the current government. There’s no guarantee any future administration would be as restrained with those “legislative and regulatory” fixes. Just look at the out of control regulation writing that’s already been going on for an example of how a tool, originally restrained in its use, gets more and more abusively used over time.

Moreover, beyond individual security and privacy, there’s this national security question, raised by the ACLU’s Christopher Soghoian:

…weakening the security of systems to enable law enforcement access also makes them far more vulnerable to compromise by foreign governments and hackers. If anything, we should be doing more to secure our data.